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ABSTRACT
Midi, Daniele PhD, Purdue University, December 2016. Security Techniques for Sensor Systems and the Internet of Things. Major Professor: Elisa Bertino.
Sensor systems are becoming pervasive in many domains, and are recently being
generalized by the Internet of Things (IoT). This wide deployment, however, presents
significant security issues.
We develop security techniques for sensor systems and IoT, addressing all security
management phases. Prior to deployment, the nodes need to be hardened. We develop nesCheck, a novel approach that combines static analysis and dynamic checking
to efficiently enforce memory safety on TinyOS applications. As security guarantees
come at a cost, determining which resources to protect becomes important. Our solution, OptAll, leverages game-theoretic techniques to determine the optimal allocation
of security resources in IoT networks, taking into account fixed and variable costs,
criticality of different portions of the network, and risk metrics related to a specified
security goal.
Monitoring IoT devices and sensors during operation is necessary to detect incidents. We design Kalis, a knowledge-driven intrusion detection technique for IoT that
does not target a single protocol or application, and adapts the detection strategy to
the network features. As the scale of IoT makes the devices good targets for botnets,
we design Heimdall, a whitelist-based anomaly detection technique for detecting and
protecting against IoT-based denial of service attacks.
Once our monitoring tools detect an attack, determining its actual cause is crucial
to an effective reaction. We design a fine-grained analysis tool for sensor networks
that leverages resident packet parameters to determine whether a packet loss attack
is node- or link-related and, in the second case, locate the attack source. Moreover,

xiii
we design a statistical model for determining optimal system thresholds by exploiting
packet parameters variances.
With our techniques’ diagnosis information, we develop Kinesis, a security incident
response system for sensor networks designed to recover from attacks without significant interruption, dynamically selecting response actions while being lightweight in
communication and energy overhead.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the current data-driven world, sensors and sensor networks are becoming pervasive
in a large number of application domains. Their small size, low cost, and limited need
for resources are among the main factors of their widespread use. At home, smart
thermostats and intelligent refrigerators reduce energy consumption and increase user
comfort. In manufacturing, autonomous controllers operate and monitor complex
production pipelines. In agriculture, large-scale networks of small sensors collect
information about the environment and enable “precision” agriculture.
More recently, the notion of pervasive sensing and computing has been generalized
by the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT merges the benefits of smart embedded systems
with the power of connected Internet-based services, computation, and management.
Different categories of IoT devices are emerging, with capabilities ranging from automatic data acquisition, to control, to networking [1]. It is thus clear that in the near
future, as well as in the longer term, we will increasingly see a pervasive deployment
of different types of computing devices connected by different communication mechanisms. Mckinsey & Company estimates the economic impact of IoT by 2025 will
range from $2.7 to $6.2 trillion dollars [2]. In addition, Gartner 2015 forecast states
that by the year 2020 we will see 20.8 billion IoT devices installed [3].
However, with the widespread use of sensor systems and IoT, security must become a first-class citizen [4–7]. Most applications – e.g., mission-critical tasks, industrial control or medical monitoring – have stringent requirements with respect
to end-to-end system reliability, trustworthy data delivery, and service availability.
Sensor systems and IoT devices are often resource-constrained, communicate via an
unreliable wireless medium, operate in unattended environments, and usually lack
any tamper-proof packaging. These conditions make the network nodes vulnerable
to operational failures. Moreover, the insecure and vulnerable nature of sensor envi-
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ronments make them vulnerable to attacks that falsify context, modify access rights,
and, in general, disrupt the system operation [8]. Malicious attacks can have a wide
range of consequences, from the malfunctioning of smart city sensors and controllers,
to a hospital patient receiving the wrong treatment in a smart healthcare scenario.
Several attacks to embedded devices, sensor systems and IoT have been recently reported [9–12]. Successful remote hacks on critical life devices, such as insulin pumps
and pacemakers, by exploiting their insecure wireless communications [13] raise also
critical safety issues on the use of interconnected sensors and actuators. A recent
study by HP about the most popular devices in some of the most common IoT niches
revealed an alarmingly high average number of vulnerabilities per device [14]. On average, 25 vulnerabilities were found per device. For example, 80% of devices failed to
require passwords of sufficient complexity and length, 70% did not encrypt local and
world traffic communications, and 60% contained vulnerable user interfaces and/or
vulnerable firmware [14].
IoT networks can differ from each other for several aspects, such as topology,
mobility, size, degree of heterogeneity, location, communication modality, and so on.
However, they also have some common characteristics, namely the use of devices
with low computational power and low energy consumption. They are also prone to
physical attacks and eavesdropping, since they are often unattended and typically
communicate via wireless channels.
Our work, presented in this dissertation, aims at developing security techniques for
sensor systems and the IoT. It is important to note that even though security for IoT
is a much less mature area than security for sensor networks, many existing security
techniques developed for sensor networks can be directly applied to the more general
setting of IoT. However, other security techniques need significant extensions because
of the heterogeneity of communication mechanisms, platforms, configurations, and
specific security requirements, which opens an extremely wide attack surface, while
at the same time increases the difficulty of deploying all-encompassing security solutions. Moreover, unlike wireless sensor networks (WSNs), IoT devices are susceptible
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not only to attacks from other devices in the network, but also from more powerful
attackers from the untrusted Internet.
The design of our security techniques is based on a security lifecycle consisting of
four phases: Prepare and Prevent; Monitor and Detect; Diagnose and Understand;
React, Recover, and Fix. Each phase is addressed by our work with one or more
projects, and this dissertation presents the research results achieved in each of those
projects. We design all of our techniques to be able to work in concert, addressing the
different aspects of the security lifecycle of sensor systems and IoT, and our results
show that each one is effective in fulfilling its role in the overall security enforcement
scenario.

Thesis Statement. The intrinsic characteristics of the sensor and IoT domain
expand the attack surface of computer and communication systems. Existing security
techniques need to be analyzed, extended, and modified in order to efficiently and effectively achieve security across heterogeneous and constrained scenarios, throughout
all the four phases of hardening, monitoring, diagnosing, and recovering.

In the remainder of this introduction, we present the four identified security lifecycle phases and the approaches we developed to address them, as well as present
the overall vision of how all the techniques work together to achieve the end goal of
security for sensor systems and IoT.

1.1 Security Lifecycle Phases and Developed Techniques
Prepare and Prevent. The first step in securing a system consists of hardening the system itself before its deployment, as well as deploying measures to prevent
attacks. For both sensor systems and IoT, this includes leveraging techniques able
to protect the software installed on the devices from unintentional bugs and vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit. In Chapter 2, we present nesCheck [15], a
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novel approach that combines static analysis and dynamic checking in order to efficiently enforce memory safety on existing embedded software, without requiring any
source modification. nesCheck targets TinyOS, one of the most popular embedded
operating systems. We tailor our approach to leverage the peculiar characteristics of
sensor systems, which make existing memory safety solutions not suitable but which
offer interesting opportunities for new, highly efficient techniques. nesCheck analyzes the source code, identifies the conservative set of vulnerable pointer variables,
finds static memory bugs, and instruments the code with the appropriate dynamic
runtime checks. We implemented a prototype of nesCheck extending the existing
TinyOS compiler toolchain with custom tools built on the LLVM compiler suite. Extensive evaluation, on stress-intensive programs as well as standard TinyOS applications, proves that nesCheck effectively enforces memory protection, while minimizing
the number of dynamic runtime checks required and thus the performance impact.
nesCheck reduces the attack surface for malicious adversaries, as well as protects the
availability and integrity of the system from unintentional bugs. Therefore, it is a
fundamental building block in our security efforts for sensor systems and IoT, by also
protecting our other security software systems – discussed later in this dissertation
– from attackers. As compared to existing work [16–18], nesCheck is specifically designed for the constraints, challenges, and advantages of embedded devices, does not
require source code modifications or annotations, and leverages more extensive static
analysis techniques to conservatively minimize the performance overhead.
As an additional step when deploying security measures in a sensor and IoT network, deciding the best placement for the various security resources plays an important role. Different portions of the network and different devices have different
levels of importance in achieving the overall security goals. Protections such as that
offered by nesCheck come at a cost, and determining the optimal allocation plan for
security measures must take into account the available security resources and their
capabilities, their fixed cost, and runtime energy consumption, how critical different areas of the network are, as well as the risk associated with successful attacks
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on them. We design and implement OptAll [19], a game-theory-based method to
compute the optimal security resource allocation plan through a Pareto optimization
problem. We present OptAll in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Prior approaches in
this domain targeted homogeneous, traditional computing deployments [20, 21], or a
single specific attack [22–24], and are focused on improving performance [25]. To the
best of our knowledge, OptAll is the first work to address the problem of finding the
optimal security resource allocation plan for IoT networks, taking into account fixed
and variable costs, criticality, and risk. Our evaluation on several network topologies
– both grid-based and random – shows that OptAll is able to determine the most efficient and effective allocation plan for security resources with respect to any specified
security goal.

Monitor and Detect. During their operation, IoT devices and sensors must
be continuously monitored in order to detect anomalies, attacks, and operational
failures. While much research has been carried out in the last decade on Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSes), very few solutions are targeted to sensor systems and
IoT. These approaches have several drawbacks, such as requiring invasive software
modifications to the devices’ firmware, being limited to only a single device or group
of devices, not supporting interoperation, and delegating security to the individual
manufacturers [26–29]. Moreover, the simple adaptation of existing IDSes, designed
for traditional computing systems and networks, is not viable, since widely-adopted
approaches – such as full network scanning – are not viable for the IoT. Several
characteristics of IoT, however, can be leveraged to design an IDS well fit for this
domain. For example, while the communication protocols and mediums are very
heterogeneous, they are mostly standardized, enabling effective use of promiscuous
overhearing and watchdog-based mechanisms. Moreover, most devices and IoT network have specific features (e.g., single-hop vs. multi-hop topology, mobility, ...) that
can help in ruling out attacks, removing ambiguity, and improving detection accuracy.
We thus first investigate the relationships between IoT network features and related
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attacks, and then design and develop Kalis [30], a self-adapting, knowledge-driven
IDS for IoT able to detect attacks in real time across IoT systems running different communication protocols and with different security goals. Kalis autonomously
collects knowledge about the features of the monitored network, and leverages such
knowledge to dynamically configure the most effective set of detection techniques.
Chapter 4 of this dissertation presents this system. To the best of our knowledge,
Kalis is the first comprehensive approach to intrusion detection for IoT that does not
target an individual protocol or application, and adapts the detection strategy to the
specific network features.
While Kalis is able to defend against threats to the IoT network and its devices,
another challenging type of attack is represented by distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks via botnets. The large amount of IoT devices and sensors that are
expected to be deployed in the near future makes the IoT an ideal vector for DDoS
attacks via botnets. Chapter 5 of this dissertation presents our work on this topic.
We analyzed the actual attack power that small IoT devices have when used as part
of a botnet. Our results show that they have a very high potential for a DDoS attack.
We thus design and develop Heimdall [31], a whitelist-based anomaly detection technique tailored to IoT devices. Our technique operates on routers acting as gateways
and is effective in identifying and blocking DDoS attacks by IoT botnets. Existing
approaches target traditional computing networks rather than IoT systems, and leverage communication patterns [32] or artificial immune system-based techniques [33,34]
to determine normal behaviors. Heimdall explicitly targets IoT botnets, and its contributions include leveraging the IoT intrinsic characteristics to design simpler but
more accurate techniques to perform anomaly detection tasks.

Diagnose and Understand. In the security lifecycle, once an attack has been
detected, it is critical to perform a diagnosis of the attack to determine the actual
cause of the attack. Such diagnosis is crucial in order to properly respond to the
attack. Packet losses in sensor networks are a particularly relevant class of attacks
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and can be caused by either attacks affecting the nodes – e.g., selective forwarding
or blackhole attacks – or attacks focusing on the wireless links – the introduction of
interference in the wireless medium, when wireless networks are used for communication. Chapter 6 of this dissertation presents the design and implementation of our
fine-grained analysis (FGA) tool for WSNs [35], a fully distributed, event-driven solution that leverages resident packet parameters such as RSSI and LQI to determine
the most likely cause of a packet loss event and, in case of interference, even to accurately locate the source of jamming. Real-world testbed experiments show that our
FGA tool is effective in differentiating between the various attacks that may affect
nodes and links. Related approaches mostly focus on detecting packet losses rather
than the important topic of the cause of the loss [36–39]. Moreover, our FGA tool
relies on a smaller set of network parameters and focuses on differentiating node- and
link-related attacks rather than natural losses and malicious discardings [40, 41].
The accuracy of the FGA tool relies on the correct choice of some system parameters and thresholds, and empirically-determined values might not always be optimal.
Moreover, the choice of a single threshold value for the entire network, can be suitable
for some neighborhoods but not appropriate for others. Therefore, we designed an
approach that builds a statistical model for determining optimal system thresholds by
exploiting the variances of RSSI and LQI [42]. This statistical approach also has the
advantage of allowing an individual threshold for each link. In Chapter 7 we present
such a model, together with its validation through extensive MATLAB simulations
based on real sensor data, showing that our model is accurate and its system parameters lead to an optimally-accurate fine-grained analysis of the underlying causes of
packet losses.

React, Recover and Fix. The applications running on sensor systems and
IoT often impose stringent requirements on data reliability and service availability,
due to the deployment of sensor networks in various critical infrastructures. Given
the failure- and attack-prone nature of sensor networks, enabling them to continu-
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ously provide their services as well as to effectively recover from attacks is a crucial
requirement. The accurate diagnosis information provided by our previously introduced solutions allow one to undertake more effective response actions. Chapter 8
presents Kinesis [43], a security incident response system for WSNs designed to keep
the network functional despite anomalies or attacks and to recover from attacks without significant interruption. Kinesis is quick and effective in responding to incidents,
distributed in nature, dynamic in selecting response actions based on the context,
and lightweight in terms of response policy specification and communication and energy overhead. A per-node single timer-based distributed strategy to select the most
effective response executor in a neighborhood makes the system simple and scalable,
while achieving load balancing and redundant action optimization. The contributions
over related systems include a wide range of response actions that go beyond simply
rerouting data or isolating the misbehaving node [29, 44], no need for a centralized
node to manage reputations and choose response agents [45], and a lightweight architecture designed for constrained systems [46]. Extensive simulations and testbed
experiments show that Kinesis successfully counteracts anomalies/attacks and behaves consistently under various attack scenarios and rates.

1.2 Overall Functional Framework
With the integration of the techniques we developed, we envision an overall functional framework that provides security to sensor systems and IoT systems in concert
throughout all the four phases of security lifecycle (see Figure 1.1.)
The use of OptAll guides the initial phase of security planning. It provides an
optimal allocation plan for the provisioning of the other security techniques we developed. For a set of nodes in the network, the memory safety guarantees provided
by nesCheck is crucial in maintaining the network functional. Choosing strategically
which nodes to protect can guarantee an optimal trade-off between performance,
cost, and security. The deployment of Heimdall on the IoT gateway ensures that
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Figure 1.1. The overall functional framework integrating the techniques developed in this dissertation.

the local devices are more protected against enrollment in botnets, and prevents any
compromised local device from partaking in DDoS attacks towards remote targets.
The knowledge about these prevention and hardening mechanisms is an essential input information to Kalis, our IDS, and OptAll can once again guide the decision of
the exact locations in which to deploy the IDS nodes. Kalis continuously monitors
the network and collects dynamic knowledge about the features of the monitored
network and entities, always selecting the best set of detection techniques out of its
extensive library. Once an attack or anomaly has been detected, Kalis notifies Kinesis
to take the most appropriate response action(s) to react with respect to the overall
chosen security goal. In cases of ambiguity on the potential attack(s) detected, our
Fine-Grained Analysis tool can investigate further into the incident in order to allow a more informed decision by Kinesis on the response action to take. Since the
monitoring and reaction are continuous and in real-time, the security enforcement
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can maintain the network and its devices functional in face of subsequent security
incidents and disruptions.

11

2 NESCHECK: STATIC ANALYSIS AND DYNAMIC
INSTRUMENTATION FOR NESC MEMORY SAFETY
In the overall scenario of the security lifecycle we target, the first step towards protecting the deployment of a sensor system is that of hardening the system to shrink
the attack surface and prevent incidents. With the deployment of WSNs for sensitive,
real-time applications, availability and integrity are of paramount importance. Moreover, as WSN nodes often manage confidential information – such as private keys
and aggregated data – confidentiality and integrity also become key requirements.
However, the distributed and concurrent nature of WSN applications, together with
the intrinsic type and memory unsafety of C/C++, make it hard to achieve these
security goals.
TinyOS [47] is an open source operating system designed for low-power wireless
embedded systems, such as WSN motes and smart meters [48]. TinyOS programs
consist of separate software components statically linked through interfaces. Common
components include routing and packet radio communication, sensor measurements,
and storage. The language used to program TinyOS applications is nesC, a dialect
of the C language optimized for the resource constraints of low-power embedded
devices [49]. Because of the strict constraints in terms of memory, storage, and
energy, neither TinyOS nor the underlying hardware provide any memory protection
or virtual memory mechanism between processes or kernel and user-space. Moreover,
the nesC language makes it easy to write memory-unsafe code, inheriting all the type
and memory safety problems of C.
Memory corruption in the software running on a single node may allow an attacker to take over the node, read private data, or even disseminate incorrect data
and degrade the entire network. Note that embedded platforms do not have code
injection protection or ASLR, so a holistic defense like memory safety becomes even
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more important. More critically, since all the nodes run the same software image, an attacker may exploit a single vulnerability to take control of every node
in the network. Concrete examples of such devastating attacks have been shown for
Harvard-architecture-based sensor nodes such as the MicaZ motes [50], as well as Von
Neumann-architecture-based ones such as the popular TelosB motes [51]. In these
attacks, a well-crafted network packet sent to a vulnerable node can take control
of the node and propagate as a self-replicating worm to the entire network through
multi-hop communications [52–56]. All of these critical attacks would be prevented
by the enforcement of memory safety.
Existing memory safety techniques do not apply to embedded systems, nesC, or
TinyOS, as they are designed for general-purpose systems. Embedded systems fundamentally differ from regular computing systems. While general purpose systems
provide plenty of ROM, memory and an MMU, on embedded systems, memory is
scarce (but dedicated) and there is usually no MMU or even distinction between
kernel-space and user-space. For example, widespread sensor motes like the Memsic
TelosB [57] only provide 10kB of RAM and 48kB of program flash memory; previously proposed memory safety approaches result in significantly bigger code size and
more intensive memory usage. Moreover, the performance degradation that many
existing solutions impose is not acceptable for energy-constrained, real-time WSNs
applications. In fact, solutions such as CCured reported slowdowns ranging from 20%
to 200% [16]. Given the resource constraints, straightforward porting of common implementations for memory protection techniques to embedded systems is infeasible.
A tailored solution for memory and type safety for TinyOS applications is therefore
needed.
For TinyOS applications, the code for applications, libraries, and operating system
is entirely available at compile time. This allows to effectively employ whole-program
static analysis and dynamic checking instrumentation to ensure memory safety. Moreover, by statically identifying and removing unnecessary checks for memory accesses
that will never result in memory errors, it is possible to achieve a low performance
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overhead. Based on such considerations, we design nesCheck, a novel scheme that
tailors static analysis, type inference, and dynamic instrumentation techniques to
embedded applications to enforce memory safety on existing nesC programs. The
goal of nesCheck is to protect embedded software against memory vulnerabilities with
negligible overhead and without requiring any source code modification. nesCheck
statically analyzes the source code, identifies the potentially dangerous pointer variables, automatically infers the minimum set of dynamic runtime checks needed to
enforce memory safety based on pointer access flow, and instruments the code appropriately.
nesCheck is novel in bringing memory safety to embedded devices by adapting
instrumentation-based approaches to the challenges and advantages of the embedded world, where whole-program analysis is feasible but memory and performance
overhead are major concerns.
To evaluate our approach, we implement nesCheck as a combined static analysis/dynamic checker on top of the LLVM compiler framework. The static analysis infers
types and removes as many checks as possible while the dynamic checker enforces
safety. We then integrate our checker into the existing nesC toolchain. We evaluate
nesCheck on standard TinyOS application benchmarks, and show that it effectively
enforces memory safety on WSN applications, while minimizing the runtime performance overhead (0.84% on energy, 5.3% on code size, up to 8.4% on performance,
and 16.7% on RAM). These benchmarks are the standard benchmarks for evaluating
WSN and present realistic usage scenarios for embedded systems.
The contributions of our work are:
• Design of an inter-procedural whole-program static analysis mechanism, based
on type tracking and pointer usage, and without the need for programmer annotations;
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• Design of dynamic instrumentation for efficient memory safety enforcement on
highly constrained embedded platforms, without MMU or kernel/user space
separation;
• Evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of our approach through an full
implementation prototype.

2.1 Adversarial Model
We assume that the attacker can inject and intercept arbitrary packets in the
network. We also assume that the application has memory vulnerabilities known to
the attacker. She will exploit them to take control of a node by means of code injection/reuse attacks (following the intrinsics of the underlying hardware), compromising
the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of the node.
Physical attacks targeting the nodes, in which the adversary tampers with the
hardware of a mote and/or directly reprograms the node with malicious firmware,
are out of the scope of nesCheck.

2.2 Background
2.2.1 Memory Safety Vulnerabilities
The root cause of all memory safety vulnerabilities is the dereferencing of invalid
pointers. There are two main categories of memory safety vulnerabilities: spatial
memory safety vulnerabilities, resulting from pointers pointing to addresses outside
the bounds of the allocated memory area, and temporal memory safety vulnerabilities, resulting from the usage of pointers after the corresponding memory areas are
deallocated (e.g. use-after-free errors).
Our current prototype of nesCheck targets spatial memory safety, but can be
extended to enforce temporal safety as well, by lock and key mechanisms [58]. However, as memory in well-developed WSN applications is allocated statically instead of
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dynamically, temporal safety errors are not an important issue for applications that
comply with the development guidelines for TinyOS. This includes all the applications that ship with the standard distribution of TinyOS, as well as most larger-scale
WSN applications. Examples of the memory vulnerabilities that nesCheck protects
against are out-of-bounds accesses to pointers on the stack and heap, uninitialized
uses, and null dereferencing.

2.2.2 TinyOS
nesC. nesC is an event-driven dialect of C. Its additional features include the concept that programs are built out of components, statically linked through interfaces.
Dynamic allocation. In the early versions of TinyOS, dynamic memory allocation was not allowed. This constraint, partially relaxed in recent releases, is still
highly discouraged, as the lack of memory protection and separation can easily lead
to involuntary stack smashing when the heap grows into the stack [59]. Specialized
components (e.g. TinyAlloc), were introduced to provide support for dynamic allocation, but behind the scenes they are however still simply managing a large chunk of
pre-allocated memory. Disabling dynamic allocation has the advantage, from a memory safety standpoint, that most needed information is available at compile-time, and
little is left for dynamic detection.
Compilation and execution model. The standard TinyOS compilation pipeline is composed of several steps. First, the nesC code is processed and all the required
components, including the operating system, are linked together. Under this model,
all code, libraries, and OS components are statically known at compile time. The
resulting single nesC code is cross-compiled to C code, in turn compiled natively into
a binary image for the specific target platform. Such single binary image – containing
both user code and OS code – runs as a single executable, assuming complete control
over the hardware at all times. The memory address space is shared among all
components, both user and system code. For this reason, the official development
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guidelines for TinyOS recommend to (i) keep the state of the various components
private, (ii) communicate only through exposed interfaces, and (iii) avoid transferring
pointers between different pieces of code. All these characteristics of the TinyOS
compilation and execution model make it a particularly good fit for static analysis.

2.3 The nesCheck Approach
Figure 2.1 shows the architecture of the final pipeline for nesCheck, and our main
memory safety goals are listed below. nesCheck performs both static bug detection –
for memory accesses that will always result in a violation regardless of the execution
path – and runtime bug catching – for memory accesses that could potentially lead
to memory corruptions, depending on the execution flow.
Bugs: (Static) Find all statically provable memory bugs and report them as errors;
Vulnerabilities: (Static) Find all potentially unsafe memory accesses, determine
and exclude those that will never result in a memory corruption (in a conservative
way), and report the remaining ones as warnings;
Checks: (Dynamic) Instrument all remaining vulnerable locations with dynamic
runtime checks, and catch all memory errors at runtime.

2.3.1 Static Analysis
nesCheck uses static analysis in order to enforce an extended type system on
the pointer variables, and subsequently compute and propagate metadata for the
vulnerable pointers. Our approach uses an inter-procedural whole-program analysis
technique, carried out on the Static Single Assignment (SSA) form [60] representation
of the code. In SSA form, each variable is written to at most once, introducing a fresh
variable every time the value is updated with a destructive assignment operation.
While the code is in SSA form, the heap remains in non-SSA form, meaning that the
same memory location can be written to multiple times through the same and different
pointers. Therefore, even though in SSA form each variable is only assigned once, a
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Figure 2.1. The complete nesCheck pipeline, with lighter blocks being
existing steps of the nesC compiler toolchain, and darker blocks the
newly introduced ones.

new value is assigned with a store operation to a memory location previously loaded
with a load operation, making it possible to connect together different instructions
operating on the same logical variable.

Extended Type System and Type Inference
In order to provide type safety, identify the potentially dangerous memory accesses, and avoid dynamic checks on the provably safe operations, it is necessary to
understand the role played by the various pointers in the code and their interrelations.
We thus enforce a type system inspired by CCured [16], that categorizes pointers according to their usage into different classes with specific characteristics. The pointer
types that we consider are the following: (i) Safe pointer to τ : it can only be null
or point to a value of type τ . At runtime, it may only need a null-pointer check. (ii)
Sequence pointer to τ : like a Safe pointer, it can be null or point to a value of
type τ . However, a Sequence pointer can also be interpreted as an integer, and be
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ALGORITHM 1: nesCheck’s type inference algorithm
foreach declaration of pointer variable p do
classify(p, SAFE);
foreach instruction I using pointer p do
r ← result of(I);
if I performs pointer arithmetic then
classify(p, SEQ);
classify(r, SAFE);
if I casts p to incompatible type then
classify(p, DYN);
classify(r, DYN);

manipulated via pointer arithmetic. At runtime, it may need a null-pointer check,
as well as a bounds check if cast to a safe pointer of base type τ . (iii) Dynamic
pointer: it is a pointer that cannot be statically typed. At runtime, it may need
null-pointer, bounds, and dynamic type checks.
The type inference engine gathers information from the source code to classify
pointer declarations according to the extended type system. The engine focuses on all
locations in which pointer variables are used and classifies them, in a fixpoint iteration,
by analyzing their usage. Our type inference algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
The type inference algorithm uses 3 rules:
1 All pointers are classified as Safe upon their declaration.
2 Safe pointers subsequently used in pointer arithmetic are re-classified as a Sequence.
3 Safe or Sequence pointers interpreted with different types in different locations
are re-classified as a Dynamic. This includes casting between different levels of
indirection (e.g., int** to int*), and between different root types (e.g., int*
to void*).
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nesCheck’s type inference engine effectively enforces a total ordering Dynamic ≺
Sequence ≺ Saf e on pointer types, so the type of a pointer is updated only if the
new type is more restrictive. For example, in the following code portion:
1 int * arr , *p , n ;
2 arr = malloc (5 * sizeof ( int ) ) ;
3 n = ( int ) arr ;
4 p = arr [3];

the pointer *arr is classified as Safe upon declaration. When casted from int* to
int, *arr is reclassified as Dynamic since Dynamic ≺ Saf e holds according to the
total ordering. However, when used in pointer arithmetic, the type of *arr is not
changed as the total ordering constraint Sequence ≺ Dynamic is not satisfied.
Note that no extra rules are necessary for some non-obvious cases, often because
the analysis runs on SSA form. For instance, indirect calls (e.g., callbacks or function
pointers) are classified as Dynamic by nesCheck’s type inference because of the use
of void* pointers. Another case includes pointers to pointers, or pointers to structs
containing pointers. If the inner type is classified as Dynamic, the outer type must be
classified as Dynamic as well. A concrete example of this is int * q1 * q2, where
q1 and q2 are pointer kinds. If q2 is Dynamic, the q1 should also be Dynamic. The
three rules presented suffice in correctly classifying these pointers, since an access
to that pointer as a whole will result in two subsequent load instructions, that will
propagate the Dynamic classification between the different levels of indirection.
After the type inference completes, all the pointers are classified. The rules guarantee that the final assignments are a conservative over-approximation, potentially
classifying non-Dynamic pointers as Dynamic pointers, but never the opposite. This
fundamental property ensures the correctness of the memory safety enforcement. The
subsequent optimizations will compensate the potential performance degradation of
conservative classification.
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Type Inference Validation. To explicitly validate the accuracy of nesCheck’s
type inference engine, we walk through one example, picking the code originally
presented in the CCured paper [16]:
1 int ** a ;
2 int i ;
3 int acc ;
4 int ** p ;
5 int * e ;
6 acc = 0;
7 for ( i =0; i <100; i ++) {
8

p = a + i;

9

e = *p;

10

while (( int ) e % 2 == 0)

11

e = *( int **) e ;

12

acc += (( int ) e >> 1) ;

13 }
The program sums an array of “boxed integers”, a data type with double interpretation: when odd, its 31 most significant bits can be interpreted as an integer,
otherwise it represents the pointer to another boxed integer.
The expected behavior of the type inference engine is to classify **a as Sequence –
since it is used in pointer arithmetic at line 8 – and *e as Dynamic – since it is casted
and used with different types at different locations (i.e., as pointer at line 11 and as
integer at line 12). All the other pointers should be classified as Safe. It is possible
to verify that, according to our type inference algorithm, the correct classification
of **a as Sequence pointer is achieved by the application of Rule 2 , while *e is
correctly classified as Dynamic thanks to Rule 3 applied at line 12. All the other
pointers are classified as Safe upon their declaration, by Rule 1 , and never change
their classification.
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Figure 2.2. Comparison of bounds metadata in nesCheck vs. the
traditional approach.

Through this example and others constructed specifically to exercise unusual
pointer usages, we verify that nesCheck correctly classifies all of the pointer types
according to our extended type system.

Metadata Computation and Propagation
The metadata maintained by nesCheck for each pointer contains information
about the memory area to which such pointer points. Differently from the traditional tracking of base b and bound e for each pointer, nesCheck’s metadata
includes the size of the areas towards both lower and higher memory addresses
(denoted with sl and sh , respectively), with respect to the current address stored
in the pointer variable.

Figure 2.2 shows a graphical comparison of our meta-

data structure and the more traditional one.

As an example, let int* p be a

pointer to an array of 5 integers, and assume int* p1 = &p[2]. The metadata
for p will be (sl = 0, sh = 5 · sizeof(int)), while the metadata for p1 will be
(sh = (5 − 2) · sizeof(int), sl = (5 − 2 − 1) · sizeof(int)). This construction can
simplify bounds checking by using only one check instead of two whenever it is possible to infer the “direction” of a memory access: for example, in a common scenario
such as a monotonically increasing (or decreasing) loop, the compiler can safely infer
the direction and remove one check.
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Figure 2.3. Explicit metadata variables.

nesCheck computes the metadata information for each pointer with different
strategies, depending on the specific pointer. For static allocations, such as arrays of
fixed size or pointers to structs, nesCheck directly computes the size of the allocated
memory. While dynamic memory allocation is discouraged in TinyOS, nesCheck supports it for completeness. For dynamically allocated memory, the size is computed
and updated by keeping track of the parameters of calls to functions such as malloc(),
realloc(), calloc(), and free().
In cases where a local pointer can point to different memory areas depending on
dynamic control flow conditions, nesCheck generates and injects an explicit variable to
hold the metadata for this pointer, depending on the control flow paths. Figure 2.3
shows a concrete example of this scenario – with the original source code on the
left and the instrumented one on the right – where function f() performs different
allocations for pointer *p depending on the value of the function parameter a. Explicit
metadata variables are needed for pointers accessed in basic blocks different than the
one they were defined in1 . In Figure 2.3, the different basic blocks are highlighted as
1

Detecting this behavior is possible as the heap is in non-SSA form. nesCheck is thus capable of connecting the same logical variable at the different locations (i.e., variable declaration and assignments
in disjoint branches).
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separate, numbered solid boxes. *p is declared in block 1, but is initialized in block
2 or 3, and accessed in block 4.

Metadata Table
A Metadata Table associates specific memory addresses with their metadata information. Efficient data structures, e.g. hashmaps, often use large virtual address
spaces [17]. Embedded devices do not have a virtual memory management mechanism, however all the pointers that will need an entry in the Metadata Table are
known at compile time, so nesCheck optimizes its data structure by using a dense,
array-based Binary Search Tree. Moreover, for code that follows TinyOS’s design
guidelines and therefore does not make use of dynamic memory allocation, this data
structure can be entirely preallocated for a statically-defined size.
We decouple metadata from the pointers – compared to fat pointers used in prior
work [16,61–65] – in order to achieve a uniform memory representation for all pointers.
Moreover, since the search tree is, on average, very small with respect to the total
number of pointers, keeping it separate allows nesCheck to choose the optimal data
structure.

2.3.2 Dynamic Instrumentation
Dynamic checks can detect all memory errors since they have full runtime view
and dynamic information when they are executed. In nesCheck, the metadata for each
pointer is set to zero upon declaration, then always kept up-to-date with the actual
offsets of the pointer in its memory area. This design allows a single inexpensive
bounds check to be effective not only against out-of-bounds memory accesses, but
also all other memory errors, such as null/uninitialized pointer dereferences or useafter-free errors.
Every time a dynamic check is necessary, the respective memory access instruction
is instrumented to be preceded by a bounds check. A failed check will terminate the
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execution and reboot the node, preventing memory corruptions. With no memory
separation nor difference between kernel-land and user-land, continuing the software
execution after a memory error can have unpredictable, arbitrarily bad outcomes.
Rebooting is the only safe fault-handling action to prevent further memory corruption
and potential compromising of the entire network on such constrained platforms.
The attacker could try to exploit the same vulnerability again, and achieve at best a
Denial of Service. Compared to probabilistic defenses, the attacker will never succeed
against memory safety. In a debugging scenario, it would be possible to extend our
prototype to send an error report message to the base station, including more details
about the code location that caused the error. Our current prototype supports the
explicit printing of details about the error location on screen when the code is run in
a simulator (more about the TinyOS simulator in Section 2.5).

Optimizations
Frequent updates and lookups in the table incur high performance overhead.
nesCheck optimizes by adding instrumentation to more directly propagate the metadata.
Functions taking pointers as parameters: A pointer appearing as a parameter in a function will assume different values for different callers of the function.
Consequently, the pointer will also inherit different metadata properties depending
on the pointer that is passed as actual parameter at every different call site. nesCheck
enhances the signature of all the functions that have pointer parameters to include
additional parameters for the metadata2 . As an example, a function with a signature
such as void f(int* p) is enhanced to void f(int* p, metadata pmeta), where
metadata is the type of the data structure holding nesCheck’s metadata information.
Finally, the pointer parameter is associated with the metadata parameter as its own
metadata.
2

Variadic functions are still supported by updates and lookups in the metadata table.
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Functions returning pointers: If a function returns a pointer, metadata propagation must also be enabled through the return value. nesCheck enhances the signatures of such functions and their return instructions, from a single value to a
structure containing the original returned value plus its attached metadata. Thus,
the sample function signature int* f() will be instrumented into {int*, metadata}
f(). All the return instructions will consequently be transformed from return p;
into return {p, pmeta};, where pmeta is the metadata information for pointer p.
Lastly, all call sites for this function must be instrumented to take into account the
change in return type, unpack the two pieces of data from the structure (i.e., the
pointer and its metadata) and associate one to the other.

2.3.3 Running Example
In this section, we present the working of the core components of nesCheck on a
program example (shown in Figure 2.4) that is small – for ease of detailed discussion
and manual analysis of expected behaviors – but stress-intensive in the number of
advanced features and memory error corner-cases included. We include casting of
pointer types to and from integers, index-based access of memory areas, usage of
pointers with incompatible types depending on specified conditions, and dynamic
memory allocation as well, even if discouraged by TinyOS, to ensure the correctness
of nesCheck even in face of wrong programming styles.
While the analysis and instrumentation of the program in nesCheck is carried out
sequentially one entire function at a time, here we follow the execution flow for a more
effective presentation. First of all, nesCheck rewrites the signatures for testMT aux
to {foo t*, meta t} testMT aux(int* p, meta t pmeta), and instruments in
a similar way testMetadataTable and assignLoop.
In main(), nesCheck infers the size for the metadata of *arr to be 5 integers,
from the parameter of malloc(). The subsequent call to testMetadataTable() is
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typedef struct foo {
int a ;
int * bar ;
} foo_t ;
foo_t myfoo ;
foo_t * testMT_aux ( int * p ) {
foo_t * f = & myfoo ;
f - > bar = p ;
return f ;
}
void tes tMetad ataTab le ( int * p ) {
foo_t * f = testMT_aux ( p ) ;
(f - > bar ) [2] = 13;
}
void assignLoop ( int * p ) {
int i ;
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i ++)
*( p + i ) = i ;
}
void te s t Dy n a mi c A li a s in g ( int n ) {
int * p ;
int a [4];
int b [12];
if ( n < 1) p = a ;
else
p = b;
assignLoop (&( p [1]) ) ;
}
int main () {
int * arr = malloc (5 * sizeof ( int ) ) ;
test Metada taTabl e ( arr ) ;
t e st D y na m i cA l i as i n g (0) ;
}

Figure 2.4. Representative example for the stress-intensive microbenchmark.

then updated for its new signature (adding as second parameter the metadata for
*arr), avoiding the need for metadata table accesses.
The testMetadataTable function leverages the support function testMT aux for
obtaining a pointer to struct foo t, using the characteristic TinyOS pattern of
global variables in place of dynamic allocation. The field f->bar is aliased to *p, and
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this time the metadata propagation required metadata table accesses, as the pointer
is in a struct. The execution resumes in the testMetadataTable function. The
storing of a numerical value inside the array member of the struct foo t bla at
line 14 is actually translated by Clang into a sequence of GetElementPtr statements.
Whenever necessary, such instructions are instrumented by dynamic runtime checks
and metadata table lookups.
Following the execution, the function testDynamicallyAliasing, conceived to
stress-test common dynamic aliasing scenarios, is first instrumented with explicit
metadata variables, as presented in Section 2.3.1. Then, assignLoop() tries to assign
numeric values to the first 4 cells of the array, resulting in an out-of-bounds memory
violation. However, an injected dynamic runtime check at line 19 will catch the outof-bounds access to the 4th element of the array, and the execution will be diverted
into a trap function.

2.4 Implementation
The implementation of nesCheck leverages the existing TinyOS compiler toolchain
and extends it with custom components built on Clang [66] and optimization passes
from the LLVM suite [67]. The technologies used are highlighted next to each pipeline
block in Figure 2.1.
The nesC source code is initially processed by ncc, the nesC compiler, that links
the different nesC components together through their interfaces and translates the
result to a single C source code file. The C source thes is transformed into the
LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR) language. Such IR is a well-specified code
representation offering an abstraction layer between the source programming language
used (nesC/C) and the actual target platform code. Then, the IR is passed to our
nesCheck Static Analyzer, based on an LLVM target-independent Optimization Pass.
The nesCheck Analysis State Manager component maintains the analysis state
throughout the different steps, and propagates information between the various com-
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ponents. Most of the metadata is kept in memory by the Analysis State Manager,
and looked up and injected only when needed for the appropriate instrumentation.
As a last step, the minimal set of required runtime checks for the memorymanipulating instructions is computed, and the code is instrumented accordingly.
The LLVM IR uses, in general, two separate instructions for pointer dereferencing:
a GetElementPtr instruction to calculate the memory address of the location to be
accessed, and a Load or Store instruction to actually access this memory location
and, respectively, place the resulting value in a variable or store a value into the
location. nesCheck’s instrumentation adds a bounds check conditional branch before
the GetElementPtr instruction, and a trap function to be invoked whenever the runtime check fails, to terminate the execution and reboot the node, preventing memory
corruptions.
Whenever nesCheck can statically determine that any execution of the instruction
being instrumented will result in a failure of the check – i.e., the condition can be
statically determined to be always false – the user is alerted that a constant memory
bug is present, providing her with insights useful to inspect and fix the bug.
The rest of the pipeline, after the instrumentation, resumes the original TinyOS
compilation toolchain, having the instrumented code go through the gcc compiler to
obtain the final native binary for the desired target platform.

2.5 Evaluation
The TinyOS development platform ships with several sample applications, such
as radio communication, sensing, and hardware interaction. As done by most other
TinyOS research works [18, 68–71], we use these applications as benchmark suite for
evaluating nesCheck. Table 2.1 provides details on each program in our benchmark
suite. We first use these applications as-is to evaluate the performance overhead.
Then, we evaluate the overall effectiveness of nesCheck by randomly injecting memory
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Table 2.1.
TinyOS standard applications used as benchmark for nesCheck’s evaluation.
Application
BaseStation

LOC
5684

Blink
MultihopOscilloscope

5505
11728

Null

4261

Oscilloscope

6868

Powerup

4306

RadioCountToLeds

6751

RadioSenseToLeds

6808

Sense

5699

Description
Simple Active Message bridge between the serial
and radio links.
Blinks the 3 LEDs on the mote.
Data collection: samples default sensor, broadcasts a message every few readings.
An empty skeleton application, useful to test the
build environment functionality.
Data collection: radio broadcasts a message every
10 readings of default sensor.
Turns on red LED on powerup, to test deploy of
app on hardware mote.
Broadcasts a 4Hz counter and displays every received counter on the LEDs.
Broadcasts default sensor readings, displays every
received counter on the LEDs.
Periodically samples the default sensor and displays the bottom bits on the LEDs.

bugs in the benchmark applications and verifying that all of them are caught statically
or at runtime.
We evaluate nesCheck on several static metrics – such as the number of pointer
variables, their inferred type classification, and the number of dynamic check instrumentations – and dynamic metrics – such as the overhead of nesCheck in terms of
program size, memory, execution performance, and energy consumption.
To evaluate performance, we compiled the applications for TOSSIM [71], a discrete event simulator, de facto-standard tool for TinyOS WSNs. TOSSIM simulates
the behavior of TinyOS accurately down to a very low level and precisely times interrupts. This allowed us to perform the evaluation in a controlled environment,
through repeatable experiments, and to increase the number of runs for each experiment, while still maintaining a realistic distributed embedded software execution.
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Each of the evaluation results has been obtained by averaging 25 independent runs
of each test.

2.5.1 Type Inference
The results in Figure 2.5 show that, on average, 81% of the variables are classified
as Safe, 13% as Sequence, and 6% as Dynamic. A large number of dynamic runtime
checks can thus already be skipped as immediate consequence of the type system
inference. Note that, since the analysis is conservative, some pointers classified as
dynamic might not be so; however, as shown in the performance evaluation afterwards,
this does not degrade the efficiency of our approach.
The average total number of analyzed variables, across all the TinyOS sample
applications in the benchmark, is 3, 633, a small number that further supports our
design choice of whole-program static analysis.

2.5.2 Code Size and Performance Overhead
We investigate the overhead of nesCheck’s instrumentation in terms of code size
and performance, and the results are shown in Figure 2.6. The programs in the
benchmark total to 57, 610 lines of code. The size overhead is measured in additional
bytes the memory-safe executable produced by nesCheck vs. the uninstrumented one,
both including the code for the TOSSIM simulator infrastructure. The code size of the
uninstrumented programs averages at 228, 761 bytes, and the instrumentation adds
only 12, 201 bytes (5.3%) of overhead on average. This result shows that nesCheck
is suitable for the instrumentation of programs to be deployed even on devices very
constrained in ROM.
We also measure the performance overhead of nesCheck through the TOSSIM
simulator for TinyOS. This tool is used by a simulation driver program by repeatedly
asking it to execute the next event from the simulation queue. The duration of each
event and the total number of events depend on the complexity of the computation
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Figure 2.5. Pointer classification results for the TinyOS sample apps benchmark.

to be executed. Therefore, we measure the overhead of nesCheck’s instrumentation
by fixing the total simulation time to 30 real seconds, running the simulation of the
original and instrumented applications, and then measuring the number of simulated
seconds actually executed. In three cases (BaseStation, Null and PowerUp), since
the applications are merely sample “skeleton” programs to guide developers, no real
events were happening after the initial program startup. Therefore, for those programs the reported overhead is 0, and we do not consider them in our averages for
the performance overhead. For all the other applications that continuously have processed events, we observe that TOSSIM is able to execute more simulated seconds
(in the span of 30 real seconds) for simpler programs than for more complex ones.
For example, the simple Blink program is executed for 120185.86 simulated seconds,
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Figure 2.6. Code size and performance overhead for the instrumented
TinyOS apps, including TOSSIM.

while the more complex RadioSenseToLeds program only reaches 6878.08 simulated
seconds (both uninstrumented). In fact, this confirms the intuition that fewer events
can be processed in the same time span when the computation of each event is more
complex. On average, nesCheck introduces a performance overhead of 6.2%. We note
that the maximum overhead (incurred by the Blink application) is still quite low, at
8.4%. We believe that this overhead is acceptable for WSN applications.

2.5.3 Memory Overhead
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, some of the pointers require entries in a separated
metadata table. We thus measure the impact of this additional data on the memory

33
of the embedded devices. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 present our results on the memory overhead of nesCheck for the TinyOS applications benchmark. In particular, Figure 2.7
shows the number of metadata lookups added to the code and the number of actual
metadata table entries required for each application. On average, nesCheck added
only 90 metadata table entry lookup instrumentation points during the instrumentation. Given the SSA form, there is a direct relationship between the number of
memory accesses and the number of analyzed variables; therefore, we compare the
number of metadata lookups with the total number of variables analyzed by nesCheck,
and see that it amounts to just 2%. When only comparing to the Dynamic pointers,
it amounts to 41%, which still represents a significant memory saving. Many of such
lookups, furthermore, refer to the same logical variable, and thus point to the same
entry in the metadata table. Thus, in fact, only 32 distinct entries are needed on
average in the metadata table, constituting approximately 1/3 of the total lookup
instrumentations for each program.
With these collected metrics, we measure the effective RAM overhead of nesCheck
for each application by comparing the RAM occupation of the uninstrumented program – as reported by the nesC toolchain when compiling for the TelosB motes
platform [57] – with the size of the metadata table in the instrumented version –
representing the effective memory overhead. Figure 2.8 presents both these metrics
side by side for ease of presentation. The numbers vary greatly for the different applications, as the number of metadata table entries is completely dependent on the
data structures used by each program. However, the average overhead is 16%, and
in all cases the total memory requirement remains significantly below the 10kb RAM
limit of the TelosB platform chosen for this experiment.

2.5.4 Checks Reduction
As part of our experimental analysis, we collected statistics about the number of
runtime checks added to the programs during the instrumentation, together with the
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entries required by the instrumentation.

checks that are removed as part of nesCheck’s check reduction. As shown in Figure 2.9, the complete analysis and instrumentation of nesCheck for all the TinyOS
applications overall reduces, on average, the required checks by 20% of the total potentially vulnerable locations, greatly reducing the performance overhead in enforcing
memory safety. For the whole benchmark suite, an average of 452 checks are added,
and 110 are skipped.

2.5.5 Energy Overhead
The power consumption for the various operations – such as computation, radio
communication, standby or sleep – varies across the different sensor mote hardware
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platforms. However, on all platforms, the majority of the power consumption is always
caused by wireless transmission and reception, as well as the transitions between the
on and off states of the radio. Shnayder et al., for example, quantitatively measure
that, in many cases, active CPU cycles in WSN applications are very small, and have
negligible effect on total power consumption [72]. The instrumentation of nesCheck
in TinyOS programs does not introduce any additional radio communication, while
instead adding some runtime computation for the dynamic checks. Therefore, the
energy overhead is, intuitively, proportional to the performance overhead that we
measured in our experiments in Section 2.5.2 by a factor of CPU energy consumption.
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Since measuring the energy consumption directly on the motes’ hardware is difficult [73], to quantify this metric we leverage the energy model proposed by Polastre
et al. [74]. We refer to the MicaZ motes hardware platform datasheet [75] (being the
platform simulated by TOSSIM), and multiply the battery voltage by current draw
and time. With those calculations, the energy overhead for nesCheck amounts on
average to 0.84%, a negligible quantity that supports our analytical expectations.

2.5.6 Fault Injection
To evaluate the effectiveness of nesCheck in preventing all memory errors, we
randomly injected memory vulnerabilities and bugs in the TinyOS applications. We
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Figure 2.10. Fault injection results on TinyOS benchmark.

injected 500 random faults in each applications in the TinyOS benchmark, for a total
of 4, 500 faults. In particular, each time we selected one random memory access,
altered its indices to produce a memory error, and included an extra printing instruction to mark the moment when that fault is executed; we then instrumented the
application and executed it. We expected nesCheck to correctly find the fault, either
statically or at runtime, and prevent the out-of-bounds access.
Figure 2.10 shows our results. On average, 22% of the injected faults were statically caught at compile time. 37% of the faults were injected in areas of the code that
were not executed at runtime. For the injected faults that were executed at runtime
(41% on average), 100% were correctly caught by the dynamic checks placed by the
nesCheck’s instrumentation, i.e., no fault was executed and went uncaught.
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2.5.7 Naive vs. Optimized Approach
While a direct comparison of nesCheck with traditional techniques such as SoftBound or CCured is infeasible due to (i) constraints of embedded systems, and (ii)
the missing implementation of SoftBound or CCured for embedded systems, we measure the performance benefits of nesCheck’s check reduction to get an estimate of the
improvement over those traditional techniques. We run nesCheck with (“optimized”)
and without (“naive”) check reduction optimizations, and run it on all the applications in the benchmark (excluding those that did not yield events in our performance
overhead evaluation in Section 2.5.2). Figure 2.11 shows a comparison of the overhead
of the naive and optimized executions of the instrumented programs. We observe an
overhead reduction of 41.13% on average, showing how nesCheck’s check reduction
effectively leads to significant performance improvements.

2.6 Limitations
Currently, a sensor node instrumented with nesCheck is rebooted when a dynamic check fails. Since this might not always be the best, in the future, we plan
to work on more advanced, programmer-guided recovery mechanisms, with the goal
of maintaining the network as functional as possible even in the presence of memory
errors.
More powerful computing platforms (e.g., Raspberry PI) are becoming increasingly available. However, they are impractical for common WSN application purposes, with significantly higher cost, energy requirements, and size, as compared to
low-power WSN nodes. The latter have the advantages of being cheap, easily replaceable, deployable in bulk, and in need of little energy. Even when such more advanced
devices will become sufficiently cost-effective for large deployments, efficiency would
still remain a critical concern for memory safety techniques, as the number and scale
of applications deployed on them would consequently increase as well. We plan to
work in this direction to investigate how nesCheck can be ported to more power-
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ful platforms, and leverage the additional capabilities of these platforms to further
improve performance.
The current prototype of nesCheck enforces spatial memory safety. Our approach
could, however, be extended to also enforce temporal memory safety. Note that most
WSN applications do not use dynamic memory allocation, and are therefore fully
protected by spatial safety alone. Nevertheless, we plan to extend our implementation
of nesCheck to explicitly address temporal safety, and design mechanisms tailored for
embedded platforms to enforce it.
Lastly, the scalability of the system, and further overhead reduction, are of great
importance. We plan to investigate whether the integration of Bounded Model Checking techniques [76] in nesCheck helps in that direction, as it would enable the use of
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formal verification techniques for proving the safety of seemingly dangerous memory
accesses, therefore further reducing the overhead. Note that there are several issues
that make formal verification on embedded software hard. Several patterns – such as
direct communication with hardware registries for sensing, network packets, frequent
interrupts, or the use of bit fields – cause the search space for formal verification to
quickly explode. Dynamic checks are able to cope with these patterns, at the price
of performance.

2.7 Proof of Safety
In this section, we sketch a formal proof of memory safety for nesCheck. First,
we give an intuition of the rules for type inference. Then, we follow the general
structure of the proof of SoftBound [77], while focusing on the features relevant for
nesCheck. We tackle the complexity of the nesC language by focusing the proof on
an abstract subset of nesC that captures most of the fundamental primitives. Due to
space limitation, we keep the formalism, operational semantics tractation and proof
short, while still remaining sound in showing safety.
The syntax we use models programs in their processed IR form, already reduced
to atomic data types (int and pointers) and simple operations. Table 2.2 shows the
grammar we consider for our proof. We use RHS and LHS to denote left-hand side
and right-hand side, respectively. Note that, while most WSN applications do not
use dynamic memory allocation, we include it in our formal grammar for the sake
of generality. In our simplified operational semantics, we consider an environment
E that models the stack with a map S from variable names to addresses and types,
models the type inference with a map Γ from variable names to pointer categories,
and models the heap with a partial map M from addresses to values.
Using some and none to denote presence or absence of a value, we model nesC’s
memory access primitives as follows: (i) read M l: if l is an allocated memory
location, return some, otherwise return none; (ii) write M l v: if l is an allocated
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Table 2.2.
Grammar used in the formal proof of safety.
Atomic Types
Pointer Types
Struct Types
Struct Fields
LHS Expressions
RHS Expressions

t
p
s
f
lhs
rhs

Commands c

::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
|
|
::=

int | p*
t | s | void
struct{f ; f }
(id:a)
x | *lhs | lhs.id | lhs->id
val | rhs+rhs | lhs | &lhs
(a)rhs | sizeof(p)
malloc(rhs)
c ; c | lhs = rhs

memory location, set the content to the value v; (iii) malloc M s: if M has an
available region of size s, allocate and return it, otherwise fail.
The normal C operational semantics processes assignments by writing the result of
the expression in the RHS operand to the address calculated from the LHS operand.
For this proof, we extend the traditional operational semantics of C by including
new outcomes for operations (that include memory errors) and tracking of pointers
metadata. A result r can therefore be: (i) v(sl,sh) , a value v with the attached metadata
for the size of the memory region towards the lower (sl) and higher (sh) memory
addresses (see Section 2.3.1); (ii) a memory address l; (iii) Success; (iv) MemoryError
if a bounds check failed; (v) MemoryExhaustion if M did not have enough free memory
upon a malloc operation.
Using the above definitions, we formalize nesCheck’s operational semantics with
four classes of rules. First, the rules for type inference and propagation. Second, the
(E, lhs) ⇒l r : a rule specifies how LHS expressions are evaluated (no changes to the
environment). Third, the (E, rhs) ⇒r (E 0 , r : a) rule specifies how RHS expressions
are evaluated (potential changes to the environment; if successful, r is v(sl,sh) ). Lastly,
(E, c) ⇒c (E 0 , r : a) is the rule to execute commands (r must be a success or failure
result). Here we omit rules straightforwardly representing standard C semantics, and
just show the rules most relevant for nesCheck’s semantics.
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Type Inference. We present some of the rules for type inference, that formalize
the rules presented in Section 2.3.1. For example, pointer arithmetic on a Safe or
Sequence pointer causes the result to be of Sequence kind, while casting a Safe or
Sequence pointer to an incompatible type3 results in a Dynamic pointer:
Γ(x) = τ
τ ∈ {Safe, Seq, Dyn}
Types
Γ`x:τ
Γ ` e1 : τ
τ ∈ {Safe, Seq}
Γ ` e2 : int
ArithT1
Γ ` e1 + e2 : Seq

Γ ` e1 : τ
τ = Dyn
Γ ` e2 : int
ArithT2
Γ ` e1 + e2 : Dyn

(E, x) ⇒l l : t
incompatible(t, t0 )
IllegCast
Γ ` (t0 )x : Dyn
No memory access to Safe pointers is subject to dynamic bounds checks; conversely, all memory accesses to Dynamic pointers are instrumented with runtime
checks. For a memory access to a Sequence pointer, if nesCheck can statically determine that it will never result in an out of bounds operation, it will not be instrumented
with a dynamic check. We therefore define a predicate saf e(∗p) that is true (>) iff
the memory access ∗p does not require bounds checks, false (⊥) otherwise:




> if Γ ` p : Safe ∨



saf e(∗p) =
(Γ ` p : Seq ∧ ∗p not out of bounds)





⊥ otherwise
nesCheck declares a memory access as never out of bounds only if the in-memory
metadata propagated up to that access statically indicates the safety of the operation.
The formal proof of CCured [16] shows it is safe to leave memory accesses uninstrumented, and the same proof also applies in our case to statically-provable Sequence
pointers accesses.
3

In Section 2.3.1, we define two types as “incompatible” when, for example, they have different levels
of indirection or have same level of indirection but different root types.
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Dynamic Bounds Checks. The bounds checking operational rules are very
similar to those of SoftBound, so we will omit most of them for brevity. We present
here the rules for the evaluation of a pointer dereference operation, both in case of
success:

(E, lhs) ⇒l l : t∗
read (E.M ) l = some v(sl,sh)
saf e(l) ∨ (sl ≥ 0 ∧ sh ≥ sizeof (t))
DerefSuccess
(E, ∗lhs) ⇒l v : t

and in the case of memory error (failed bounds check):
(E, lhs) ⇒l l : t∗
read (E.M ) l = some v(sl,sh)
sl < 0 ∨ sh < sizeof (t)
DerefFail
(E, ∗lhs) ⇒l MemoryError : t
Other rules, such as those for type casts and pointer arithmetic, need to ensure
that metadata information is propagated correctly:
(E, ptr) ⇒r (E 0 , l(sl,sh) : p∗)
(E , val) ⇒r (E 00 , of f(sl0 ,sh0 ) : int)
l0 = l + of f ∗ sizeof (p)
sl0 = sl + of f ∗ sizeof (p)
sh0 = sh − of f ∗ sizeof (p)
PtrArithm
0
(E, ptr + val) ⇒r (E 0 , l(sl
0 ,sh0 ) : p∗)
0

(E, rhs) ⇒r (E 0 , v(sl,sh) : t)
t0 6= int
TypeCast
(E, (t0 )rhs) ⇒r (E 0 , v(sl,sh) : t0 )
For the formal rule for integer-to-pointer cast, we follow SoftBound’s approach of
zeroing out the metadata to avoid potentially undefined behaviors:
(E, rhs) ⇒r (E 0 , v(sl,sh) : t)
t = int
(sl0 , sh0 ) = (0, 0)
TypeCastIntToPtr
(E, (t0 )rhs) ⇒r (E 0 , v(sl0 ,sh0 ) : t0 )
With this support infrastructure of rules in place, we note that the operational
rules for values that are valid at runtime and need runtime bounds checks are fully
equivalent to their corresponding rules in SoftBound’s formal model [17]. Therefore,
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they satisfy the same safety invariants and ensure memory safety for those values, as
proven for SoftBound (in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, and Corollary 4.1 in [17]).
While adding bounds checks to every memory access is surely sound, as shown
by the proof in SoftBound, by combining the latter with the proof in CCured we improve the performance overhead by removing unnecessary checks while still remaining
sound. Thus, given the operational semantics rules above, every memory access in
nesCheck is either safe at runtime – resulting in a correct access – or causes the application to stop – due to a detected memory error. Therefore, the nesC applications
analyzed and instrumented by nesCheck fulfill the set memory safety goals.

2.8 Related Work
Memory safety is an ongoing research topic [78].

Attacks to WSN software

through memory vulnerabilities have been widely investigated. Against common belief that Harvard-architecture devices would prevent code injection attacks, Francillon
et al. [50] showed a detailed exploit for code injection without size limitation through
carefully crafted network packets. Giannetsos et al. carried out a similar study [51],
targeting Von Neumann-architecture devices. These two works cover most common
architectures for WSNs, able to exploit, for example, both MicaZ and TelosB motes.
From the defense point of view, research work has typically taken three different
directions: runtime protection, formal analysis and symbolic execution. nesCheck
uses an approach that enhances the runtime protection class of mechanisms with
static analysis techniques. Note that all related work mostly focuses on either spatial
or temporal safety, since addressing both in a same technique is too complex.
Runtime protection. Necula et al. introduce an extended type system for
CCured [16]. CCured uses pointer classification as a static analysis technique to infer
safe pointers that do not need bounds checks; however, it instruments all non-safe
pointers in the code with runtime checks, potentially generating many unnecessary
checks. nesCheck overcomes this issue by leveraging more extensive static analysis
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techniques to conservatively detect whether some of the sequence pointers can be left
unchecked too, as well as detecting statically-recognizable memory violations.
SoftBound [17] is a compile-time approach that instruments C code to enforce
spatial memory safety by (i) keeping track of the properties of each the pointed
memory area, and (ii) wrapping each memory access instruction with a bounds check.
This approach was designed for desktop system and not embedded devices. While
nesCheck too leverages dynamic runtime checking to enforce memory safety, it tailors
and optimizes this approach to the specific characteristics of nesC applications in
order to improve performance.
Compared to the notable solutions just discussed, as well as other traditional
ones, nesCheck works for embedded software, being designed specifically for their
constraints, challenges, and advantages.
One of the most relevant approaches for memory protection in WSN applications
– and TinyOS in particular – is Safe TinyOS [18]. Cooprider et al. investigate
issues related to the implementation of memory protection for TinyOS programs by
formalizing the problem and the requirements, and developing optimizations that
make runtime checks more viable under the strict performance constraints of WSN
software. Safe TinyOS relies on the Deputy source-to-source compiler [79] to infer
necessary information for the code instrumentation4 . Safe TinyOS, however, puts
much of the analysis burden on the programmers, requiring them to either annotate
the code with specific type definitions and safety guidelines, or to declare entire
components as “trusted” and therefore skipped by the tool. nesCheck, on the other
hand, automates the entire process, with no need for source code modifications. Also,
nesCheck reduces the potential runtime overhead by removing unnecessary checks
before the instrumentation.
Formal analysis. Bucur et al. [68] propose a source-to-source transformation tool
to make TinyOS code processable by the CBMC [80] bounded model checking [76]
proving tool. The well-known limitations of formal verification, in particular the
4

The Deputy project, however, is no longer maintained.
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search space explosion, are inherited by this approach too. Even though Bucur et
al. propose several optimizations to reduce the complexity to be handled, large-scale
applications can still suffer by long times for analysis and potential undecidability if
the state becomes too big to be handled.
Symbolic execution. Sasnauskas et al. [70] build an approach on top of the
Klee symbolic execution framework to debug TinyOS applications before deployment.
Just like for the formal analysis-based approaches, the bottlenecks for these designs
are: (i) the need for a good model definition of the application to be tested, and
(ii) the rapid explosion of the search state. If either part of the design results in
a non-complete coverage of every possible vulnerability, then not all the bugs can
be effectively identified. Conversely, since nesCheck leverages runtime checks for all
the memory accesses that cannot be statically proven as safe, in a conservative way,
nesCheck is guaranteed to always catch all the potential vulnerabilities and prevent
memory corruption.
Hardware. Not belonging to any of the three categories of defense research
directions, Francillon et al. [52] propose a hardware modification to split the stack
in a control flow stack and a data stack. While this is an interesting idea, it would
require hardware manufacturers to change the platform (an economically burdensome
path unlikely to be pursuable). nesCheck’s software-only approach does not require
changes to the hardware platform, nor to the source code.

2.9 Summary
This chapter presented nesCheck, a novel approach that combines whole-program
static analysis and dynamic checking techniques to efficiently enforce memory safety
on nesC programs, without requiring any source modification. Among the contributions of this work, we design an inter-procedural whole-program static analysis
mechanism – based on type tracking and pointer usage and without the need for programmer annotations – and a dynamic instrumentation technique for efficient mem-

47
ory safety enforcement on highly constrained embedded platforms, without MMU or
kernel/user space separation.
Even with efficient techniques, memory protection comes with a performance cost.
Therefore, it is important to strategically plan which devices it is more critical to
protect, as well as allocate any additional security resource accordingly. We address
this problem in the work presented in the next chapter.
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3 STRATEGIC ALLOCATION OF SECURITY RESOURCES FOR IOT
The technique presented in the previous chapter provided hardening to the individual sensor nodes from the point of view of memory safety. It is however critical that
an effective security infrastructure be adopted throughout the whole network, considering the available security resources and existing protection level of each node.
An important requirement for such an infrastructure is to carefully address resource
efficiency, due to constrained resources. Its cost would in fact outweigh the low cost
of IoT technologies. From these observations it follows that, besides effectiveness,
efficiency is a main goal driving the design of an IoT security infrastructure. Efficiency, as well as effectiveness, depends on the choice of the security resources (IDS,
special hardware, additional devices, etc), and how they are allocated in the system
of interest. Among all possible resource allocation plans, some are more efficient – as
they require a lower amount of energy consumption and/or entail a cheaper cost in
terms of additional equipment, while other plans are more effective – because harder
to be evaded by the attackers. In the work presented in this chapter, we focus on the
problem of effectively and efficiently securing IoT networks, and propose a method to
compute a resource allocation plan as a Pareto-optimal solution. We start from the
assumption that, for each available security resource, we can estimate its installation
cost and its average energy consumption at operating speed. We can thus estimate
the efficiency of an allocation plan, based on the total energy consumption of the
security infrastructure and the costs of its components. To measure the effectiveness
of an allocation plan we use two metrics, namely risk and criticality. The former
is defined as the maximum number of network nodes that are no longer protected
when an attacker succeeds in taking down at least one security resource. The latter is a measure of how critical certain nodes are for the correct operation of the
network. We identify a set of heuristics for computing the criticality value of each
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node of the IoT network of interest. We model the interaction between attacker and
defender as a Stackelberg leadership model in which the leader (the defender) moves
before the follower (the attacker) [81]. We show how to compute a Pareto-optimal
defender strategy (resource allocation plan) in two steps. First, among all possible
allocation plans, we compute the subset of the Pareto-optimal plans, as the solutions
of a three-objective optimization problem, which minimize (i) the total energy consumption, (ii) the installation cost, and (iii) the maximum criticality. In the second
step, we select the plan, among those identified in the previous step, which minimizes
the risk – as the solution of a single-objective optimization problem. The resulting
defender strategy is efficiency-optimal because entails the lowest energy consumption and the cheapest installation cost, while its effectiveness lies in the fact that
the number of security resources an attacker needs to take down is maximized – and
consequently, the probability of a successful attack is reduced. We have implemented
our algorithms and tested them with different network topologies. Our results show
that the proposed algorithm provides security infrastructure options for IoT networks
that represent different combinations of energy consumption, cost, and probability of
successful attacks.
The framework provides the following main features:
• the formalization of a process that is critical and often done in an ad-hoc manner
by administrators;
• a method for computing the best defender strategy, that gives to security managers the possibility to choose the resource allocation plan that best fits their
efficiency and effectiveness requirements;
• the formulation of the defender’s problem as a linear optimization problem;
• a heuristic for the formalization of the equations that define the IoT scenario
and the security goals;
• measures to formalize efficiency and effectiveness of the defender strategy.
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3.1 Threat Model
While our approach is independent from the actual attack, we assume that the
attacker can take any of the steps commonly used to carry out attacks, such as physically tampering with the network nodes, capturing and reprogramming legitimate
nodes and security resources, and adding malicious entities to the network to overhear data communications, inject false data and control traffic, intercept and drop
data packets, introduce interference, claim multiple identities, and more. We further
assume that the attacker must compromise at least one security resource to carry
out an attack, is aware of the defense strategy, and smartly targets the most critical
security resource.

3.2 Security Model and Definitions
The goal of the defender is to secure the network. To do so, the defender needs
to choose a set of security resources among the available ones, and decide where
to deploy them in the network area for securing all the network nodes. Due to
the heterogeneity of IoT systems, there are different kinds of security resources the
defender may have to use. Intrusion detection systems [26] as well as attack prevention
systems [82] can be installed on network nodes to, respectively, detect ongoing, and
prevent future attacks; physical tools, like directional antennas and highly sensitive
transceivers [83, 84] can be installed on watchdogs nodes, thus enabling these nodes
to better control other nodes [85]; nodes with tamper resistant hardware can replace
normal network nodes in order to strengthen the network [86]; nodes with specialized
hardware can be used to implement specific security techniques [87, 88]; additional
nodes can be deployed at specific locations in the network with the sole purpose of
executing security tasks [85].
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3.2.1 Basic Concepts and Notation
Here we introduce the basic concepts and notations that help us to formalize the
IoT environment and the security requisites for the defender.
Definition 3.2.1 (security resource) A security resource is a tuple
sr = hc, e, t, loci, where:
• c is the cost;
• e is the energy consumption;
• t is the resource’s type;
• loc is the location.1
Definition 3.2.2 (network) A network is an undirected graph N = hV, Ei, where:
• V = {(e, loc, cr) : e is the node energy consumption, loc is the node location,
and cr is the criticality value} is the set of network nodes;
• E = {{v1 , v2 } : v1 is in the communication range of v2 , and vice versa, and
v1 , v2 ∈ V } is the set of links.
We define a network as an undirected graph given the physical-based topology
(inferred by the communication range of network nodes), different from the routingbased topology (always a sub-graph of the physical one), regardless of routing protocol
and direction of the links. The notation v.x and sr.y denotes attributes x of node v
and y of resource sr. Given a network N and a set of security resources R, we define:
• a resource allocation plan AP for N as a subset of R, AP ⊆ R;
• AP as the set of all possible resource allocation plans for N ;
1

The attribute loc in Definition 3.2.1 helps us to simplify the formalization of the linear programs
we show hereafter. The basic idea is the following: given that in the network area there are many
locations where a security resource can be placed, for each resource sr∗ we assume to have sr1 , . . . srn
resources, one for each location where sr∗ can be located.
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• the criticality of a network node n ∈ N as the measure of its relevance for the
correct function of the network;
• function crit : R × AP × N → N as the criticality associated with a security resource sr; given an allocation plan AP ∈ AP and a network N , crit(sr, AP, N )
returns the maximum criticality value over the set of nodes of N that are not
any longer protected if sr stops working and no other security resource sr0 ∈ AP
covers them;
• function risk : R × AP × N → N as the risk associated with a resource sr;
given an allocation plan AP ∈ AP and a network N , risk(sr, AP, N ) returns
the number of nodes of N that are not any longer protected if sr stops working
and no other security resource sr0 ∈ AP covers them.
• the function N eighbors : V → 2V ,
such that N eighbors(v) = {v 0 : {v, v 0 } ∈ E};
• the function Edges : V → 2E ,
such that Edges(v) = {{v, v 0 } : v 0 ∈ N eighbors(v)};
• the set of locations as L = LV ∪ LA , where LV is the set of locations taken
by each v ∈ V , and LA is the set of all other available locations in the network
area;
• the function Res : 2L → 2R , such that, given a set of locations X, Res(X) =
{sr : sr.loc ∈ X}, i.e., the resources that can be placed on locations of X;
• the domain of a security resource sr as the set of locations that are in the action
range of sr, i.e., the portion of network area covered by sr;
• the function Dom : R → 2L , such that Dom(sr) returns the set of locations
that belong to the domain of sr;
• T = {sr.t : sr ∈ R} as the set of security resources types.
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Example 1 Figure 3.1 shows a network with 7 nodes protected by two security resources sr1 and sr2 . The main square which contains the network represents the
network area. Security resources can be deployed in the locations of the network area,
represented by internals dotted squares. The dashed circles denote the action range of
the security resources. The number associated to each node denotes both the criticality value and the node id. If one of the two security resources stops working, the set
of nodes left without protection is S1 = {1, 4, 5} for sr1 , and S2 = {2, 3, 6} for sr2 .
The node with maximum criticality in S1 is node 5, while in S2 is node 6. The criticality and risk values of the two security resources, thus, are: crit(sr1 , AP, N ) = 5,
crit(sr2 , AP, N ) = 6, and risk(sr1 , AP, N ) = risk(sr2 , AP, N ) = |S1 |= |S2 |= 3, with
AP = {sr1 , sr2 }. Furthermore, we have that:
• N eighbors(1) = {4, 7}, N eighbors(2) = {3, 7}, . . .;
• Edges(1)={{1, 4}, {1, 7}}, Edges(2)={{2, 7}, {2, 3}}, . . .;
• L = {hx1 , x2 i : x1 , x2 ∈ {A, B, C, D, E, F, G}};
• LV = {hB, Bi, hB, Di, hD, Bi, hD, Di, hD, F i, . . .};
• LA = L \LV ;
• Res(hC, Ci) = {sr1 }, Res(hE, Ei) = {sr2 },
Res(hC, Ci, hE, Ei) = {sr1 , sr2 };
• Dom(sr1 ) = {hx1 , x2 i : x1 , x2 ∈ {B, C, D}},
Dom(sr2 ) = {hx1 , x2 i : x1 , x2 ∈ {D, E, F }}.

The idea behind the notion of risk lies in the fact that the minimization of the
maximum risk restricts the operating range of the attacker, in case (s)he manages
to compromise a security resource. Thus, (s)he probably will need to compromise
more than one resource in order to carry out the attack. For instance, during a sybil
attack [89] on a wireless sensor network, a malicious node presents multiple identities
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Figure 3.1. An example network.

to other nodes. The attack is much more effective when those identities belong to
real nodes of the network. Thus, the attacker needs to compromise a certain number
of nodes, from which to steal the identity, before the one from which to start the
attack. However, if the defender strategy is well designed, the attacker will probably
have to damage more than one security resource in order to steal a sufficient number
of identities, therefore delaying the attack and increasing the risk of being detected.
Other types of attacks, instead, need just to compromise one node. This is the case
of the black hole attack [89], in which the compromised node drops all the incoming
packets. A black hole is much more effective when the attacker chooses to compromise
a critical node, such as one with a high incoming traffic rate. In this case, a defender
strategy must provide stronger coverage for the most critical nodes, i.e., those that
are more relevant for the correct function of the network. An attacker will thus be
forced to compromise more than one resource in order to compromise the most critical
nodes.

3.2.2 Definition of Secure Network
A formal definition of secure network that matches the techniques adopted by the
security systems is crucial, since it gives the guidelines for the formalization of the
linear constraints we will use in the Pareto analysis. We can classify security systems
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into two main categories: detection and prevention systems. Those categories correspond to two different security policies: (i) node/link monitoring, and (ii) node/link
hardening. As an example of link monitoring we mention the IoT IDS by Raza et
al. [26], which checks the link quality for the detection of network layer and routing
attacks, and the Liteworp system [90] that uses guard nodes as a countermeasure
for wormhole attacks in WSNs. We would like also to mention Dataguard [91] as an
example of node monitoring based on a code attestation technique to check the presence of malicious code in the memory of network nodes. Titan [86] is an example of
a security architecture for hardening tiny devices with a hardware-assisted dynamic
root of trust. The encryption key management scheme by Eschenauer et al. [92], to
harden links among nodes neighbors, is an example of link hardening. According to
those two security policies, we derive the definition of secure network.
Definition 3.2.3 (secure link) A link {v,v’} is secure if at least one of the following conditions holds:
(σ) both nodes v and v’ are in the communication range of the same watchdog;
(γ) both nodes v and v’ can establish a secure communication channel.
Definition 3.2.4 (secure node) A node v is secure if at least one of the following
conditions holds:
(α) v is tamper resistant;
(β) every link that involves v is secure.
In condition (α) the term tamper resistant means that the node is equipped with
a security tool that makes it inaccessible to attackers wishing to compromise it. In
other words, Definition 3.2.4 states that the correct functioning of a node can be guaranteed by avoiding malicious code injection, or by monitoring/strengthening the links
connecting to the other nodes. In Definition 3.2.3, a watchdog [29] is a security resource that monitors network nodes behavior. Past approaches to intrusion detection
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use watchdogs for overhearing in/out-coming traffic of neighbors nodes, performing
code attestation, checking the signal strength, etc. Conditions (α) and (γ) capture
the policy adopted by prevention systems (node/link hardening), while conditions (β)
and (σ) the policy adopted by detection systems (node/link monitoring).
We can now define a network N = hV, Ei as secure if each node v ∈ V is secure,
according to Definition 3.2.4.

3.3 Players’ Strategy
In this section, we define the concept of “strategy” for the defender and the attacker. Their interaction is modeled as a Stackelberg game [81]. In such a game the
defender plays the leader and makes the first move by installing a security infrastructure AP . The attacker plays the follower by trying to compromise one or more
security resources sr ∈ AP , so that the attack can be carried out on the nodes that
are no longer protected by the damaged security resources.

3.3.1 Defender’s Strategy
The defender strategy consists of a security resource allocation plan. Given that
each security resource entails an installation cost and some energy consumption, the
best resource allocation plan for the defender is the one that provides a reasonable
balance between efficiency, in terms of energy consumption and cost, and effectiveness,
in terms of maximum risk and maximum criticality. The best plan is computed in two
steps. In the first step we perform a Pareto analysis which solves the optimization
problem defined by the following equation:
min {ec(AP ), tc(AP ), max crit(sr, AP, N )}

AP ∈AP

sr∈AP

(3.1)

where ec(AP ) and tc(AP ) denote the total energy consumption and the total cost of
the allocation plan AP , respectively, and maxsr∈AP crit(sr, AP, N ) is the maximum
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criticality value over the set of nodes of N that are no longer protected when one
resource in AP stops working. The Pareto analysis consists in computing a set of
Pareto points p = (ec, tc, cr), that we refer to as Pareto curve. Each point corresponds to a set of allocation plans, i.e., all the plans (strategies) that have an energy
consumption, a total cost, and a maximum criticality equal to the values of ec, tc and
cr, respectively. Then, we choose the point p+ whose values best fit our efficiency
and criticality requirements. In the second step we compute the best allocation plan
(best defender strategy), by solving the optimization problem defined by the following
equation:
min { max risk(sr, AP, N )}

AP ∈AP + sr∈AP

(3.2)

where AP + ⊆ AP is the set of allocation plans that entail an energy consumption,
a cost, and a maximum criticality as the values of the Pareto point p+ chosen in the
previous step; and maxsr∈AP risk(sr, AP, N ) is the maximum number of nodes of N
that remain unprotected when a security resource in AP stops working.

3.3.2 Attacker’s Strategy
We assume that an attacker needs to compromise at least one security resource in
order to carry out an attack. In fact, whatever is the attack, an attacker always needs
to first open a breach in the security, before attacking the system. We address the
worst case attacker, that is the one who knows the defenders strategy AP , and plays
her/his best strategy, i.e., chooses to compromise the security resource that maximizes
the risk (i.e., leaves unprotected the maximum number of nodes), the criticality (i.e.,
leaves unprotected the most critical nodes), or a combination of both. An attacker
strategy is represented by a security resource sr ∈ AP . The best attacker strategy is
defined as follows:
sr∗ = max α · risk(sr, AP, N ) + β · crit(sr, AP, N ), α + β = 1
sr∈AP

(3.3)
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3.4 Computing the Defender’s Strategy
In this section we first introduce a heuristic for computing node’s criticality, then
we briefly survey the concept of Pareto analysis. Finally we describe the two steps
for computing the optimal defender strategy.

3.4.1 Computing Node’s Criticality
Computing the criticality of each node is a key aspect of our approach. The
more accurately we identify the “relevance” of each node for the correct function
of the network, the better the defender strategy works. Due to the heterogeneous
nature of IoT devices and IoT networks, it is not possible to design a general method
for computing nodes criticality which work well for all IoT scenarios. Rather, we
encourage network administrators to follow an ad-hoc approach for each specific case.
However, we propose a two-steps approach to determine criticality, that we believe
can be adopted for the majority of the existent IoT scenarios. The first step assigns a
criticality value to each node based on the rate of their in/out-going traffic. Nodes that
are more fundamental for the correct propagation of data will have higher criticality.
The criticality values are then normalized across all the nodes. This information
can be automatically collected by means of actual traffic analysis – if the network
has already been deployed – or through simulations of data communications on the
topology and chosen protocol – if the network is still in its design stage. In the second
step the network administrators can tune any criticality value by either (i) overriding
the computed value with a new, custom one, or (ii) by specifying “multipliers” for
specific areas of the network, to be applied to all the nodes located in that area. The
second step is not required. However our two-step approach helps in characterizing
the network in the best possible way by leveraging the administrator’s knowledge of
the intrinsics of the network and its functionality, while still automating most of the
activities for characterizing the node criticality.
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Our two-steps approach is well suited to many IoT scenarios. First of all, the
correct transmission of data is often at the core of the security goal. In these cases
the first step of our approach properly addresses the needs to distinguish nodes basing
on their in/out-going traffic rate. Second, many IoT networks are designed with a
hierarchical structure, thus some nodes need to be considered at a different level of
criticality with respect to the other ones. Is the case of cluster-heads in cluster-based
network topologies, that are responsible of the correct functioning of nodes belonging
to their cluster. Or else, in a home IoT environment it is often the case that external
attackers launch attacks trough the router linking the IoT network with the Internet.
In such cases it is mandatory to assign the highest criticality value to the router,
which represent an access point for intruders.

3.4.2 Overview of the Pareto Analysis
Pareto analysis [93] is a classic optimization method used in situations in which
there are multiple competing objectives that must somehow be satisfied simultaneously. The basic idea behind Pareto optimization of three competing objective
functions φ1 , φ2 and φ3 subject to a set C of constraints is as follows. Suppose that
σ = (x1 , x2 , x3 ) and σ 0 = (x01 , x02 , x03 ) are two different solutions (resource allocation
plans) and suppose that φ1 , φ2 and φ3 are minimization problems. We say that σ
dominates σ 0 , denoted σ B σ 0 , iff:
(x1 ≤ x01 ∧ x2 ≤ x02 ∧ x3 ≤ x03 ) ∧ (x1 < x01 ∨ x2 < x02 ∨ x3 < x03 )
A solution σ is said to be Pareto optimal w.r.t. a set of minimization problems Φ,
and constraints C if and only if there is no solution σ 0 6= σ such that σ 0 B σ. We use
Pareto analysis to solve the optimization problem defined by Equation 3.1 in order
to find a compromise strategy. The main point of this method is the computation of
the Pareto curve (see [93]).
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3.4.3 First Step: Pareto Analysis for the Defender
To perform our Pareto analysis, let
P = {(ec(AP ), tc(AP ), max crit(sr, AP, N ))|AP ∈ AP}
sr∈AP

be the set of all possible values for our three objectives.
Definition 3.4.1 (Pareto curve) The Pareto curve PC for the three-objective optimization problem defined by Equation 3.1 is the set {(a, b, c) | (a, b, c) ∈ P and
@(a0 , b0 , c0 ) such that (a0 , b0 , c0 ) B (a, b, c)}.

ALGORITHM 2:
Function(ComputePC (minCR,maxCR)) X = ∅;
for cr = minCR − 1, . . . , maxCR do
tc ← getT C(∞, cr);
while (tc 6= null) do
ec ← getEC(tc, cr);
X ← X ∪ (ec, tc, cr);
tc ← getT C(ec, cr);
return Pareto-optimal points in X;
where:
getEC(tc, cr) =

min

ec(AP )

AP ∈ AP
tc(AP ) ≤ tc
maxsr∈AP crit(sr, AP, N ) ≤ cr

getT C(ec, cr) =

min

tc(AP )

AP ∈ AP
ec(AP ) < ec
maxsr∈AP crit(sr, AP, N ) ≤ cr

Algorithm 1 computes the Pareto curve of the three-objective optimization problem defined by Equation 3.1. More specifically, by fixing each possible value of criticality cr (Line 3), the algorithm computes the set X of points p = (ec, tc, cr) (Lines
4-9), where ec and tc are the total energy consumption and the total cost, respectively.
The first step is to compute the minimum total cost without considering the energy
consumption (Line 4). This optimization is performed by the function getTC, and the
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Figure 3.2. An example of Pareto curve.

value is assigned to the variable tc. Then, given tc and cr, function getEC computes
the minimum total energy consumption ec (Line 6), and the point (ec, tc, cr) is added
to X (Line 7). Now the algorithm computes a different value of tc (Line 8). This
value is obtained by the function getTC, which minimizes the total cost by imposing
that the total energy consumption is strictly less than the one previously computed.
If such value exists, the algorithm continues to generate more points by iterating in
the while loop, otherwise it exits. Finally, in Line 11 the algorithm returns all Pareto
(non-dominated) points of X. Notice that in Line 3, we start to enumerate the values
of cr from minCR − 1, so that, as no node exists with cr < minCR, the plan being
calculated with cr = minCR − 1 provides risk = 0, i.e., each network node is covered
by at least two security resources. For allocation plans with cr = 0 it is not necessary
to perform the second optimization step, since we already know that the risk will be
also equal to 0. Figure 3.2 shows an example of Pareto curve, computed for the Pareto
analysis of one of the topologies used for our experiments, and discussed in Section
3.6. It can be noticed that no point (ec, c, cr) of the curve is dominated, according to
the definition in Section 3.4.2.
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3.4.4 Linear Constraints for the Pareto Analysis
We formalize the set of basic constraints as follows.

Variables
• x1 , . . . , x|R| ; if resource sri belongs to AP , then xi = 1, otherwise xi = 0;
• z11 , . . . , zd|L||R|e ; if location loci ∈ Dom(srj ) and srj ∈ AP , then zij = 1, otherwise zij = 0;
• q1 , . . . , q|V | ; if loci ∈ LV belongs to the domain of no more then one security
resource, then qi = 1, otherwise qi = 0;
• l1 , . . . , l|E| ; if link ei is secure, then li = 1, otherwise li = 0.
All variables are binary. The set of basic constraints is shown in Figure 3.3.
Constraint 3.4 says that no more than one security resource can be placed on the same
location.2 Constraint 3.5 says that variable zij is assigned value 1 if srj ∈ AP and
loci ∈ Dom(srj ). Constraints 3.6 and 3.7 capture the fact that, if a location loci ∈ LV
is guarded by no more than one security resource, then qi = 1, otherwise qi = 0. Here,
M is a constant big enough to satisfy the constraints for all values of qi and the lhs of
the equation (any integer greater than R). Variables qi are used to compute the risk
and the criticality associated with each resource sr ∈ AP . Constraint 3.8 captures
the definition of secure node, according to which a node is secure if conditions (α) or
P
(β) of Definition 3.2.4 hold, i.e., expressions srj ∈Res(vi .loc):srj ∈T1 xj or ci , respectively,
equal 1. The value of variable ci is computed by constraints 3.9 and 3.10, and it has
value equal to 1 if all links belonging to Edges(vi ) are secure, otherwise it is equal
to 0. The definition of secure link is captured by Constraint(s) 3.11, according to
which a link is secure (lk = 1) if conditions (σ) or (γ) of Definition 3.2.3 hold, i.e.,
variables ak or bk equal 1. The values of these variables are computed by Constraints
2

Constraint 3.4 does not bear any loss of generality since a security resource can implement more
than one security function.
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P

≤ 1,

sri ∈Res(locj ) xi

zij = xj ,
P

≤ qi + M · (1 − qi ),

srj :loci ∈Dom(srj ) zij

P

≥ 2 − qi ,

srj ∈Res(vi .loc):srj .t∈Tα

P

ek ∈Edges(vi ) lk

P

ek ∈Edges(vi ) lk

∀loci ∈ LV

∀loci ∈ LV

xj + ci ≥ 1,

∀vi ∈ V

(3.5)
(3.6)
(3.7)
(3.8)

< ci + |N eighbors(vi )|,

∀vi ∈ V

(3.9)

≥ ci · |N eighbors(vi )|,

∀vi ∈ V

(3.10)

lk ≥ ak , lk ≥ bk , lk ≤ ak + bk ,
P

(3.4)

∀srj ∈ R, ∀loci ∈ Dom(srj )

srj :loci ∈Dom(srj ) zij

P

∀locj ∈ L

srj :{v.loc,v 0 .loc}∈Dom(srj )∧srj .t∈Tσ

dkj ≥ ak ,

∀ek ∈ E

(3.11)

∀{v, v 0 }k ∈ E

(3.12)

∀{v, v 0 }k ∈ E, ∀srj : {v.loc, v 0 .loc} ∈ Dom(srj ) ∧ srj .t ∈ Tσ
(3.13)
P
z
≥
2d
,
0
ij
kj
loci ∈{v.loc,v .loc}
(3.14)
∀{v, v 0 }k ∈ E, ∀srj : {v.loc, v 0 .loc} ∈ Dom(srj ) ∧ srj .t ∈ Tσ
P
loci ∈{v.loc,v 0 .loc} zij < dkj + 2,
(3.15)
∀{v, v 0 }k ∈ E, ∀srj : {v.loc, v 0 .loc} ∈ Dom(srj ) ∧ srj .t ∈ Tσ
P
loci ∈{v.loc,v 0 .loc} zij ≥ 2bk ,
(3.16)
∀{v, v 0 }k ∈ E, ∀srj : {v.loc, v 0 .loc} ∈ Dom(srj ) ∧ srj .t ∈ Tγ
P
loci ∈{v.loc,v 0 .loc} zij < bk + 2,
(3.17)
∀{v, v 0 }k ∈ E, ∀srj : {v.loc, v 0 .loc} ∈ Dom(srj ) ∧ srj .t ∈ Tγ

ak ≥ dkj ,

zij + qi ≤ 1,

∀loci ∈ LV , ∀srj ∈ R : srj .t ∈ Tα ∧ srj .loc = loci
P
∀loci ∈ L
srj :loci ∈Dom(srj ) zij ≥ 1,

(3.18)
(3.19)

Figure 3.3. Basic constraints.

3.12-3.15 and 3.16-3.17, respectively. Constraint 3.18 says that for tamper resistant
nodes the variable qi is forced to 0, i.e., it does not affect the risk and criticality
values of the allocation plan is being computed. Finally, Constraint 3.19 says that
each location has to belong to the domain of at least one security resource in AP .
This last constraint is fundamental because it addresses the dynamic characteristic of
IoT networks. In an IoT environment, as new devices can enter and leave the network
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getEC(tc, cr) = minimize

X

sri .e · xi

sri ∈R

subject to: basic constraints, and
X
sri .c · xi ≤ tc
(3.20)
sri ∈R

vi .cr · qi ≤ cr

∀vi ∈ V

(3.21)

Figure 3.4. Linear program for computing the minimum energy consumption.

area, it is important to monitor all locations where any new device can move over time.
When this happens, we are sure to have at least one security resource monitoring its
location. We emphasize that the concept of dynamic topology we refer to is different
from the concept of mobility. In our network model it is expected that the nodes
are static, and that the topology changes due to the (dis)appearance of nodes. For
mobile device scenarios a different approach to resource allocation should be adopted.
In Constraints 3.8 and 3.14-3.18 the symbols Tα , Tσ and Tγ are subset of T , the set of
security resource types. In particular, Tα is the set of types of security resources that
make a node tamper resistant, Tσ is the set of types of security resources that behave
as watchdogs, and Tγ is the set of types of security resources that make a node able
to establish a security communication channel with its neighbors. In Section 3.5 we
implement the proposed method for two real-case IoT scenarios where we show how
to compute such sets.
The basic constraints shown in Figure 3.3 capture the dependencies between the
variables in the integer linear programs shown in Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. The
objective function of the formulation in Figure 3.4 says that we want to minimize the
total energy consumption of the security infrastructure. Constraint 3.20 says that the
total cost must be lower or equal to tc, and Constraint 3.21 says that the criticality
value of the nodes protected by no more than one security resource, must not exceed
cr. The objective function of the linear program in Figure 3.5 minimizes the total
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getT C(ec, cr) = minimize

X

sri .c · xi

sri ∈R

subject to: basic constraints, and
X
sri .e · xi < ec
(3.22)
sri ∈R

vi .cr · qi ≤ cr

∀vi ∈ V

(3.23)

Figure 3.5. Linear program for computing the minimum cost.

cost of the set of security resources. Constraint 3.22 imposes that the total energy
consumption be strictly less than ec, while Constraint 3.23 is equal to Constraint
3.21.

3.4.5 Second Step: Best Defender Strategy
Once we have computed the Pareto curve P C, we can choose the point p+ =
(ec+ , tc+ , cr+ ) ∈ P C closest to our requirements of energy consumption, cost, and
criticality. p+ identifies the set AP + of different allocation plans that have an energy
consumption equal to ec+ , a cost equal to tc+ , and a criticality value equal to cr+ .
Among all plans in AP + we choose the one which minimizes the risk, i.e., the maximum number of unprotected nodes an attacker can exploit after compromising one
security resource. To do that, we solve the optimization problem defined by Equation
3.2, and formalized as shown in Figure 3.6. The intuition behind constraint 3.24 is
that instead of bounding the risk associated with each security resource sr ∈ AP
on the right-hand side of this constraint, we set it to an unknown value h and then
require the objective function to minimize h. Here, M is a constant big enough to
ensure the satisfaction of the equation for all values of qi and xj (any integer greater
than |V |). Constraints 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27 impose that the allocation plan must be
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getR(ec, tc, cr) = minimize h
subject to: basic constraints, and
X
(
qi ) − (1 − xj ) · M ≤ h

∀srj ∈ R

(3.24)

loci ∈{Dom(srj )∩LV }

X

sri .e · xi ≤ ec

(3.25)

sri .c · xi ≤ tc

(3.26)

sri ∈R

X
sri ∈R

vi .cr · qi ≤ cr

∀vi ∈ V

h≥0

(3.27)
(3.28)

Figure 3.6. Linear program for computing the minimum risk.

computed so to have an energy consumption, a cost and a criticality value not greater
than ec, tc and cr, respectively.

3.5 Examples of Real Case Scenarios
In this section we show how to implement the proposed approach for two real case
IoT scenarios. The cases we address here are: (1) a wireless sensor network exposed
to several kinds of attacks; and (2) a domestic IoT environment exposed to jamming
attacks [89], according to which an adversary conducts radio interference on the links,
in order to partially or entirely disrupt a node’s signal.
Case 1. To make sure to counteract different kinds of attacks, the defender
should secure both nodes and links. Suppose that the available security tools are:
an intrusion detection system (IDS), a highly sensitive transceiver (HST)3 , and a
tamper resistant sensor node (TRN). The defender can use tamper resistant sensor
nodes in place of normal nodes (node hardening), in order to prevent the attacker
from having free access to node’s memory, and install an IDS on (additional) sensor
3

A HST increases the device’s communication range, so it can interact with more network nodes.
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nodes for detecting and stopping ongoing attacks (link/node monitoring). Overall,
the defender has available 6 types of security resources as a combination of a set of
security tools and a (additional) sensor node:
1. an IDS installed on a network node;
2. an IDS installed on a network node equipped with a HST;
3. a TRN to put in place of a network node;
4. an IDS installed on a TRN to put in place of a network node;
5. an IDS installed on an additional node to deploy in the network area;
6. an IDS installed on an additional node equipped with a HST to deploy in the
network area;
The defender assigns to the nodes a criticality value based on the amount of their
in/out-going traffic. For this scenario we have that: T = {1, 2, . . . 6}; for each security
resource sr such that sr.t ∈ T 0 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, sr.loc ∈ LV ; for each security resource
sr such that sr.t ∈ T 00 = {5, 6}, sr.loc ∈ LA ; R = T 0 × LV ∪ T 00 × LA ; Tα = {3, 4},
Tσ = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6} and Tγ = ∅.
Case 2. In the majority of cases a jammer is an attacker that uses its own
device for disrupting nodes signal. The defender thus chooses to adopt the link
monitoring technique to detect the attack. The IoT devices used in this scenario
are not user-programmable; thus, the defender can only adopt additional devices for
security purposes (security resources of type 5 and 6 of the list of Case 1). The node’s
criticality is assigned customly. For this scenario we have that: T = {5, 6}; for each
security resource sr, sr.loc ∈ LA ; R = T × LA ; Tα = Tγ = ∅, Tσ = T . Notice
that here the defender is only adopting the link monitoring technique, which formally
means that conditions (α) and (γ) are false, while conditions (β) and (σ) are true.
In the linear programming formulation this is formalized as Tα = Tγ = ∅ which, in
P
Constraints 3.8, forces srj ∈Res(vi .loc):srj .t∈Tα xj to be 0, and ci to be 1 ((α) = f alse
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Table 3.1.
Main statistics of the topologies used in the experiments, and packet
delivery rate provided by each strategy. V is the set of nodes, E is the
set of edges, S is the set of source nodes, and L is the set of locations.
Topology

|V|, |E|, |S|, |L|

1 - grid 10 × 10

100, 342, 10, 400

2 - grid 10 × 5

50, 157, 7, 200

3 - grid 5 × 5

25, 72, 5, 100

4 - random

63, 147, 8, 390

5 - random

62, 135, 7, 395

6 - random

24, 38, 5, 183

7 - random

14, 28, 4, 93

8 - random

13, 21, 4, 86

9 - random

11, 17, 3, 83

AP ∗

APc

APec

APcr

(min cost)

(min energy c.)
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Figure 3.7. Performance of the strategies for each of the cases listed in
Table 3.1. Even in an attack-free simulation, the PDR is never 100% due
to the packet drop caused by natural physical phenomena and network
operations.

and (β) = true, respectively); and in Constraints 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.16 and 3.17,
forces ak to be 1 and bk to be 0 ((σ) = true and (γ) = f alse, respectively).
In both cases, for each security resource, the values of cost c, energy consumption
ec and communication range d, depend on the set of adopted tools, and whether
an additional node is deployed. For instance, a security resource of type 5, has
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c = cIDS + cnode , ec = ecIDS + ecnode , d = dnode ; whereas a security resource of type 2
has c = cHST + cIDS , ec = ecHST + ecIDS + ecnode , d = dHST .4
We assume that the network topology is already known to the security administrator. There are various methods for network topology discovery and we refer the
reader to past work [94, 95]. We do not cover such methods in this chapter because
of space constraints. Concerning the security resource features, these can be easily determined from their data sheet, where average energy consumption, cost and
communication range are usually provided.

3.6 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of our proposed framework
when applied to the attack scenario described in Case 1 of Section 3.5. The goal is
to demonstrate the importance of accounting for effectiveness metrics in the design
process of a security infrastructure, besides efficiency. We show how the effectiveness
of the best defender strategy is higher compared to any other strategy. We applied
our technique to 9 different network topologies, whose main characteristics are reported in Table 3.1. For each topology, we computed four different strategies: (i)
the one which entails the minimum cost APc , (ii) the one which entails the minimum
energy consumption APec , (iii) the one which provides a reasonable balance between
cost, energy consumption and criticality (c∗ , ec∗ , cr∗ ), namely APcr , and (iv) the best
defender strategy AP ∗ (the one which entails the minimum risk, given (c∗ , ec∗ , cr∗ )).
We simulated a selective forwarding attack, and measured the packet delivery rate
(PDR) of the network for the four strategies.
4

For resources of type 2, the cost does not depend on the cost of the node, since this already belongs
to the network, but the same principle does not apply for the energy consumption, since together a
security tool and a sensor node become a single thing.
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3.6.1 Settings
We implemented our framework in Java and used IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.5 to
solve the ILPs. All computations were run on an Intel Core i7-5600U CPU clocked at
2.59GHz, running Windows 8.1 64bit, with 2GB RAM available for each experiment.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the different allocation plans, we implemented the
various topologies in TinyOS [47], and carried out 10 independent simulations of 500
seconds each in the TOSSIM simulator [71]. We computed nodes criticality as integer
p
values, ranging from minCR = 1 to maxCR = d |V |e. Its computation was based
on the amount of data packets DP passing through a node during an attack-free
simulation of 500 seconds. More precisely, we normalized the DP value of each node
according to a scale from minCR to maxCR. Then, we assigned to source nodes the
maximum value plus one, in order to assign to these nodes the maximum degree of
security. The set of security resources R is as described in Section 3.5. We assigned
a value for cost c, average energy consumption ec and communication range d, as
follows:
• network node: cn = 2, ecn = 2, dn = 2.
• IDS: cIDS = 1, ecIDS = 2;
• TRN: cT RN = 7, ecT RN = 3;
• HST: cHST = 5, ecHST = 3, dHST = 5.
The values above were assigned so as to reflect real relative differences of cost,
energy consumption, and communication range between them. Overall, we believe
these values to be realistic for our experimental purposes.

3.6.2 Results Analysis
We simulated a selective forwarding attack [89] (with 50% probability of dropping
packets) for 500 seconds, over the nodes no longer protected when the security resource

71
that maximizes the risk is removed from the defense strategy. Table 3.1 shows the
simulation results for each strategy and network topology. We report cost c, energy
consumption ec, maximum criticality cr and maximum risk r provided by the strategy,
in the form (c, ec, cr, r), and the PDR of the network under attack. Figure 3.7 shows
a comparison of the performances for each set of strategies, together with the PDR
of an attack-free scenario.
First of all, we note that the most efficient strategies APc and APec are not the
most effective; in fact, due to the higher value of cr and r, they provide a lower
PDR with respect to APcr and AP ∗ , i.e., the strategies computed by taking into
account effectiveness metrics too. Furthermore, we observe that the PDR is inversely
proportional to the risk and criticality values, since the more relevant and numerous
the unprotected nodes are, the more the lost data packets are. In more detail, in
Case 1 APcr and AP ∗ provide the same criticality, but AP ∗ entails a lower risk and,
as a consequence, a higher PDR. In Case 2, we observe that APc and APcr provide
the same risk, but APc entails a lower PDR since its criticality is higher. In Case 7,
we have that APcr and AP ∗ are exactly the same, because the set of strategies with
cr = 1 has cardinality 1, i.e., there exist only one strategy and, consequently, it is
also the best one. In Case 9, we have that the cheapest strategy APc is also the best
strategy for cr = 1. Furthermore, notice that we always chose an APcr with criticality
greater than 0, which implies a risk greater than 0, and then be able to provide a
more meaningful comparison of the strategies. If we had chosen APcr always with
cr = 0, the risk would have also been 0, and AP ∗ would have always been exactly the
same of APcr . Overall, we note that the quality of a strategy usually increases with
the introduction of effectiveness metrics in the computation process. Hence, for all
the cases (apart case 9), APcr results in a higher PDR than APc and APec , and the
best strategy AP ∗ – the one computed by taking also into account the risk besides
efficiency and criticality – is even better than APcr . We conclude that our approach
provides a high qualitative defender strategy, for which the minimum cost is used,
and that consumes the minimum amount of energy.
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3.7 Scalabililty
We now report some preliminary results about our current analysis on large scale
network scenarios. For space reasons we do not show all details, but we briefly survey
the method.
For large scale networks, the problem could require a large amount of time to
be solved. The time Algorithm 2 takes for computing the Pareto curve depends on
many factors: the size (number of variables) of the problem, the characteristics of
the security resources, the number of solutions (resource allocation plans) found by
the algorithm, the adopted ILP solver (for our implementation we used CPLEX [96]),
the implementation of the framework and the computational power of the machine
used for running it. The size of the problem is computed as: |R| + 2|V | + 4|E| +
P
sr∈R |Dom(sr)|, where |R| is the number of x variables, 2|V | is the number of q
P
and c variables, 4|E| is the number of l, a, b and d variables, and sr∈R |Dom(sr)|
is the number of z variables. We conducted a scalability analysis on a set of five
different network scenarios, that differ from each other for topology, set of security
resources, and ratio between locations and network nodes. Figure 3.8 shows how
the time grows w.r.t. the size of the problem. For all scenarios the set of security
resources is that described in Case 1 of Section 3.5, except for random2 and grid3
where the communication range of the HST is reduced by 20%. The ratio L/V is 4.5,
except for scenarios grid2 and grid3 where it is 2.25. We based this analysis on two
different topologies, grid and random, that are those used in most of the real world
cases.
In order to address scalability, we use an approach organized into three steps: (i)
we divide the network area into smaller sub-areas by using a clustering algorithm;
(ii) we solve in parallel the sub-problems of security configuration; and (iii) we merge
the results obtained for each sub-area. We have carried out an initial assessment of
this approach and found that, on average, the defender strategies consume +9.11%
of energy, costs +6, 83%, but reduces the risk by −8.96% of |V |, w.r.t. the strategies
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obtained without the preliminary clustering step. For large instances our three steps
approach provides solutions with low overhead w.r.t the optimal ones, and due to the
use of parallel computing technique, in an amount of time equivalent to that needed
for a small instance.

3.8 Security Analysis
Robustness of the Security Allocation. The robustness of the final allocated
security configuration depends on the robustness of the security resources chosen and
employed by the network administrator. Nevertheless, our approach always provides
the best security resource allocation, focusing on the optimal trade-off between redundancy and cost minimization.
Attacker with a Different Strategy. We assume an attacker carrying out the attack that is the worst case attack for the defender, i.e., targeting the security resource
that maximizes risk, criticality, or both. In case of an attacker behaving differently
than the worst-case scenario (therefore, in some sense, less smartly), the allocation
provided by our approach will clearly be able to provide an even higher security than
that estimated at the time of the computation of the plan.
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Attacks on Several Different Security Resources. No defender strategy is able
of protecting the network against an attacker able to compromise all security resources. The strategy that best addresses such a situation is the one that delays the
attack as much as possible, by maximizing the number of security tools the attacker
needs to compromise for launching the attack. This way, the defender can hope that
the attacker will bail out because the “pre-attack” process is much too long or complicated, or that (s)he will be caught while trying to compromise the security tools. The
most effective to implement such strategy is to deploy a highly redundant security
infrastructure, in order to make any attack very hard to be carried out. However,
this solution is not efficient in terms of energy consumption, and can also be quite
expensive for large-scale networks. Our approach, instead, provides the most effective solution among the most efficient ones. While this scenario is out of scope for
our work, it would be nevertheless easy to add additional redundancy on top of the
optimal plan computed, in particular around the areas of the network deemed more
important by the administrator.

3.9 Further Uses and Implementations
Our method computes the best defender strategies based on four objectives, that
are energy consumption, cost, and criticality, mutually optimized in a first phase (see
Section 3.4.3), and risk, minimized in a second phase (see Section 3.4.5). We chose
to split the optimization process in those two phases for three main reasons. First, a
Pareto analysis with more than three competing goals may require much more time,
or alternatively, a much higher computing power in order to be performed. Second,
a Pareto analysis involving less then three competing goals provides a much smaller
set of solutions, thus limiting the administrator’s decisional power. The reason is
that the definition of dominated point becomes less restrictive when the number of
dimensions decreases (see Section 3.4.2). Finally the choice to optimize criticality in
the first phase in place of risk is mainly a matter of convenience, since the range of
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criticality values is always much smaller than the range of risk values (risk ∈ [0, |V ]]),
and thus it is faster to enumerate (see Line 3 of Algorithm 2). However, there are
cases in which one or more of the four objectives do not matter for a particular
IoT scenario. For instance, in a home environment is often the case that the energy
consumption is not a metric of interest since in such small areas the electrical power
is always available. Or else, in a one-hop WSN where all nodes perform the same
sensing task, there is no criticality. Therefore the second phase is not required as
the risk can be evaluated concurrently with the other two objectives, or alternatively,
the first phase can be converted in a two-objective optimization process. The cost
might be not relevant for small-scale networks and can thus be discarded from the
analysis. Furthermore, to restrict the set of solutions of interest, and thus to speed
up the optimization process, one can impose bounds on the objectives values. For all
this cases it is easy to adapt our framework.
A further use of the proposed method is in the performance assessment of security
tools. For a given attack different detection/prevention techniques might exist for
which efficiency and effectiveness depend on some feature of the network of interest,
such as topology, mobility, routing protocol, etc. A security administrator may want
to perform a simulation to determine which IDS/IPS provides the best performance
in her(his) specific case. Our framework can also be used in research as an evaluation
tool for the comparison of new security techniques with existing ones.

3.10 Related Work
The problem of finding efficient security solutions with the help of game theory
and Pareto analysis has been extensively considered in the domain of computer networks [20, 21, 25]. Other work focuses on securing the physical layer from eavesdropping and jamming attacks. In such previous approaches, players include attackers,
non malicious users, and the layer itself (with its access control policy). These games
are largely based on performance indexes of the physical layer, and the main goal is to
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optimize these performance indexes. Approaches in [22,23] use game-theory to study
jamming attacks, while the approach in [24] uses Stackelberg games [81] to model
the interaction between defender and eavesdroppers. We like also to mention [97, 98]
as typical examples of game theory and Pareto analysis applied to IoT scenarios.
The approach in [97] investigates sensor networks in which an attacker can physically
capture, replicate the nodes, and deploy sensors into a network, and then proceed to
take over the network. A multi-player game is formalized in order to model the noncooperative strategic behavior between the attackers and the network. The approach
in [98] is based on a node clustering algorithm, with effective tax-based sub-carrier
allocation tailored to wireless mesh networks with QoS support. Here, Pareto analysis is used for the optimal resource management. Solutions proposed in the context
of IoT have focused on efficiency, due to the small “size” of network components, in
terms of CPU, memory, and energy budget. Zhou and Chao [99] propose a mediaaware security framework for facilitating IoT applications, and provide a design rule
and strategy to achieve a good trade-off between system’s flexibility and efficiency.
Raza et al. [100] propose an IPsec extension of 6LoWPAN, and show that IPsec is a
feasible option for securing the IoT in terms of packet size, energy consumption, memory usage, and processing time. Many approaches have been proposed for computing
the criticality of graph nodes. Recent approaches target the distributed evaluation
and placement of the nodes most critical to network robustness, thus assessing node
centrality in a distributed way [101]. Marsden [102] shows empirical evidence that
localized centrality measures calculated for one-hop radius neighborhood are highly
correlated to the global centrality measure. Kermarrec et al. [103] propose a new
centrality measure, called second order centrality, defined in terms of the standard
deviation of the time between visits of a perpetual random walk to each node. Arulselvan et al. [104] propose critical nodes to be detected as those whose deletion results
in the minimum pairwise connectivity among the remaining nodes. These techniques
are useful when the IoT-based system is not deployed yet, but we can still determine
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its actual network topology and estimate the nodes criticality with the help of graph
theory or, as alternative, simulation tools [71].
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of finding the optimal security resource
allocation plan for IoT networks has never been investigated. Past work on IoT security focuses on protection mechanisms against specific attacks [22,23,85], investigates
ISO/OSI layer-related security problems [105], or proposes architectures for intrusion detection, attack prevention, or recovery systems [26, 82]. To assure the correct
function of IoT networks even under attack, one may need to deploy many such security mechanisms. Therefore, a formal methodology for allocating such mechanisms
is needed. To this end, this work proposes a method capable to function for all the
different security techniques adopted by the systems cited above.

3.11 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a game-theoretic model to answer the following
question: In an IoT scenario, given a set of security resources and a set of attacks
to protect against, which resources should a security manager choose, and how should
(s)he allocate them in the network in order to ensure protection with the minimum
cost, the minimum energy consumption, and a certain degree of robustness against attacks? We provide a method for computing the best defender strategy, corresponding
to the resource allocation plan that best fits efficiency and effectiveness requirements.
With the mutually competing goals of efficiency and effectiveness, we formulate the
problem as a Pareto optimization, show how to formulate the defender’s problem as a
linear optimization problem, and suggest a number of measures to formalize efficiency
and effectiveness aspects of the defender’s strategy. Our experimental results prove
that our method provides the best defender strategy compared to other strategies
that do not take into account (all) effectiveness measures, but efficiency only.
The knowledge about the security resources deployed and their placement provided
by OptAll can be useful to perform more effective monitoring of the now-deployed
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network. In the next chapter, we present our system for detecting attacks in the
network that was designed specifically to make the best use of such knowledge.
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4 KALIS: A SYSTEM FOR KNOWLEDGE-DRIVEN ADAPTABLE
INTRUSION DETECTION FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Following the hardening of the devices and the deployment of network nodes and security resources, according to a strategically-designed allocation, it is crucial to perform
continuous monitoring to detect attacks and anomalies. Cryptographic techniques
for the IoT [106–110] help in ensuring confidentiality and authenticity of in-network
traffic; however such techniques are not able to protect against all attacks. Therefore, it is critical to re-design fundamental security tools for the specific IoT settings.
One such tool is represented by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). IDSes are vital
to maintain the IoT functional. Detecting an undergoing attack is the first line of
defense for such always-on systems; however, most devices lack logging and reporting mechanisms present instead in enterprise security products [111]. Moreover, an
accurate diagnosis is critical for an effective response action.
Different approaches can be taken when designing an IDS for the IoT; however
limited research has been carried out on this topic. Most current solutions aim at
deploying a custom IDS on each device or group of devices [26, 112]. This approach
has the major drawback of being “too local”, meaning that each IDS will only have
local view of the security situation and insufficient information. Moreover, it does
not account for the interoperation of separate IoT devices or groups of devices. Last,
it delegates security to the manufacturers of the individual devices. On the other
hand, while a more global solution can protect from attacks at a more general level, a
preset standalone IDS would not be flexible enough against the complex and heterogeneous IoT ecosystem. Also, simply adapting an existing IDS, designed for traditional
computing systems and networks, is not a viable solution. Approaches such as full
network scanning to look for threats – used by the widely adopted products such as
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SNORT [113] – would not be a good choice for IoT [114] since most emerging IoT
standards are shifting to IPv6 [115].
There are, however, several characteristics of IoT that can be leveraged to design
an IDS well fit for IoT. First, while heterogeneous, most IoT devices communicate
and operate on standard mediums and protocols (such as IEEE 802.15.4 [116], WiFi
or Bluetooth for mediums, and ZigBee [117] or 6LoWPAN [118] for protocols). Therefore, as long as a device is able to communicate by using several of these mediums
and protocols, effective techniques such as promiscuous overhearing and watchdogbased mechanisms [119, 120] can be deployed. If such a device were able to host a
modularly-designed IDS, new detection capabilities could be added as soon as new
communication interfaces are available. Moreover, when simply observing events that
may be symptoms of security incidents, specific network features can help in ruling out
particular attacks, removing ambiguity, improving accuracy, and increasing detection
performance. We leverage these observations in the design of our system.
In this work, we first analyze the different attack scenarios that make IoT a unique
domain, and investigate the relationship between different network and devices features and related attacks. Then, we propose Kalis1 , a self-adapting, knowledge-driven
IDS for IoT able to detect several attacks in real time across IoT systems running different communication protocols and with different security goals. Kalis autonomously
collects knowledge about the features of the monitored network and entities, and
leverages such knowledge to dynamically configure the most effective set of detection
techniques. To the best of our knowledge, Kalis is the first comprehensive approach to
intrusion detection for IoT that does not target an individual protocol or application,
and adapts the detection strategy to the specific network features.
To minimize the impact on performance and to support IoT devices to which new
software cannot be added, Kalis can be deployed as a standalone tool on a separate,
external device, providing “security-in-a-box”. In that setting, Kalis does not require
changes to existing IoT software and has no performance impact on the applications
1

Kalis is acronym of Knowledge-driven adaptable lightweight intrusion detection system, but is also
a traditional double-edged Filipino sword.
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running on the IoT devices. Kalis can be easily extended for new emerging protocol
standards and can leverage a customizable library of intrusion detection techniques.
Last, it provides a knowledge sharing mechanism that enables collaborative incident
detection, and can act as a data source for multi-source security information and
event management (SIEM) systems [121].
The contributions of this work are the following:
• the introduction of an IoT attack taxonomy and extensive analysis of the relationship between potential attacks and network/device features;
• the conceptual modeling of a knowledge-driven intrusion detection approach,
and its application in the design of a self-configuring, knowledge-driven IDS for
the IoT;
• the development and evaluation of a complete IDS prototype, with modules
covering a wide range of network features and attacks.

4.1 Background
In this section, we provide an overview of the IoT paradigm and its characteristics,
and we introduce some common characteristics of IDSes.

4.1.1 IoT
The IoT paradigm has several characteristics that make it a unique and challenging domain for security measure design. First, the wide range of hardware used for
consumer and enterprise IoT devices results in a diverse set of computing capabilities
as well as in terms of communication mediums utilized. Second, while traditional
computer networks – for which common IDS techniques have been developed – run
mostly on top of the TCP/UDP and IP protocols, the IoT depends on a much more
diverse set of communication protocols. In some cases, a same device needs to communicate through multiple protocols and interfaces at the same time in order to perform
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Figure 4.1. A common home automation scenario, depicting the different patterns of IoT communication.

its tasks. In this regard, the communication patterns in IoT are also various. Deviceto-device communication among different IoT devices (also referred to as “things”) –
often from different manufacturers – is almost always carried out over the Internet,
through cloud services designed specifically for device interoperability. At the same
time, though, groups of devices collaborating for a common task – usually from the
same manufacturer and part of the same product – form a “master-slaves” structure
that we refer to as hub-to-subs; in this case, a more powerful device coordinates,
controls, and communicates with several more constrained devices through wireless
protocols that are more constrained in power or bandwidth, such as IEEE 802.15.4
or Bluetooth.
Consider for example a common home automation scenario (see Figure 4.1) composed of a smart lighting system and a smart thermostat, all controlled via a smart-
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phone. The smart lighting system typically consists of a IoT device serving as hub
and connected to the Internet through the router, and a set of wireless-enabled light
bulbs powered by more constrained microprocessors. When the command of turning
on a light is issued from the smartphone, it hits the Cloud services, reaches the hub
device through the Internet, and is then propagated locally via a ZigBee-like protocol
to the actual light bulb. Conversely, interoperability between separate systems is
not usually achieved via local communication. When the smart thermostat becomes
aware that the user has arrived home, it can set the correct temperature and also
require the smart lighting system to turn on the lights. Even though both devices are
in the same household, such communication is typically achieved with the thermostat
pushing a command to its own cloud service, then having the cloud services of the two
systems communicating, and finally having the smart lighting system’s cloud service
propagating the command to the hub device.

4.1.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Most IDSes have a common structure: a data gathering module that collects data
possibly containing evidence of an attack, an analysis module that processes such data
to detect attacks, and a reporting mechanism to report attacks. The main differences
in design choices for IDSes lie in [122]:
• Data source: host-based, network-based, hybrid
• Detection methods: signature-based, anomaly-based
• Time of detection: online, offline
• Architecture: centralized, distributed
• Environment: wired/wireless/ad-hoc network, ...
Network-based IDSes perform their tasks by externally analyzing network traffic,
whereas host-based IDSes require small pieces of software, called agents, to run on
the monitored devices themselves.
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Traditionally, intrusion detection techniques can be broadly classified into either
signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature-based approaches observe the monitored network and attempt to match a pattern of events or data to known attack
signatures; such approaches are generally simpler to develop but cannot detect attacks for which the signature is unavailable. Conversely, anomaly-based techniques
monitor network traffic and compare it against an established “normal” baseline –
which can be dynamically learned by the system or statically set by the administrator – to detect anomalous behaviors. Such approaches are more versatile, as they
can detect unknown attacks, but they are harder to implement and more inaccurate,
potentially yielding high false positive rates [123].

4.2 Knowledge-driven Intrusion Detection
IDSes typically leverage a library of several detection techniques. Activating all
those detecting techniques guarantees a good coverage against potential attacks, but
easily leads to inaccuracy and wasted resources. Consider the situation of attacks that
share similar symptoms: to a passive external observer – which is the case for networkbased IDSes – such attacks will be indistinguishable. Moreover, processing network
events and traffic through all the detection techniques requires an unnecessarily high
amount of system resources, and can even introduce delays in the attack reaction.
We observe, however, that some features of the monitored network and entities
allow one to rule out specific attacks and anomalies; for example, a selective forwarding attack cannot be carried out in a single-hop network. Collecting knowledge
about the network’s features thus enables the selection of the optimal set of detection
techniques. Such knowledge acquisition can be carried out autonomously by the IDS,
thus avoiding the need for providing the IDS with predetermined information about
the features of the network. Doing so also removes the configuration burden from
the user, often not expert in IoT or network security especially in domestic settings,
where IoT is witnessing a wide adoption. Moreover, since IoT is a dynamic environ-
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ment, a particular configuration of the IDS that is optimal at a certain point in time
might not be optimal anymore later on. Supporting continued security enforcement
even in face of environment changes is critical.

4.2.1 Conceptual Model
We develop a conceptual model of our knowledge-driven intrusion detection approach. For that purpose, we now define several key concepts:
• Observation: a piece of information gathered by observing the available events
(e.g., the used communication protocols, a special forwarding field in intercepted
packets, a change in signal strength from a node, ...);
• Feature: an intrinsic characteristic of the monitored entities and networks
(e.g., multihop vs. singlehop network, mobile vs. static network, powerful vs.
constrained devices, ...);
• Symptom: a particular case of observation that could be associated with a
potential security incident (e.g., data losses or inconsistencies, change in traffic
frequency, packet duplication or alteration, packet dropping, ...);
• Detection Technique: the detection technique for a known security incident,
attack or anomaly, carried out purposefully or not, that should trigger a consequent repair mechanism, such as an alert to the user or an automatic response
action (e.g., selective forwarding attack, replication attack, Sybil attack, interference, poor link quality, ...).
With these concepts in place, our knowledge-driven intrusion detection approach
follows this conceptual process: using Observation O, the system can discover a Feature F of the monitored entities and network. Given the knowledge about F , the
system can effectively determine which one(s) of Detection Technique {D1 , D2 , ...Dn }
to activate. When only the right detection techniques are active, they will process
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Figure 4.2. ICMP Flood attack vs. Smurf attack.

the available information to identify symptom(s) S, and detect the security incidents
happening, improving the accuracy of the system.

Working Example
To illustrate our model, we now walk through a concrete example. We consider
two possible attacks: ICMP Flood attack and Smurf attack (see Figure 4.2). In the
ICMP Flood attack, a single attacker node sends many ICMP Echo Reply messages
to the victim, using several different identities as sender. In the Smurf attack, the
attacker sends ICMP Echo Request messages to several neighbors of the victim using
the victim’s identity as sender; those neighbors will therefore respond with ICMP Echo
Reply messages directed to the victim. To an external observer, these two attacks
show the same symptoms, that is, a high amount of ICMP Echo Reply messages sent
to a victim node. However, the Smurf attack is not possible under single-hop network,
and this knowledge can be leveraged to achieve an accurate detection.
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Consider the attack and the topology shown in the left-hand side of Figure 4.2.
Node 5 will carry out an ICMP Flood attack on victim node V . Our knowledge-driven
model can then be instantiated for this example as follows: observing the traffic,
the system can reconstruct the portion of topology in the monitored network, and
determine that it is a single-hop network. Given that knowledge, the system activates
the detection technique for ICMP Flood attacks and not that for Smurf attacks. Upon
the detection of an unusually high amount of ICMP Echo Reply messages to the node,
the only active module will unambiguously detect the undergoing ICMP Flood attack.

4.2.2 Taxonomies
In order for the knowledge-driven model to be effectively employed, it is necessary
to formalize and categorize the threats in IoT. We thus propose two taxonomies that
look at IoT security threats from different points of view.

Attack Patterns: Taxonomy By Target
In the complex IoT ecosystem, different entities have different capabilities and
potential to cause security incidents. We propose a classification and nomenclature
from the point of view of attack patterns, considering the source and the destination
of each pattern. Table 4.1 summarizes our taxonomy, reporting the attack sources
on the rows and the targets on the columns. Figure 4.1 can be used as reference,
together with Table 4.1, for a visual interpretation of these attack patterns.
Smart routers2 are becoming an increasingly available commercial product, and fit
well in the IoT ecosystem; therefore, we choose to include them in the categorization
not only as target of attacks, but also as potential source of attacks. An interesting
aspect of our attack patterns classification is that some source-target pairs are not
possible. For example, a sub would not typically be able to attack a router or an
2

We use the term “router” to indicate both routers and gateways, as they are the same for our
purposes.
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Table 4.1.
Taxonomy of IoT attacks by target.

SOURCE

TARGET

Internet
Service

Hub

Sub

Router

Internet

Denial of
Service

Remote
Denial of
Thing

-

-

Hub

Denial of
Service

Control
Denial of
Thing

Denial of
Thing

Denial of
Routing

Sub

-

-

Denial of
Thing

-

-

Control
Denial of
Thing

-

Denial of
Routing

Router

Internet service directly, as it lacks the communication hardware necessary to reach
them.
Attacks aimed at Internet services are usually in the traditional form of Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. Recent news have in fact reported the use of IoT devices for
botnet attacks [12]. Moreover, we coin the general term “Denial of Thing” (DoT) to
denote an attack aimed at disrupting the functionality of a thing. Some sub-types
of DoT attacks are considered in our taxonomy. For example, attacks targeting an
IoT hub are typically aimed at denying the execution of some functions of that hub,
including the control of all its dependent subs, if any. Therefore, we refer to such
attack as a “Control DoT”. Last, we use the term “Denial of Routing” for all attack
patterns that target IoT routers. Such attacks will typically aim at blocking the
normal functionality of all the IoT devices on the local network. Note that attacks
from the Internet to a local smart router – possible but still far-fetched – cannot be
addressed by any local solution, and are therefore out of the scope of our work.
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Figure 4.3. Taxonomy of relationships between IoT network/device
features and attacks. Dots and crosses indicate the possibility and
impossibility, respectively, of an attack in presence of a specific feature; circles indicate that the appropriate detection technique for the
attack depends on the specific feature.

Leveraging Knowledge: Taxonomy By Features
The effective development of a knowledge-driven intrusion detection model requires also a clear understanding of the relationships between monitored network/entity features and security incidents. Therefore, we propose a taxonomy for the most
common features and attacks in the IoT. Figure 4.3 shows our classification, with dots
and crosses indicating the possibility and impossibility, respectively, for an attack to
happen in presence of a specific feature, and circles indicating instances in which the
appropriate detection technique for an attack depends on the specific feature.
Note that in many cases the detection technique for a specific attack depends on
the characteristics of the network of interest; for instance, for attacks such as sybil,
sinkhole, etc., the detection techniques for single-hop networks are significantly different from those adopted for multi-hop networks. Thus, for such attacks, it is important
that all and only the appropriate detection techniques are activated depending on the
knowledge about the various network features.
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Also note that the IoT is unique in being susceptible to a range of attacks that span
those proper of constrained WSN nodes as well as those more proper of traditional
computer networks. For this reason, our taxonomy includes a very wide set of features
to accommodate all potential attacks (even though it is not possible to be exhaustive
in the actual instantiation of this classification.). Doing so, it becomes easier to
build a comprehensive library of detection techniques that can work well with our
knowledge-driven approach. Lastly, note that we include as features also the presence
of prevention techniques; for example, cryptographic techniques deployed on some of
the monitored devices make the latter immune to attacks such as data alteration.

4.3 Design of Kalis
In this section, we introduce the requirements that have driven the design of
Kalis, and then provide a detailed presentation of the event-driven architecture and
the components of Kalis.

4.3.1 Design Requirements
The design of an IDS for a domain as complex as the IoT must fulfill several
important design requirements. Following are the ones we considered in the design
of Kalis.
• Asynchronous and Event-driven. Since the IDS has to capture and analyze
big amounts of traffic for several possible threats across many data sources and
protocols, the IDS should be completely asynchronous and event-driven.
• No software changes. As IoT software is often proprietary, closed-source,
and heterogeneous, it is not realistic for an IDS to require changes to the source
code of application software. Rather, the IDS should be able to monitor network
and devices as an external entity through overhearing and environment sensing.
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• Multi-medium and Multi-protocol. Different IoT devices, applications and
products leverage different communication mediums and protocols. Moreover,
all of the attack patterns discussed in our taxonomy by target need to be considered. Also, an IDS for the IoT should be able to comply with several such
standards, as well as be extensible so to be able to support new technologies or
protocol standards that emerge.
• No performance overhead. IoT applications have a wide range of purposes
characterized by different requirements in terms of Quality of Service (QoS).
Therefore, an IDS should have no impact on the performance of the devices’
applications.
• Collaborative. Interoperation is one of the core characteristics of the IoT
paradigm. Moreover, a single point of view is not always sufficient for acquiring
knowledge about the environment and detecting security incidents. Thus, an
IDS should enable knowledge sharing, as well as collaborative detection techniques.

4.3.2 Architecture
In this section, we discuss the architecture and all the individual components of
Kalis (see Figure 4.4).
With respect to the different design choices of IDSes discussed in Section 4.1.2,
Kalis is a network-based, hybrid signature/anomaly-based, hybrid centralized/distributed, online IDS that adapts to different environments.

Communication System
The Communication System acts as interface with the external world. Specialized subcomponents take care of interacting with traffic on different protocols. In our
current design we include ZigBee/XBee/6LoWPAN (on IEEE 802.15.4), WiFi (on
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Figure 4.4. The high-level architecture of Kalis.

IEEE 802.11), and Bluetooth traffic, but the design makes it easy to extend to future standards. The Communication System overhears all traffic on all the supported
interfaces, satisfying the breadth requirement of considering all attack patterns discussed in our taxonomy by target.

Data Store
All traffic from all sources is managed and stored in the Data Store component.
The Data Store listens for events from the Communication System on newly captured
packets, manages a history of recent traffic for modules to access, and logs all traffic
on disk, if required by the user. In order to appropriately utilize memory, only a
sliding window of configurable size of the most recent packets is kept in memory.
Logs from disk can also be replayed for traffic analysis by the network administrator
in case security incidents are detected. The Data Store abstracts the traffic sources
by replaying traffic transparently to the detection modules, which will perform their
tasks as if operating on live traffic.

Knowledge Base and Collective Knowledge Management
A key component to Kalis is the Knowledge Base. It stores all the available
information about the features of the monitored entities and networks in a unique,

93
centralized place, as well as it provides this information to all the parties that require
it, such as various Detection Modules and the Module Manager. In Kalis, we refer to
an individual piece of knowledge as knowgget (i.e. “knowledge nugget”).
Knowledge Modeling. The pieces of knowledge representing features managed
by the Knowledge Base in Kalis can vary significantly with respect to the type of
data that they are represented by. For example, the knowledge about a portion of
the network being multi-hop can be modeled as a boolean data type, but the knowledge about the total number of nodes monitored by the IDS has to be represented
by an integer. For this reason, we choose to keep the model as agnostic and generic
as possible, and we model each knowgget as a label, describing the information represented, and its associated value of any type. Additionally, each knowgget has a
“creator” field – representing the Kalis node that created it (useful for knowledge
sharing, as discussed later in this section) – and an optional “entity” field – in case it
is specific to an individual monitored entity (e.g., the detected signal strength for a
monitored sensor node). Moreover, some knowggets may also in turn be composed by
several different pieces of data; consider for example the knowledge about the current
traffic frequency (as packets per second), having several sub-pieces of information for
each different packet type, such as TCP SYN, TCP ACK or TinyOS CTP. We refer
to these as multilevel knowggets. In this case, the label of a multilevel knowggets is
not associated with a single value, but with a group of other knowggets, in a treelike structure. Last, Kalis does not know in advance all the knowggets that will be
collected, and new modules may want to store new, previously unknown knowggets.
Therefore, the set of labels is not fixed, and is dynamically managed as a multi-level
map data structure. Figure 4.5 shows an example of Knowledge Base containing some
knowggets about the monitored network.
Formally, a knowgget k is defined as the tuple k = hl, v, c, ei, where l is the label,
v is either a primitive value or a set of knowggets (for multilevel knowggets), c is the
identifier for the Kalis node creator of k, and e is the entity related to k (or null if
none).
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Figure 4.5. An example of knowledge base with heterogeneous
knowggets, each showing label, value, creator field, and entity field.
KnowledgeBase {
"K1$Multihop" = "true",
"K1$MonitoredNodes" = "8",
"K1$SignalStrength@SensorA" = "-67",
"K2$SignalStrength@SensorA" = "-84",
"K1$TrafficFrequency.TCPSYN" = "0.037",
"K1$TrafficFrequency.TCPACK" = "0.090"
}
Figure 4.6. Key-value pair representation of the Knowledge Base in
the implementation of Kalis.

Collective Knowledge. The collected knowledge represents the view of the network portions surrounding the Kalis node and, therefore, the latter’s specific point
of view. In most cases, this knowledge is exactly what is needed to efficiently and
effectively perform intrusion detection in that portion of the network. For example,
while other parts of the network might have a multi-hop topology, this is not relevant
and potentially harmful to an accurate detection as compared to the knowledge that
the local area – for which this Kalis node is responsible – is single-hop. In some cases,
however, sharing knowledge among different Kalis nodes can enable the detection and
discovery of global features useful for intrusion detection. As an example, being aware
that other Kalis nodes are noticing changes in signal strength for specific monitored

95
entities can enable the local Kalis node to correlate such changes with those experienced locally and detect mobility in the network. For this reason, we provide as part
of Kalis a mechanism for collective knowledge management. Such mechanism allows
sharing and synchronization of selected pieces of information across all Kalis nodes.
To enable this mechanism, a module inserting a knowgget of collective interest into
the Knowledge Base can simply mark the knowgget as “collective”. The Knowledge
Base will then take care of automatically communicating significant changes in that
knowgget to the other Kalis nodes for storage in their Knowledge Bases, making sure
to mark the appropriate identity in the “creator” field, which reports which Kalis
node originally generated and shared the knowgget. Note that this mechanism does
not provide a way for a Kalis node to overwrite or alter knowledge in another Kalis
node. When a Kalis node, say T1 , receives a new or updated collective knowgget k
from a different Kalis node, say T2 , the Knowledge Base of T1 will check to see if
the label and creator of k matches any existing knowgget in the Knowledge Base.
Therefore, T1 can only update those knowggets in T2 that were originally generated
by itself.
Static Knowledge. Kalis also provides the user with the possibility of specifying
initial or static knowggets about the IoT network. For example, if the network does
not have mobility and will always remain so, it makes sense for the user to simply
provide Kalis with this information, as it can be leveraged for example to avoid
trying to detect mobility in the network, and to improve the detection accuracy as
well. For this purpose, the Knowledge Base optionally loads a configuration file from
the file system, providing initial settings and a-priori available knowggets. Figure 4.7
shows the (JSON-inspired) grammar for the language used in the specification of
configuration files, and Figure 4.8 shows an example of configuration file to activate
by default two modules (passing parameters to one of them), and to insert in the
Knowledge Base the a-priori knowledge that the network is static. Note that in this
case the knowggets might specify an “entity” field, but not a “creator” field, as they
will be assigned the local Kalis node’s identifier as such.
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hconfigi

::= hmodulesi hknowggetsi

hmodulesi

::= ‘modules = {’ hmodule-listi ‘}’

hmodule-listi ::= hmodule-def i ‘,’ hmodule-listi
| hmodule-def i
hmodule-def i ::= hmodule-namei [ ‘(’ hparam-listi ‘)’ ]
hparam-listi ::= hkey-value-pair i ‘,’ hparam-listi
| hkey-value-pair i
hknowggetsi ::= ‘knowggets = {’ hknowgget-listi ‘}’
hknowgget-listi ::= hkey-value-pair i ‘,’ hknowgget-listi
| hkey-value-pair i
hkey-value-pair i ::= hkeyi ‘=’ hvaluei
Figure 4.7. Grammar for Kalis configuration files.
modules = {
TopologyDetectionModule,
TrafficStatsModule (
activationThresh=1,
detectionThresh=2
)
}
knowggets = {
mobility = false
}
Figure 4.8. Example of Kalis configuration files.

Modules
Kalis is designed to be fully flexible and extensible. For this reason, any network
feature-specific or attack-specific functionality is implemented as independent module. The Module Manager component takes care of coordinating all the modules,
activating/deactivating them when necessary, depending on changes in the Knowledge Base, routing new packet events to all the interested parties, and collecting
alerts about detected incidents. Each module is capable, given a particular instance
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of the Knowledge Base, to determine whether its services are required and, therefore,
whether it should be active at that particular point in time.
Kalis includes two different types of modules: Sensing modules and Detection
modules.
Sensing Modules. Sensing modules are the core of the autonomous knowledgediscovery mechanisms of Kalis. We include in our prototype a few basic sensing modules, including a Topology Discovery module, a Traffic Statistics Collection module,
and a Mobility Awareness module. The first uses the captured traffic to reconstruct
the local topology and differentiate between multi-hop and single-hop networks, the
second continuously collects statistics about the traffic load, differentiated for each
type of packet (e.g., ZigBee data, ZigBee routing, TCP SYN, TCP ACK, ...), and
the third leverages the signal strength to dynamically detect whether the network is
static or mobile. We provide more details on the implementation of these modules in
Section 4.4. Whenever a sensing module finds a relevant change in network features
– such as the discovery that a portion of the monitored network is multi-hop – it will
store this new knowgget into the Knowledge Base. The Knowledge Base will in turn
notify the Module Manager that recent changes to the available knowledge might
require revisiting which modules are activated or deactivated.
Detection Modules. Detection modules are actually responsible for analyzing
the captured traffic – together with the available knowggets – and detect anomalies
and security incidents. Each module is specialized for a specific attack, but some
techniques might be able to be generalized to detect attacks with similar symptoms
but different severity or root causes – e.g. selective forwarding attack vs. blackhole
attack. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, intrusion detection techniques in general are
either signature-based or anomaly-based, and IDSes often operate in only one of the
two fashions; however, the large amount of data and knowledge made available by
Kalis makes it possible to have a library including detection modules of both kinds,
increasing the accuracy in detecting well-known attacks while at the same time being
able to react to unknown security incidents as well. In our prototype, we include
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several basic detection modules for common attacks, as selective forwarding, SYN
flow, ICMP flood, replication, and more.

4.4 Implementation
Development Environment. We implement Kalis using Java on an Odroid
xu3 development board. In order to interact with the IEEE 802.15.4 traffic for our
prototype, we leverage a TelosB [57] wireless sensor mote with a custom TinyOS [47]
application as bridge. Moreover, we integrate into Kalis the tcpdump utility – which
internally uses the libpcap library – in order to promiscuously monitor all WiFi traffic. Our implementation makes use of Java Reflection in various parts of the system.
For example, when the configuration file is parsed and a module is specified to be
activated, the corresponding class is dynamically instantiated by name. If the configuration file specifies some parameters for that module, Kalis looks for properties
in the instantiated module object whose names match the specified parameters, and
sets them to the provided values. This implementation makes the entire core of Kalis
agnostic of the specific classes that implement the modules, thus making it possible
to add new modules without the need to recompile the entire system as long as those
modules implement the required interfaces.
Event-driven Architecture. To fulfill the design requirement of being eventdriven and asynchronous, all the components in Kalis (see Figure 4.4) run independently. For example, when a new packet is captured on any protocol, all the interested
parties are asynchronously notified of the new packet event, and can independently
and concurrently process the new information. In the same way, when any of the detection modules detects a potential security incident, it raises a detection event that
is then routed to all the subscribed parties. This also allows Kalis to interoperate
with cloud-based monitoring dashboards, automated response systems, and real-time
user notification mechanisms.
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Knowledge Representation. To implement our Knowledge Base, we choose to
model each knowgget as a key-value pair, in which both the key and the value are
represented as strings. When querying the knowledge base, the modules can either
retrieve the raw value and parse it independently, or specify what is the data type
they expect in return for a given key and the knowledge base will attempt to parse
the string as that data type. We choose an encoding of the key that allows for fast
queries. Given a knowgget k = hlabel, value, creator, entityi, Kalis encodes it as a
key "creator$label@entity" and a value "value". Looking up local (or collective)
knowggets only requires searching for the prefix matching (or not matching) the
identifier of the local Kalis node. Instead, looking up knowggets related to a specific
entity only requires searching for keys with a suffix matching the identifier of the
entity of interest. Last, finding a single specific knowgget is done by matching the
key exactly. This model also allows Kalis to uniformly represent multilevel knowggets
by flattening the hierarchy of labels in dot notation; that is, the sub-information of
the “TrafficFrequency” knowgget about TCP SYN packets created by Kalis node T1
is represented as an individual knowgget with key "T1$TrafficFrequency.TCPSYN".
Figure 4.6 shows an example of how the Knowledge Base in Figure 4.5 is represented
in our implementation of Kalis.
Collective Knowledge Synchronization. The implementation of the synchronization mechanisms for collective knowledge relies on a few building blocks. First,
the discovery of peer Kalis nodes is carried out by means of periodical beaconing on
the local network. Each Kalis node will listen for advertisement broadcast packets
from other Kalis nodes, and add newly-discovered nodes to a peer list. This is a
commonly used discovery-through-advertisement pattern that is effective especially
for local networks with a moderate number of peers (reasonable assumption for an
ideal deployment of Kalis). All communications among the nodes are encrypted, and
only enable a one-way communication (in each direction) between pairs of nodes,
without the need for interaction beyond the acceptance of incoming new or updated
collective knowggets. Our current prototype uses WiFi as communication medium,
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but the technique could be adapted to any other medium supported by the hardware.
For example, an extension to our prototype could use mainly WiFi but with fallback
on Bluetooth in case of connectivity issues through the local WiFi router.
Sensing Modules. As part of our prototype, we include several sensing modules. The Topology Discovery module detects multi-hop and single-hop topology by
analyzing the captured traffic. The features used for this analysis include the communication medium used (IEEE 802.15.4 or WiFi), the detection of known protocols
(such as RPL in 6LoWPAN or Collection Tree Protocol in TinyOS), the inclusion of
specific forwarding/next-hop headers in packets, and more. The range of characteristics that are leveraged to understand the topology of the network can be extended
when new protocols or mediums are standardized for the IoT. The Traffic Statistics
Collection module maintains detailed statistics about the frequency of the various
types of traffic overheard in the network, both on a global and per-monitored-device
level. In our implementation, we consider several different types of traffic, including TCP SYN, TCP ACK, ICMP Requests, ICMP Responses, ZigBee plain packets,
Collection Tree Protocol packets, and more. For each traffic type, the module keeps
track of the number of packets per unit of time (configurable but set to 5 seconds by
default); the frequency of each type of traffic is recorded both globally for the whole
network, and for each individual monitored device (to support an accurate detection
of targeted DoS-like attacks and subsequent potential response actions.) The Mobility Awareness module uses a simple approach that detects mobility when any node’s
signal strength changes more than a certain threshold. More complex techniques
could also be employed, but are out-of-scope for this work.
Dynamic Detection Module Configuration. We implement the dynamic activation and deactivation of detection modules based on the changes in the Knowledge
Base via a publish-subscribe mechanism, for best efficiency. Each detection module
can subscribe to changes on one or more knowggets by key, and is automatically notified; the modules will therefore notify the Module Manager when their services are
no longer required, according to the latest knowledge.
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4.5 Evaluation
In our experiments, we evaluate (a) the breadth of the IDS coverage over heterogeneous networks, devices and protocols, (b) the benefits of the knowledge-driven
approach on the detection accuracy in terms of false positives and detection rate, as
well as resource consumption, (c) the reactivity of the IDS in the dynamic discovery of a changing environment, and (d) the benefits of the collaborative knowledge
mechanisms.

4.5.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate Kalis by placing the IDS node near a network of heterogeneous,
real-world IoT devices. Our setup includes a small WSN of 6 TelosB nodes, a Nest
Thermostat, an August SmartLock, a Lifx smart lightbulb, an Arlo security system,
and an Amazon Dash Button. All the WSN nodes are programmed with a TinyOS
application that sends a data message every 3 seconds towards a node acting as
base station, using the Collection Tree Protocol (CTP) [124]. Concerning the WSN
traffic, the Kalis node is placed near the middle portion of the WSN, able to overhear
intermediate hops of data packets. Since compromising commodity IoT devices –
especially to carry out various controlled attacks in a repeatable way – is very difficult,
we choose to record and replay actual traces of network traffic from these devices,
enhanced with additional packets representing symptoms of such attacks. For each
attack scenario, we run the systems on 50 symptom instances, representing the ground
truth for detection. We believe that this setup truthfully represents the complexity
of the IoT ecosystem, including both multi-hop and single-hop networks, different
protocols on different mediums (CTP on IEEE 802.15.4, TCP/IP on WiFi), and very
different devices in terms of computational power and functionality. Furthermore,
to simulate potential response actions upon an IDS detection, we program as simple
countermeasure the temporary revocation from the network of any node identified as
suspect by the IDS.
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4.5.2 Benefits of the Knowledge-Driven Approach
In our experiments, we compare our knowledge-driven approach to that of a traditional IDS. For total fairness with respect to the detection techniques, we emulate
a traditional IDS by running our system without Knowledge Base, and with all the
modules active at all times. We compare the systems on several metrics: (i) Detection Rate – number of adverse events detected out of all the adverse events in the
test scenario; (ii) Classification Accuracy – number of correctly classified attacks
out of all the detected attacks; (iii) Countermeasure effectiveness – how positive
a response action based on the detections of Kalis is for the overall network; (iv)
CPU usage; (v) RAM usage.

ICMP Flood attack on a single-hop network
The first scenario we use for the evaluation is that of an ICMP Flood attack on a
single-hop network (see Section 4.2.1). In this setting, the traditional IDS identifies
all the attacks (high detection rate); however it generates false positives as it is not
able to disambiguate the ICMP Flood attack from a Smurf attack.
With respect to countermeasures, the ICMP Flood detection module considers
as suspect all nodes within one hop from the victim, and attempts an approximate
disambiguation through a comparison of the signal strength with previous overheard
communications [125, 126]; conversely, the Smurf attack detection module considers
as suspect all nodes at a 2-hop distance from the victim, and also approximately
disambiguates the attacker through signal strength. We observe that, in this scenario,
Kalis revokes the correct attacking node, while the traditional IDS attempts to revoke
the only node two hops away from the victim, which in a simplistic graph exploration
is the victim node itself, therefore disconnecting the entire network.
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Replication attack on static vs. mobile network
The replication attack is an application-independent attack unique to wireless
networks of constrained devices. In such attack, malicious devices are added to the
network as replicas of some legitimate node(s), allowing the adversary to steal sensitive information, disrupt the routing, or inject false data in the network. Many
detection techniques exist for this attack; however each one is specific to a network
with certain characteristics, e.g. mobility [127]. In this experimental evaluation, we
provide two different detection modules for replication attacks, one suitable for static
networks, and the other for mobile networks. The network in this evaluation randomly
changes between a static and mobile behavior for the nodes over time. We repeat
the evaluation 100 times, each time carrying out 3 replication attacks (i.e., sending
data packets from 3 nodes that are replicas of legitimate nodes in the network). The
traditional IDS randomly selects one of the two modules for each of our experiment
runs, simulating closely a static module library configuration by the user that does
not adapt to the changes in network features. Kalis, instead, leverages the knowledge
provided by the Mobility Awareness module, and dynamically selects modules for
the current network mobility setting. We observe the detection rate and accuracy
of both Kalis and the traditional IDS approach and, as expected, while Kalis always
uses the right modules, the traditional IDS approach misses some attacks when the
active module is not the one suitable for the current mobility profile of the network.

Overall Results
Over the two different scenarios presented in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.2, we summarize the results in Figure 4.9 for effectiveness metrics, and in Table 4.2 for performance
metrics. Kalis achieves 100% classification accuracy, since it always leverages the optimal set of modules for detection based on the knowledge about the network’s features.
Due to the fact that the detection techniques used cannot always detect all attacks,
the detection rate is not perfect; however, this is independent from Kalis, and the
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Figure 4.9. Effectiveness comparison for Kalis vs. a traditional IDS
approach across all experimental scenarios (averages).

Table 4.2.
Performance comparison for Kalis vs. a traditional IDS approach
across all experimental scenarios (averages).
CPU usage (%)
RAM usage (kb)

Trad. IDS
0.22%
23961.06

Kalis
0.19% (−16.00%)
13978.62 (−41.66%)

comparison with the traditional IDS approach that uses the exact same detection techniques still shows the benefits of Kalis. The results show that our prototype is very
lightweight in terms of CPU and RAM requirements, and that the knowledge-driven
approach of Kalis outperforms the traditional IDS on all the considered metrics.

4.5.3 Reactivity to Environment Changes
In order to evaluate the reactivity of Kalis, we start it with a configuration file
that does not activate any detection modules by default and does not contain any
a-priori knowgget. We then let Kalis monitor a ZigBee network in which one node is
programmed to carry out a series of selective forwarding attacks, and measure how
soon Kalis detects the first attack. The selective forwarding detection module only
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activates upon discovering a multi-hop network; the Topology Discovery sensing module is able to detect such feature from the first CTP packets intercepted. Therefore,
we verify that Kalis correctly detects 100% of the selecting forwarding attacks from
the very beginning of the communications, even with no detection modules initially
active.

4.5.4 Knowledge Sharing
We evaluate Kalis in a scenario in which collaborative knowledge sharing enables
the selection of the appropriate set of detection modules, improving the accuracy of
the system. In this scenario, two Kalis nodes are monitoring two different portions of
a ZigBee network. One node in each portion is malicious, namely nodes B1 and B2 ,
and they both collude in carrying out a wormhole attack. In such attack, B1 does
not correctly forward traffic, transmitting it instead directly to B2 . The Kalis node
observing the behavior of B1 would, by itself, detect a blackhole attack, while the
Kalis node observing B2 would, without further information, consider it a source of
traffic. However, correlating the events between the two Kalis nodes, they are able
to correctly identify such attack as a wormhole.

4.6 Related Work
Extensive research has been carried out in the area of IDSes for traditional networks. Two popular open source IDSes are SNORT [113] and Bro [128]. Both IDes
rely on network information gathered using a packet sniffer, and detect attacks using signature matching over this information. Their signature-based schemes provide
good detection rates for specified, well-known attacks. However, the techniques used
in these traditional systems are not applicable to the IoT domain. For example, techniques such as host scanning or port scanning would be ineffective on most emerging
IoT standards that use IPv6 as addressing scheme. Also, both SNORT and Bro only
work on traditional networks (wired and wireless), while Kalis supports a wide variety
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of mediums and related protocols, and can be easily extended with the emergence of
new IoT standards. Several IDSes have been developed for WSN [129–133]; however, they suffer from one or more limitations with respect to IoT: inability to adapt,
applicability only to a single platform and protocol, small and specific range of detection techniques, complete dependency on collaboration, reliance on the existence
of a central control point.
While much research has been carried out on intrusion detection for traditional
systems and WSNs, the work on IDSes specifically tailored to the IoT is still in an early
stage. One of the most relevant tool for intrusion detection in IoT is SVELTE [26].
SVELTE is both centralized (at the hub of an IoT system/group of devices) and
distributed (at each sub). It is composed of a module called 6Mapper, which reconstructs the topology of the subs with respect to the hub, and an intrusion detection
module, which analyzes data and detects incidents. The IDS is complemented by a
mini firewall that filters undesirable incoming traffic from the Internet. In comparison
to Kalis, SVELTE (a) is host-based and therefore requires modifications to the IoT
devices’ software to deploy the IDS component, (b) targets a single IoT system (hub
and subs), (c) is primarily designed for devices communicating via the RPL protocol
(IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks) [134] and cannot be expanded to multiple heterogeneous protocols and mediums, (d) leverages an extensible
but predefined set of detection techniques, with no dynamic activation, (e) does not
adjust to environmental changes.
Liu et al. propose the application of Artificial Immune Systems to IoT IDSes [112,135], mapping concepts between the two domains and presenting a detection
mechanism based on datagram signature analysis, with the possibility of sharing
vaccines among IDS nodes when a new attack signature is generated. While their
approach leverages genetic-like algorithms to generate detectors for unknown attacks,
it is unclear how to determine the ground truth about legitimate datagrams. Moreover, the administrator is still required to understand which attack a new detector
is capturing and supplement the attack library knowledge. While the self-adaptation
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mechanisms of the authors’ systems aims at providing flexibility as in Kalis, their
attack detection mechanism is limited to string-matching. Last, different areas of the
network guarded by different Kalis nodes will all have access to the same library of
Detection Modules as with vaccines sharing, but Kalis will activate only the necessary
ones for the monitored network portion, improving efficiency and accuracy. Jun et al.
propose the use of Complex Event-Processing (CEP) techniques for intrusion detection in IoT [136]. In CEP, a stream of events is filtered through queries to select those
relevant for attack detection. Such work focuses on improving the IDS performance
online rather than offline. Our work leverages similar event-driven techniques, but
uses the Knowledge Base to avoid the processing of unnecessary rules.
Some research efforts have focused on developing a taxonomy of IoT threats.
Babar et al. [137] proposed a taxonomy of attacks based on the attacker goal, such as
Physical Threat, Communication Threat, Identity Management, and more. Mayzaud
et al. [138] instead proposed an extensive taxonomy of attack for RPL-based IoT networks, but focusing only on such routing protocol. In our proposed taxonomies, we
aim at classifying attacks from the high-level perspective of the specific attack and
communication pattern used, as well as finding relationships between the features of
the monitored devices/networks and the potential security issues, since these classifications are more useful from the perspective of designing a comprehensive IDS for
the IoT.

4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed two taxonomies, for IoT attack patterns, and for the
relationship between different network/device features and security threats. Then,
we presented the design and implementation of Kalis – to the best of our knowledge
the first comprehensive, self-adapting, knowledge-driven IDS for IoT, able to detect
attacks in real time across a wide range of protocols and security goals. The evaluation
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of our complete prototype shows that our knowledge-driven approach makes Kalis
effective and efficient in detecting anomalies and attacks in IoT networks.
The scale of IoT devices and their exposure to the untrusted Internet make them
desirable for enrollment in botnets. Therefore, in complementation of the monitoring
performed by Kalis, we develop specific techniques to address this threat, presented
in the next chapter. Moreover, in some cases, the detection can still bear some
ambiguity with respect to the root cause of a security incident. However, an accurate
diagnosis is crucial to an effective recovery, and we address such problem with the
work presented in the upcoming chapters.
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5 ROUTER-BASED DEFENSE AGAINST IOT-BASED BOTNETS
While monitoring the local sensor and IoT network through our IDS technique is
critical, such systems are exposed from threats coming from the untrusted Internet
as well. It is thus necessary to extend the monitoring also to the interactions that
such devices have with remote services. One of the biggest threats that the rapid
diffusion of IoT can enable, is that of botnets. The already mentioned large number
of devices, together with their insecurity and surprising computational power, make
IoT devices perfect tools to carry out powerful distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks. While the actual effectiveness of IoT devices in carrying out such attacks has
not yet been investigated, recent news show that attackers already have understood
and exploited their potential in real-world attacks [139].
Current defenses are not ready to counter such novel botnets. Techniques that
have proven effective against previous “conventional” botnets can be grouped in two
main categories: honey pots and anomaly detection. The former category includes
approaches that aim at purposefully exposing a vulnerable machine, hoping to get it
infected as part of the botnet, with the goal of infiltrating the botnet and take it down.
However, for botnets organized according to a peer-to-peer (P2P) structure, such
defenses are not very effective. In fact, the infiltration into a portion of the network
only results in the removal of a few attacking machines [140]. While extracting
information about the attacker’s network from a honey pot machine can be easily
achieved, for IoT devices it is rarely possible to access such information after the
infection, due to the lack, or extreme limitation, of user interfaces. Moreover, this
defense technique is reactionary, as it aims to shut a botnet down once it has exposed
itself, and cannot prevent an attack from taking place or the botnet from spreading.
The second category of defense mechanisms, anomaly detection, includes approaches
that build a model of “normal” behavior for an endpoint – usually by means of
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statistical techniques – and then leverage such model to detect outliers that could
reveal undergoing attacks. Such approaches, however, are very complex to design
and tune, as they are meant to target general purpose machines whose activities are
hardly profilable in a complete manner, thus subjected to a large amount of false
positives. These considerations make it evident that previous defense techniques are
hardly applicable to this new threat, and a design for an effective defense is thus
needed.
In general, it is easy to understand that developing a “blanket defense” for IoT
devices against botnet infections is an unachievable goal. In fact, the fragmentation in
hardware platforms, operating systems, architectures, and proprietary firmware make
it impossible to develop a one-size-fits-all defense strategy. Moreover, even a single
vulnerability in one of these devices may easily vanish the entire defense work: an
attacker able to exploit that single vulnerability may be able to replace the firmware
of the device with malicious software, potentially spreading the infection to other
local IoT devices. For these reasons, a more effective defense strategy is to leverage
the connecting point of all the IoT devices, that is, the router that connects them to
the Internet.
In the work presented in this chapter, we focus on both attack and defense aspects of IoT botnets. First, we thoroughly investigate the attacking potential of a
botnet composed by IoT devices and construct a taxonomy based on our findings.
From the defense point of view, we address the shortcomings of existing mitigation
techniques and use such experience to tailor defense mechanisms to the peculiarities
of IoT devices. Specifically we propose Heimdall, a lightweight, whitelist-based policy
mechanism with dynamic profile learning capabilities designed for use on routers. We
implement a complete prototype and evaluate it, showing that uncompromised devices see no disruption to their functionality while malicious traffic from compromised
devices is immediately blocked, all with negligible overhead.
To summarize, the contributions of our work are the following:
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• The evaluation of the attack potential of hardware devices and construction of
a taxonomy of IoT devices;
• The design, implementation and evaluation of a centralized, lightweight defense
mechanism able to prevent IoT devices from being used as part of botnets, while
not disrupting their normal day-to-day functionality.

5.1 Background
In this section, we discuss the threat model that we address, a brief overview of
botnets, and a summary of the platform used.

5.1.1 Threat Model
We consider a standard network comprised of a router with both wireless and
hardwired connections to various IoT devices. Within such network, there may be
devices whom have a base station and have their own communication protocol to
their sub devices. An example of this is the Arlo home security system, from which a
single base station can connect to multiple wireless home security cameras. However,
these wireless cameras are not network bound to the router and invisible to the network. Within this model, there are no devices that communicate among themselves
while also being bound to the router. This constraint is reinforced by the fact that
there currently is no established general communication protocol among IoT devices;
instead, each one of the device platforms interacts with each other via their public
cloud APIs. Thus, if an attacker wanted to attack a device, they would be required
to communicate with the victim through the gateway router. We assume the traditional network communication pattern in which a device willing to communicate to
a destination (e.g., a remote service) first resolves a domain name to an IP address
by means of a DNS query, and subsequently uses such IP address to communicate.
This pattern is common to IoT devices as well as traditional computing systems.
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5.1.2 Botnets
A “botnet” is a network of compromised machines (bots) running malicious software under a command and control (C&C) infrastructure. Usually, the controller of
the botnet compromises a series of systems using various techniques – such as Trojan
horses, worms, and viruses – to install a bot enabling remote control of the target
machines. These “zombie” machines are then remotely controlled by the attacker
(botmaster). Botnets with a large number of compromised machines have enormous
bandwidth and computing capability. Such networks are utilized by botmasters for
initiating various malicious activities, such as email spam, DDoS attacks, password
cracking, key logging, and, most recently, crypto currency mining [10]. Modern bots
can even automatically scan whole network ranges and propagate themselves using
known vulnerabilities and weak passwords on other machines. After a successful
invasion, a bot may use Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), or HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to transfer itself to the new
compromised host. The binary is then executed and tries to connect to the botnet.
Today, there are primarily two organizations to botnets, both with their own unique
advantages.

Centralized Botnet
In this approach, the botmaster distributes a command over the botnet via multiple C&C servers in order to hide their own identity. Figure 5.1 shows the basic control
communication architecture of a typical C&C botnet (in reality, a centralized botnet
would have more than two C&C servers). Through the use of multiple C&C servers,
centralized botnets are difficult to shut down. This architecture is easy to construct
and efficient in distributing botmaster’s commands with low latency. However, it has
its major weakness in the C&C servers, as they are a single point of failure; shutting
down these servers would cause all the bots to lose connection with their botmaster.
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Figure 5.1. Example architecture of a C&C botnet

P2P Botnet
P2P botnets are an architecture that evolved from the centralized botnet architecture. As discussed in the previous paragraph, centralized botnets depended upon
C&C servers for the botmaster to issue commands to all of the bots, making it very
easy for defenders to monitor and shutdown these servers by creating a decoy to join
a specified C&C channel. Thus, a natural strategy is to utilize a P2P control mechanism to circumvent defenses that aim at shutting down the C&C servers. Just like
P2P networks, which are resilient to dynamic churn (i.e., peers join and leave the
system at high rates) [141, 142], P2P botnet communication will not be disrupted
even when losing several bots. As seen in Figure 5.2, in a P2P botnet there is no
central server; bots are connected to each other, and act as both C&C server and
client. P2P botnets have shown advantages over traditional centralized botnets. As
the next generation of botnets, they are more robust and difficult to defend against.

5.1.3 Defense Platform
For the development, deployment and testing of our defense mechanism, we use
the Linksys WRT1900AC router [143] running OpenWRT Chaos Calmer [144]. The
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Figure 5.2. Example architecture of a P2P botnet

Linksys WRT line of routers is a popular network solution used in various applications, and it is a prime example of routers that we would find as the gateway
between IoT devices and the Internet. We decided to use the OpenWRT firmware
over stock firmware, as OpenWRT allowed us to easily make modifications to the
router. OpenWRT is a popular open source Linux distribution, primarily used on
embedded devices to route network traffic. OpenWRT is optimized for size and efficiency, so to be small enough to fit into the limited storage and memory available
in home routers, while at the same time supporting a wide range of features with its
3500 optional packages [145]. Because of its many advantages, OpenWRT is used as
the basis of production firmware in consumer routers, such as those found on Asus
routers [146].

5.1.4 Virus Total
In addition to the utilization of the Linksys WRT1900AC router in the development of the defense, we utilized a 3rd party security information aggregation service
called VirusTotal [147]. VirusTotal is a free online service that analyzes files and
URLs, enabling the identification of virus, worms, trojans, and many other forms of
malicious content detected by antivirus and scanners. VirusTotal acts as an informa-
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tion aggregator, with data coming from over 60 different antivirus engines, website
scanners, file and URL analysis tools [148]. It is therefore an excellent validation
endpoint that Heimdall leverages in monitoring.

5.2 Related Work
The work presented in this chapter touches on several different research areas.
Among the defense techniques against botnets, two directions are particularly
interesting: the use of statistical analysis anomaly detection techniques – aimed at
blocking the attack from leafs to victims – and the infiltration in the structure of the
botnet through honeypots – aimed at identifying the root to kill the botnet.
In the anomaly detection area, a great number of big data/statistical approaches
have been proposed. Many of them focus on exploiting data mining techniques to
detect outliers. For the case of IoT, such techniques require special care as their
effectiveness rely entirely on the completeness and correctness of the “normal” profile.
In Heimdall, we generate independent profiles for each IoT device by leveraging the
correct Internet destinations needed for their functioning, and enforce those profiles
with different levels of strictness for best effectiveness.
In the scenarios in which autonomous devices are able to directly talk to each
other, Murynets et al. [32] investigated techniques for clustering devices based on
their communications. Therefore, the profiles built show normal, expected interactions among devices, and use those to develop anomaly detection techniques for
cellular Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications. In IoT application scenarios,
the manufacturers have in their best interest to use cloud services as intermediaries
for all device-to-device communications; therefore, the lack of direct communication,
while making the M2M-communication-based defenses not applicable, can actually
be used to our advantage in the design of the defense technique.
Liu et al. [33] proposed an anomaly detection model for IoT based on an artificial
immune system, which uses agents deployed at several gateways to collect statisti-
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cal data and share those with a central service. In a related solution, Gonzales [34]
analyzes how artificial immune systems can benefit anomaly detection; various representation schemes are investigated, and four different algorithms for the generation
of detectors are proposed.
One first interesting work about measuring and mitigating P2P-based botnets is by
Holz et al. [149]. They used the Storm worm as case study, and identified a three-phase
process for botnet response: first, the extraction of relevant botnet bootstrapping
information from a captured bot (such as the IP addresses of initial peers, and more);
second, the infiltration of the botnet to monitor it from the inside; third, exploiting
the publish-subscribe communication to take over the botnet and thus mitigate the
attack. The authors correctly discuss how P2P botnets are technically hard to tackle,
supporting our claim about the criticality of our motivations.

5.3 Attack
In this section, we discuss the challenges and advantages of IoT in terms of attack
and botnet design.

5.3.1 Challenges in IoT Attack Design
Despite the fact that embedded devices have grown significantly in capabilities
over the recent years, they still have many limitations. IoT devices suffer from the
same limitations, which creates unique challenges in the construction of IoT botnets.
In our analysis concerning how to construct a IoT botnet we identified a number of
critical challenges unique to IoT devices that we discuss in what follows.

Low Resources
As with all embedded systems, IoT devices have very limited resources available
for operation, including CPU cycles, memory, and available network bandwidth. Such
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limitation is not an issue with respect their expected use, as IoT devices generally
do not generate much traffic and do not require massive computations to fulfill their
intended purpose. However, in a botnet that is not the case. Depending upon the
intended use of the botnet, limitations of specific resources are a major issue. For
example, limitations in the CPU cycles would be of primary concern if the purpose
of the botnet were to mine crypto currencies, whereas network bandwidth limitations
would be the main concern if the purpose were a DDoS attack.

Variety of Devices
IoT provides countless device, each specialized on different tasks. Each such device
has its own hardware platform and software implementation. This leads to many
different architectures and chipsets that need to be accounted for when crafting the
malware and attempting to hijack devices during the botnet construction. Such
variety vastly increases the difficulty in creating botnets, as no longer are attackers
able to focus on a single architecture with a single operating system. However, as
discussed next, this is also an advantage to the botnet, as the variety of devices
increases the difficulty in shutting it down.

5.3.2 Advantages in IoT Attack Design
While there are many disadvantages from utilizing IoT devices in the construction
of botnets, there are also many advantages, as we highlight below.

Variety & Number of Vulnerable Devices
It is estimated there will be over 20.8 billion IoT devices online by the year 2020,
while there already are about 4.9 billion connected devices in 2015 [150]. This means
that there will soon be an even larger number of devices for botmasters to target.
Previously, when developing defenses against botnets, a single architecture, namely
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x86, was considered. This allowed researchers and vendors to deeply analyze the
specific strain of malware and how it worked in compromising its targets [151], to
then develop a blanket defense against it. However, with such large numbers of
devices and services, there is a much larger variety of devices to be targeted. This
allows future botmasters to construct a botnet with a high entropy in device types,
enabling them to construct a very robust network. Now, when a vendor patches a
vulnerability utilized by the botnet thus removing the botmasters malware, it will
only affect a small portion of the botnet, leaving the rest of the network unaffected.

Ease of exploitation
As the OWASP 2015 report highlights, IoT security is the worst of all domains.
The reason is that IoT is a conglomerate of technology that links network, application,
mobile, and cloud technologies together into a single ecosystem [152]. Such heterogeneity introduces multiple failure points all within a single application, making it an
ideal target for attackers. A report by HP describes vulnerabilities that have been
exploited, such as credentials being sent over clear text, network ports listening with
root shells without a password, private data leakage, and a range of web and mobile
vulnerabilities [14]. A second study by HP evaluated IoT home security systems and
found the following: 100% of systems were vulnerable to account harvesting via the
cloud interface allowing attackers to brute force credentials; 100% allowed weak password, such as 123456; 100% failed to implement account lockout defense; 90% lacked
a two-factor authentication option; 70% had security posture variance between their
cloud, web, and mobile interface; 70% had egregious issues with their software update
systems; 50% exhibited improperly implemented SSL/TLS encryption. In such study,
it was noted that one of the systems analyzed went as far as retrieving firmware via
FTP, allowing the capture of credentials that would give an attacker write access to
the update server [153]. This would be a botmaster’s dream case, allowing them to
quickly and effortlessly distribute their malware to every device utilizing that server
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at once. As the list of issues found in these devices increases, it is trivial to conclude
that targeting IoT devices will be a unavoidable step in the evolution of botnets.

Diurnal Dynamics
As Dagon et al. pointed out [154], the online population of traditional botnets
has a clear “diurnal” dynamic, due to many users shutting down their computers
at night. In a specific time zone, the peak online population of a botnet could be
as much as four times the valley level online population. However, within the IoT
this is not the case. By definition, IoT devices are constantly online, which creates
a diurnal dynamic very helpful for a botmaster. Thus, when leveraging IoT devices,
a botmaster will no longer be restricted to certain time periods to launch optimal
DDoS attacks, or achieve optimal spread of new malware.

Device Taxonomy
As discussed previously, many different platforms and architectures enable IoT.
Out of those, we selected multiple exemplary devices from popular categories of consumer IoT devices and classified them based on processor power and specificity of
the purpose they serve. Figure 5.3 shows the result of our classification, using a
scale from 0 to 100 for the varying degree of the measured metrics. We observe a
very clear pattern among the devices as the specificity of the devices increases. Low
specificity devices such as an Odroid or Raspberry Pi, which are examples of single
board computers, run a full Linux distribution on their respective platform, allowing
for users to rapidly develop various applications to run on them. These boards are
perfect examples of the hardware that would be found in real-world deployments. As
we move along the specificity scale, we see another grouping of low power platforms
such as Arduino, Photon, and Galileo boards. These are all examples of development
hardware which allows rapid prototyping of their respective IoT devices, while being
more limited. Following, the next grouping is of IoT devices that have their own
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Figure 5.3. Device taxonomy of surveyed IoT devices

native app support, such as Amazon Echo, Moto 360, and the Samsung Family Hub
Fridge. These devices are examples of production IoT devices that not only serve
their specific purpose but also allow for additional user configurations and installation of applications. Last, we see the cluster of very specific devices that have no
built-in interface and are all interacted with via their respective apps. Devices within
this category are the most attractive to attackers, due to the fact that there is limited
user interaction with them but they have a wide range of processing power.

5.4 Heimdall Defense Technique
In this section, we discuss the challenges and advantages of IoT in terms of defense
technique design, and describe Heimdall, our proposed defense techniques.

5.4.1 Challenges
Designing a defense technique against IoT botnets is challenging. Our anomaly
detection-based approach, Heimdall, is based on a strategy that builds a profile of the
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normal behavior of each device, and enforces a white-listing policy that only permits
actions compliant with such profile.
In the specific case of IoT devices, an appropriate profile should include the destination servers that the device contacts under normal operation. However, the first
obstacle that becomes apparent by analyzing the traffic patterns on common consumer devices is that their backend services are usually hosted on load-balanced,
public cloud infrastructures. Consequently, the IP address for a correct destination
server is bound to change frequently, and therefore an IP-based whitelisting approach
for the profiling and policy enforcement would result in disrupting the normal functioning of the devices.

5.4.2 Advantages
Despite the challenges of designing defenses against IoT botnets, a careful consideration of the specific behaviors of Io”T devices highlights specific features of IoT
devices that can be leveraged to design a lightweight yet effective defense.
Building a profile for anomaly detection for general purpose machines – such
as personal computers or workstations – is very hard because of all the different
behavioral patterns that they can present. Conversely, IoT devices usually perform
a well-defined, small range of operations. Thus, within Heimdall, such recurring,
static set of possible actions can be leveraged when determining the normal behavior
to be included in the profile. It is also important to notice that anomaly detection
techniques for IoT do not need complex statistical or probabilistic inference models
for building profiles and enforcing whitelist-based policies. Instead, a small whitelist
can be used in combination with a traffic validation service to obtain a very effective
and more accurate defense mechanism.
Moreover, the fact that the destination IP addresses for the devices’ network
communications often change for load-balancing actually leads to an advantage. In
fact, by monitoring the domain name system (DNS) queries issued by the devices,
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one can obtain a human-readable set of valid server destinations to whitelist. This
opens the way for interesting scenarios. In fact, since this set of valid hostnames is
consistent across all the devices of the same kind (e.g. all the Nest thermostats will
reach out to frontdoor.nest.com), it would be possible to ship Heimdall to the end
users already including some partially-built profiles.
Lastly, when placing the defense mechanism on the gateway router that all IoT
devices in the local network use to reach the Internet, there is the possibility of missing potential device-to-device direct communications. In fact, some devices are able
to cooperate and exchange state and commands, as in the case of the August Smart
Lock and Nest integration. However, by analyzing the design choices of the vast majority of consumer IoT devices (and of all the devices in our evaluation testbed), any
communication between devices goes through cloud API services, and never directly
from a local device to another. This is a very reasonable and effective design choice
by the manufacturers, as it centralizes the communication specifications and enables
extensible interoperability, while at the same time reducing the attack surface.

5.4.3 Heimdall Architecture
Our approach is implemented as an event-driven defense algorithm – i.e., it is
triggered on-demand by external events generated by the IoT devices, such as a
new device joining the local network or the request by a device to send a packet to
the Internet – in order to improve performance and react to external triggers. We
now discuss the event-driven defense algorithm. The pseudocode for such algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 3. Note that dest d in the algorithm can be both a domain name
or an IP address, depending on the packet currently being analyzed (i.e., whether it
is a DNS query or a subsequent packet destined to the resolved IP address.)
Whitelist Manager. While Heimdall is active, the whitelist manager is in charge
of maintaining each connected IoT device’s whitelist. Upon detecting that a new
device is connected, a list is created for said device and populated with the device
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ALGORITHM 3: Overall event-driven Heimdall pseudocode
Function(WhitelistMgr.onTraffic (device D, dest d)) create empty WL D if not exists;
if d not in WL D then
if realTimeValidation then
if d not in DestCache then
DestCache.checkDest(d);
if d malicious in DestCache then
return REJECT;
add d to WL D;
return APPROVE;
Function(TrafficMgr.onTraffic (request req, device D, dest d)) if d in Blacklist then
drop(D, d);
return;
r = WhitelistManager.onTraffic(D, d);
if r == REJECT then
drop(D, d);
return;
let req from D go to d;
intercept response R (don’t let go to D yet);
if req is DNSQuery then
if r.IP != null then
if r.IP != R.IP then
r’ = WhitelistManager.onTraffic(D, R.IP);
if !r’ then
if !selfCorrection then
drop(D, d);
return;
rewriteReply(R, r.IP);
WhitelistMgr.associateForSession(r.IP, WL D.d);
release R;
Function(TrafficMgr.drop (device D, dest d)) send(D, ”Destination Unreachable”);
sendAlert(D, d);
Function(Auditor.audit ()) forall the entry in DestCache do
DestCache.checkDest(d);
Function(DestCache.checkDest (dest d)) r = queryVirusTotal(d);
if r benign then
remove from DestCache.malicious[];
add to DestCache.benign[];
else
if d in DestCache.benign[] then
remove from DestCache.benign[];
WhitelistManager.purgeFromAllWLs(d);
sendAlert(d);
add to DestCache.malicious[];
return r;

destinations as they are enumerated. The primary purpose of this is that, once a
destination is validated, any future validation is streamlined to minimize traffic delays.
While monitoring the communication of each device, the whitelist manager is also
auditing all whitelisted domains. Carrying out this continuous verification, Heimdall
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can ensure that even if a destination within a whitelist becomes malicious after the
initial verification, it will be removed from all devices’ whitelists and added to the
global blacklist within a short time period. This will block all future communication
to or from that destination, such that, even if the device is compromised, it would
not be able to participate in the botnet. With the combination of validation at
enumeration time and continuous auditing of the whitelists, all entries in a devices
profile will then constitute all and only the legitimate destinations for the device’s
traffic.
Traffic Manager. During the execution of Heimdall, the traffic manager analyzes
each packet sent and its destination. This component is responsible for leveraging the
whitelist manager and validating that each destination for a specific device’s communication is legitimate. Upon each new communication, the traffic manager checks to
see if the destination is contained within the global blacklist or the device’s whitelist.
If the destination is within the blacklist, then the communication is instantly dropped,
otherwise it is allowed through. However, if the communication is a DNS request, the
traffic manager has the secondary duty of validating the DNS response as well. Upon
receiving the response from the DNS server for a specified request, the traffic manager compares the DNS response against the report returned from VirusTotal. If it is
found that the destination IP addresses do not match, then there is a high probability
that a DNS poisoning attack is occurring against that device. The response packet is
then rewritten to contain the correct IP address from VirusTotal and then sent to the
device, preventing attackers from externally forcing a device to communicate with a
malicious destination whose domain was previously whitelisted.
Multitiered Policy Enforcement. Since each IoT device will have a different
set of requirements for its functionalities, Heimdall supports two different modes of
validation, namely maximum throughput and real-time validation. The maximum
throughput mode is a simplified validation where each destination is checked against
the global blacklist and if not found there automatically each destination is added to
the whitelist and then audited at a later time by the whitelist manager. This mode

125
incurs a constant overhead for each communication as at no point are transmissions
being held for validation before they are forwarded. On the other hand, the real-time
validation mode looks at every single communication and, if the destination is not
in the device’s whitelist, it is validated with VirusTotal. This is the strictest model,
since a domain known to be malicious would never be added to a whitelist. Under
both policy modes, however, the DNS requests are always validated, as they are the
entry point for all communications for any device.

5.4.4 Implementation Details
We implemented a prototype of Heimdall operating on the Linksys WRT1900AC
router. As highlighted in Section 5.1.3, this platform was chosen due to its support
from the OpenWRT project. With OpenWRT we were able to add new features to
the router by installing our defense tool at the gateway for connected IoT devices.
When a new device is connected to the router, Heimdall immediately isolates it
and begins analyzing the devices traffic. In order to implement this, we utilize the
IPTables [155] utility in combination with our custom proxy and the VirusTotal service. We utilize IPTables to forward all traffic for each of the IoT devices through
our proxy running on the router. The proxy is thus able to analyze each outgoing
communication and DNS response, to validate the destinations accordingly by utilizing VirusTotal services. Based on the input from the proxy, we query VirusTotal
upon encountering a new destination. By leveraging the 63 data points including
known trusted services such as BitDefender, Kaspersky, and Malwarebytes in the report VirusTotal provides [148], Heimdall is able to judge whether the destination is
known to be malicious. If it is found that the destination is malicious, the domain
and IP address are added to the blacklist to prevent all further communication on
the network to that destination.
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5.5 Evaluation
In the evaluation of our defense, we utilize five very popular IoT devices, namely
Nest Thermostat [156], August Smart Lock [157] with August Connect [158], Amazon
Dash Button [159], Arlo Home Security System [160], and Lifx smart bulb [161].
These devices were selected due to their features including a mobile application, user
account, cloud-based back-end, automated features, and inter-device integration. Our
evaluation consists of three parts. First, validating that there was no interrupted
service while Heimdall is active. Second, validating that the device could not reach a
known malicious destination. Finally, we evaluated the network overhead of Heimdall
when active on the router.

Attack Evaluation
Since it is not in the scope of this work to construct a botnet, we simulated common attacks to benchmark the capabilities of the different devices we were using. We
utilized the Hyenae Network Packet Generator Tool [162] to do this. Hyenae is a
flexible, platform-independent network packet generator. It allows users to reproduce
multiple DoS and DDoS scenarios such as TCP-SYN and ICMP-Echo flooding. For
the purpose of our experiments, we tested three distinct attack scenarios, namely
TCP-SYN, IMCP-Echo, and UDP flooding. For each attack, we limited it to one
million packets and monitored how long the execution took, to calculate the average Mbps each device was capable of. In order to evaluate the capabilities of the
Linux boards in a botnet attack scenario, we implemented a hybrid P2P botnet with
our boards and benchmarked their capabilities. To do this, we utilized the network
benchmark tool iperf, a platform-independent tool for performing network throughput measurements [163]. For the purpose of our experiments, we tested both TCP
and UDP throughput between each board and the test server. For each result we
took the average of twenty-five benchmarks.

127
The Desktop averaged at more then 930 Mbps for TCP and over 800 Mbps for
UDP. This is due to the fact that modern machines are equipped with gigabit ethernet connections that allow for very fast network connectivity, in addition to the
south bridge on the motherboard that offloads a majority of the computational requirements for network communication. The next highest performing device was the
Odroid xu4. This board averaged 9̃19 Mbps for TCP communication and 5̃95 Mbps
of UDP traffic. This is very impressive due to the fact that the Odroid xu4’s network
connectivity is comparable to that of a full fledge x86 based desktop. Due to this an
attacker could easily replace a desktop with an IoT device utilizing similar hardware
such as the Odroid xu4. The next highest performing device was the Odroid c1. This
board averaged greater than 400 Mbps of both TCP and UDP communication. It
is interesting to note that this board – despite having limited processing and memory capabilities in comparison to the Odroid Xu3 – still out performed it. This is
due to the fact that the Odroid C1 has a dedicated network controller, the Realtek
RTL8211F [164], whereas the Odroid Xu3 utilizes the LAN9514, a shared LAN/USB
controller [165]. The third highest performing board was the Odroid Xu3 with optional USB 3.0 gigabit adapter, averaging more than 405 Mbps for UDP traffic and
220 Mbps for TCP traffic. The fourth and fifth highest performing boards are the
Raspberry Pi 2 and Raspberry Pi, which maximized their fast ethernet connections.
Despite the deeply different range of resources, each one of these boards is actually
bottlenecked by the network hardware implementation. As these chips improve, we
can expect to see more lower-end IoT devices increase to more closely match that of
full x86 machines.
Based upon our experimental results we can now estimate how many IoT devices
would be required to build a botnet that would compete with its traditional x86 based
counterpart. Assuming that there is a botnet of size 100,000 x86 devices and with a
55% peak of its population online at maximum due to the diurnal dynamics of the
botnet. This botnet would achieve a peak of 49.5 Tbps, given that each device can
average 900 Mbps. To achieve this within an IoT domain we would then need 90,000
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Figure 5.4. Functional profile completeness

IoT devices, assuming an average of 550 Mbps from each device. This may appear
as a massive number of devices but in comparison to the 20.8 billion new devices
expected to be online by 2020 it is only 0.00000432% of the population. In addition
in a domestic scenario where the internet connection of the devices is limited by the
provider it is worth noting that even the lowest performing board, the Raspberry
Pi, would match that of its x86 counterpart. Thus despite the limitations in the
network capabilities of these embedded devices a botmaster could easily construct a
very effective effective botnet.

Validation of Profile Health
We validated how quickly consumer devices would expose a complete enough behavior in terms of destinations reached. We went through the initial configuration
of each device within our lab, following the instructions provided to connect our accounts to the respective devices and sync them with their cloud services. We captured
snapshots of the whitelists built by Heimdall – with no ongoing attacks – at 1 hour,
24 hours, and 1 week of normal execution for all devices. We define nominal completeness of a device’s whitelist as the completeness w.r.t. the entire set of possible
destinations that such device will ever attempt to communicate with. Conversely,
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we define functional completeness of a device’s whitelist as the completeness w.r.t.
to the minimum set of destinations that need to be reachable for a device to carry
out its normal functionality. A functionally complete whitelist is a subset of the related nominally complete whitelist. This distinction is necessary because IoT devices
make heavy use of load balancing techniques in reaching their cloud servers. For
this reason, some devices might try to contact, at different times, different domain
names corresponding to various replicas of the same service. However, if traffic towards one of those replica domain names is blocked, it is often the case that a device
will simply attempt another one as fallback, having therefore no interruption in the
regular functionality. Thereofre, while including all those replicas’ domain names
concurs to a better nominal completeness for a whitelist, the functional completeness refers to collecting the minimum set of destinations that allows an uninterrupted
functioning of the device. We used the 1 hour, 24 hour, and 1 week traffic snapshots
to evaluate the nominal completeness and functional completeness of the whitelists
at those points in time. Throughout the whole week of testing, we observed that
Heimdall never interfered with legitimate execution, not preventing any correct activity. Upon analyzing the network traffic during the experiment, we found that
not all the legitimate destinations were observed during the first hour, leading to
whitelists that were initially not 100% complete until later on, as seen in Figure 5.5.
This is due to the fact that some devices such as Arlo only attempted to enumerate
other domains used in load balancing after a few hours. For example, in the first
hour Arlo enumerated two separate domains vzweb07-prod.vz.netgear.com and
vzweb06-prod.vz.netgear.com. However over the course of the week it attempted to
enumerate vzweb01-prod.vz.netgear.com, vzweb04-prod.vz.netgear.com, and
vzweb05-prod.vz.netgear.com. Thanks to the dynamic learning of Heimdall, at no
point in time was the device functionality compromised. Thus, as seen in Figure 5.4
the functional profile reaches 100% completion in just over 3 mins. This means that
after 3 mins of the device communicating, Heimdall has learned all required domains
for the device to perform its tasks.
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Figure 5.5. Nominal profile completeness

Validation of Blacklist construction
To test the enforcement phase, we used a Raspberry Pi 2 as a malicious device
to impersonate each of the five consumer IoT devices after the learning phase was
complete. In order to accomplish this we powered off the original device, disconnected
it from the network, and spoofed the Raspberry Pi 2 MAC address to mimic that
of the device. Upon connecting the Raspberry Pi 2 to the router, we proceeded to
have it ping multiple domains that we knew were not on the whitelist, which resulted
in those packets being blocked by the router. Next, we attempted to subvert the
whitelist by pinging the target IP address directly instead of using their respected
domain name. These attempts were again blocked as the IP addresses we targeted
were not included in the whitelist.

Heimdall Overhead Evaluation
Lastly, we validated the overhead of Heimdall in terms of latency introduced in the
network traffic. To benchmark it, we utilized the same Raspberry Pi 2. During this
time, we used the network ping utility to ping an allowed domain from each of the
devices. As seen in Figure 5.6, our results show less than 1% in overhead over 50 pings
with Heimdall active and without Heimdall active. Such close-to-ideal performance
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Figure 5.6. Heimdall latency

is due to the fact that Heimdall leverages the existing low-latency features of the
iptables tool to enforce the profile, thus leveraging the existing optimizations and
network functionalities.

5.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we provide a discussion of the security of our approach, and how
a malicious attacker might try to bypass the defenses put in place by our work.
The goal of an attacker would be to bypass our whitelist-based defense mechanism.
The scenarios in which this can be attempted are as follows.
An already-compromised device joins the network, and the attacker tries to exploit
local device-to-device communication as a vehicle to spread the attack to other uncompromised devices on the local network. This is one of the most important scenarios, in
which the attacker tries to get the IPs of the C&C servers to be whitelisted for other
devices. As this is one of the most dangerous scenarios – given that the compromised
device inside the local network represents conceptually an insider threat – we devoted
special attention to it. There are two cases: (1) the malicious IPs are already blacklisted, or (2) the malicious destinations are seen by Heimdall for the first time. In
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case (1), not only the compromised device will not be able to spread to other devices,
as they will be blocked from reaching those destinations, but it also would not be able
to reach such destinations itself. In case (2), at the first attempt to communication
to malicious destinations, the verification carried out by Heimdall will lead to their
blacklisting, then falling back on case (1). This covers all possibilities and ensures
that no insider attack can manipulate the process and compromised the device or
poison its whitelist.
The reliability of a destination changes over time. A destination initially allowed
might be discovered as malicious later on. The auditing process carried out periodically by Heimdall takes care of refreshing all whitelists with the most up-to-date
security statuses for all destinations. This limits the attack window to a short period
of time, making it ineffective for DoS attacks.
A device’s firmware receives an update. In this situation, the range of valid destinations for a device might change. Since Heimdall exercises a constant learning
on new destinations and subsequent validation of them, after a firmware update the
device will be able to attempt to contact new destinations and those (if valid) will
be added to its whitelist. If the firmware update compromises the devices, no new
malicious destinations can be reached anyway as they will be subject to the validation
process as any other initial destinations.
The attacker carries out a DNS poisoning attack affecting the local devices. This
could lead to a domain being verified as legitimate by Heimdall, but then being
resolved to a false, malicious IP address. Since Heimdall performs an extra validation
step to compare the publicly available DNS resolution with the DNS Reply from
the local DSN server, DSN poisoning attacks will not be able to circumvent the
system. In fact, the destination IP will eventually be blocked anyway before any
actual communication can take place.
A malicious device (or development prototype) communicates with hardcoded IP
address destinations, without DSN queries. In this case, Heimdall’s destination verification process will still be able to verify the IP rather than the domain. The leveraged
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information can include publicly available IP blacklists. If it is not yet known as malicious or benign, the destination can be temporarily allowed and the periodic auditing
will block it as soon as the assessment changes, greatly limiting the attack possibilities
even in face of unknown, hardcoded IP destinations.
Even though the whitelist for a device is correct (i.e., it does not contain the IPs of
any botnet C&C server), the attacker tries to evade the detection. Unless the router is
compromised, this scenario is once again covered completely by the whitelisting-based
defense mechanism itself, and therefore the attacker’s attempt will not succeed.
The attacker compromises the router. Even though it is out of the scope of this
work, we also consider the scenario in which an attacker tampers with the router’s
firmware in an attempt to disable or alter Heimdall. This situation would require
the attacker to have physical access to the router in order to either re-flash a new
software image on it, or install or remove individual software modules installed on
it. For the use cases in which this might be a real threat – such as unattended
operation environments for routers in manufacturing or industrial scenarios – any
remote software attestation technique available in literature would be able to mitigate
this issue. In fact, the router’s firmware could be digitally signed, and a cloud service
could periodically perform attestation to verify that no tampering has occurred with
the router’s software.
From all the scenarios described above it is possible to see that Heimdall is thorough and effective.

5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the effectiveness of an IoT device based botnet and
evaluated multiple Linux development boards to test their effectiveness in a DDoS
attack. We showed that constructing such a botnet is quite easy due to the number of
vulnerabilities identified in IoT devices. In addition, we proposed a defense technique,
Heimdall, that mitigates these attacks by restricting the devices to their respective
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legitimate domains. We validated Heimdall’s approach and showed its effectiveness by
testing it on several real-world IoT devices. Based on the results of our analysis and
implementation of the defense, we argue that that whitelist-based anomaly detection
is a practical and low-overhead defense against IoT botnets.
After the monitoring tools deployed in a network detect an attack, it is paramount
for the system to quickly recover. However, an effective response relies on an accurate
diagnosis of the root cause of the occurred security incident. We address such problem
with the work presented in the next two chapters.
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6 FINE-GRAINED ANALYSIS OF PACKET LOSSES IN WSNS
Once our monitoring techniques have detected an attack, determining its actual cause
is crucial to an effective response action. In fact, a key requirement for highly secure
network systems [166, 167] is represented by situational awareness (SA). SA typically
refers to the gathering of a (possibly real-time) knowledge about relevant events happening in the network of interest. This enables an understanding of the impact of
events and defensive actions on the network security, both immediately and in the
near future. For wireless sensor networks (WSNs), packet loss is a class of events
particularly relevant for SA, as it may result in relevant information to be lost, as
well as undermine data quality solutions based on redundant data transmission [168].
However, just detecting the loss of data packets is not sufficient. Correctly diagnosing
the causes of such losses is also crucial. Packet losses may be the result of either compromised or misbehaving nodes, or of attacks focused on network links. Determining
the actual causes of packet loss attacks is vital in order to deploy effective responses
to attacks as well as recovery and debugging actions.
Selective forwarding and blackhole attacks are examples of node related attacks,
while interference is an example of a link related attack. Both these classes of attacks
can result in partial or total packet loss. However, even thought the causes of such
losses are different, current intrusion detection systems (IDSes) are typically only
able to detect the packet losses, but are unable to determine the actual causes of the
losses, whether node or link related [169–171]. Therefore, current IDSes need to be
enhanced with techniques able to carry out a correct diagnosis of the cause of packet
losses in the WSN of interest.
The work presented in this chapter addresses this need through the design and
implementation of an approach for a fine-grained analysis (FGA) of packet losses to
accurately diagnose their underlying causes. By analyzing all the links in the WSN
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of interest, our approach is able to determine whether a packet loss attack is caused
by a malicious node or a link-related problem. Our FGA tool builds profiles for the
network links by leveraging packet resident parameters such as the received signal
strength indicator (RSSI), the link quality indicator (LQI), and the packet reception
rate (PRR). Upon the reporting of a packet loss by the IDS, these profiles support a
thorough analysis, in order to determine the actual cause of the loss. Moreover, for
packet losses caused by an interference on the links, our approach can estimate, with
good accuracy, the location of the source of such interference. This knowledge empowers network administrators and automated incident response systems (IRSes) [43]
to estimate the network regions affected by the interference – a crucial information,
for example, in determining the affected nodes and letting the unaffected sensors take
effective response actions, such as re-routing their data through links and nodes not
affected by the interference.
The design of our FGA tool has many advantages that make it ideal for asynchronous systems such as WSNs. First, the analysis is event-driven and is carried
out simultaneously at every investigating node. Second, multiple investigations can
take place at the same time in cases when there is more than one misbehaving node
in different network locations. Third, the investigation is carried out in a stealthy
manner, giving no chances for the malicious node to interfere with the investigation results. Fourth, our approach is fully distributed, thus not relying on the base
station (BS) to coordinate or perform the analysis. Instead, it is carried out solely
by the direct neighbors of the faulty node or link. Lastly, our FGA tool has a low
overhead, and can be implemented as a layer in many WSN systems. Sensor nodes
have very limited computational and power resources. For this reason, to perform
the required analyses, our approach leverages resident parameters – such as RSSI
and LQI – that are available within every received packet. Therefore, unlike previous
approaches [172,173], our FGA tool does not require any additional node or resource.
Our FGA tool has various applications, from forensics investigations to real-time
response systems. As an example, forensic analysts may want to record the link mea-
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surements for every packet in order to investigate and determine the nodes involved
in some suspicious data transfers. Additionally, real-time IRSes may leverage the accurate analysis results of our FGA tool to enact better and more effective responses.

6.1 Adversarial Model
In this section, we introduce the assumptions that define the adversarial model.
We assume that the WSN consists of a large number of sensor nodes, and is fully
connected via multi-hop communications. We assume the network topology to be
designed so that every node has at least two disjoint paths to reach the BS. We
also assume that an IDS is deployed at each node so that each sensor is capable of
detecting packet loss attacks as well as data modifications [174–177].
The attacker has two ways of attacking the network:
• After the deployment, the nodes may be captured by the attacker, that will
then be able to access all the information stored in those nodes, as well as
reprogram them and control their actions. The attacker could therefore make
node refusing to forward some of the packets (Selective Forwarding attack) or
even all of them (Blackhole attack).
• The attacker may place a source of interference on the network surface, disrupting the wireless communication links between the nodes. The attacker can
therefore cause the loss of some of the packets (Low Interference attack) or of
most of them (High Interference attack).
Compromising a node to actively drop packets and introducing interference in the
network are from a high level perspective, the two ways in which an attacker can
disrupt network communications through a packet loss attack. For this reason, our
adversarial model covers in fact many different attackers that aim at causing packet
losses, since their means will eventually fall in one of the those two attack categories.
Examples of other attacks that fall into such categories are the use of self-replicating
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WSN worms that find vulnerabilities in the neighbors and propagate using packets as
attack vectors (a node-related attack), or the alteration of environmental condition of
a mote such as artificial exposure to very high or very low temperatures (a link-related
attack).
Each node whose IDS detects a packet loss attack will investigate upon the loss;
we assume the investigating nodes to be trustworthy and not to report false votes.
This assumption is particularly important for the Majority Voting algorithm adopted
as part of our approach. However, we will also present a variant of this algorithm able
to relax this constraint, and thus able to tolerate up to a certain number of colluding
investigating nodes.
We assume that multiple simultaneous attacks can be carried out at the same
time in different parts of the network. In fact, one of the strengths of our approach
is that multiple simultaneous investigations can be carried out.

6.2 Background
In this section, we introduce the basic parameters that are used in profiling the
links among nodes in a WSN. As hardware platform, we use the CC2420 radio chips
that are installed on the Telos nodes (see Section 6.7 for more details about the the
CC2420 radio chip). The CC2420 chip provides two useful metrics: the RSSI and
the LQI. It is important to note that our approach is not limited to the CC2420 radio
chip, but can work on any radio providing those measurements, such as any newer
radio based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
The RSSI represents the signal power of the received packet and is measured in
dBm. Its value is calculated over 8 symbol periods and stored in the RSSI V AL
register of the CC2420 radio chip. Chipcon, the manufacturer of these radio chips,
has specified in the CC2420 datasheet that the signal power value is computed in
dBm as RSSI V AL + RSSI OF F SET , where RSSI OF F SET is about −45.
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The RSSI value ranges between −50 and −100, with the higher value (less negative)
representing a stronger signal.
The LQI is a measure of the current quality of the received signal and can be
viewed as the chip error rate of the received signal. It is calculated over 8 bits
following the start frame delimiter (SFD). According to the CC2420 specification,
the measured LQI1 is actually the average correlation of each symbol obtained by
comparing the symbol that is supposed to be received and the symbol actually received
(signal + noise). Its value usually ranges between 50 and 110, with the higher values
representing better quality frames.
Finally, a third parameter used in our approach is the PRR, which is defined as
the ratio of the number of successfully received packets over the number of packets
sent between two neighbor nodes. A high PRR means a better link quality and a
healthy communication link.

6.3 Network Profiling Management
In this section, we explain how we use the RSSI, LQI, and PRR parameters to
profile each link between two neighbor nodes, and how we aggregate those individual
profiles to determine each node’s neighborhood profile.

6.3.1 Link Profiling
The purpose of link profiling is to provide a better understanding of the relationship between each node and its direct neighbors, which is a critical feature for
determining the causes of packet losses. At initial network setup, the BS gets to know
all the nodes by issuing a HELLO command and then requests each node, one at a
time, to start the Link Profiling process. Each node, in turn, broadcasts M dummy
messages, one every 10 milliseconds, to all its direct neighbors. The value of M must
1

LQI values are generally calculated by a software converting their values to a range of 0 − 255. The
values are computed using the RSSI and the average correlation values. In this dissertation, we refer
to the LQI as the average correlation, that is, the value that CC2420 chip denotes as LQI.
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be chosen according to the stability of the network and its topology. The RSSI and
LQI values can show high fluctuation in some networks; therefore a larger M will
result in a slower initial profiling process, but more accurate profiles.
Since link profiling occurs during initial network setup, we assume that at this
step there are no node or link related attacks, as such attacks can be easily detected
by network administrators during initial testing. Figure 6.1 summarizes the steps in
the link profiling.
When a node receives the dummy messages from its direct neighbor, it records
the RSSI, LQI and PRR values for that specific link that connects the node to the
sender. Afterwards, each node will create the specific profile of that link consisting of
the averaged RSSI and LQI values, together with the PRR, to form the link profile
triplet (AvgRRSI, AvgLQI, PRR) with each direct neighbor. Each link profile is
saved locally at each node. Since link profiles depend on the parameters carried by
received packets, our profiles are directional: the profile of the link between node n
and node n’ from the point of view of node n, denoted by n←n’, is different from the
profile of the link from the point of view of node n0 , denoted as n’←n.
If M is the number of dummy messages broadcasted by every node, and Rn←n0 is
the set of messages from node n0 received by node n, then the components of the link
profile n←n’ are computed as follows:
PM
AvgRSSIn←n0 =

i=1

i
RSSI (Rn←n
0)
|Rn←n0 |

PM

AvgLQI

n←n0

P RRn←n0

i
LQI (Rn←n
0)
=
0
|Rn←n |
|Rn←n0 |
=
M
i=1

The corresponding link profile n←n’ is represented as the following triplet:
n ← n0 = hAvgRSSIn←n0 , AvgLQIn←n0 , P RRn←n0 i
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Figure 6.1. Profiling steps performed at initial network setup.

The storage required at each node depends on the number of direct neighbors of
the node.
The initial Link Profiling process is vital for the FGA subsequent analyses. In
fact, the RSSI and LQI measurements are piggybacked in the individual packets
exchanged by the nodes, and the traffic load throughout the steady network might
be highly different, providing more data for the profiles at some nodes and very little
information at nodes where the traffic load is light. This would lead some of the
averaged link profiles to show high variance and less reliability for their use in the
analysis. Therefore, even though these profile will be updated over the lifetime of the
WSN (see Section 6.3.3), the initial Link Profiling process guarantees a consistent
base for the profiles to be built with comparable accuracy.

6.3.2 Neighborhood Profiling
We also define the profile of the neighborhood of each node by averaging all the
link profiles of the direct neighbors of the node. The neighborhood profile is critical
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in cases of strong interference for localizing the source of the interference and getting
a better understanding on the areas of the network that are possibly affected, as
discussed in Section 6.6.
Using the notation n ↔ n0 for a communication link between node n and n0 , we
define the set of the direct neighbors of a node n as:
D(n) ⊆ N = {n0 ∈ N s.t.∃n ↔ n0 }
By leveraging this definition, the components for the neighborhood profile of node n
are computed as follows:
P
AvgRSSIn =

n0 ∈D(n)

P
AvgLQIn =

n ← n0RSSI

|D(n)|
0
n0 ∈D(n) n ← nLQI

|D(n)|
0
n0 ∈D(n) n ← nP RR

P
P RRn =

|D(n)|

and the corresponding neighborhood profile for node n, denoted P (n), is represented
as the following triplet:
P (n) = hAvgRSSIn , AvgLQIn , P RRn i

6.3.3 Profile Updates and Current Health Profile
During the normal lifetime of a node, its battery level will naturally lower. This
phenomenon will result in communications showing a link profile (RSSI and LQI)
for that node that is different from the one stored by all its direct neighbors. On
the long run, as soon as the difference between the new “organic” profile and the
original profile gets above the threshold for interference attacks, any packet drop will
immediately be diagnosed as a link-related attack, even if it is not.
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ALGORITHM 4: Algorithm for updating the current health profile for a generic link
n ← n0
CHP [link] = initialP rof ile[link];
lastU pdate[link] = timestamp();
on snooping packet p from N ode n0 do
P p = calculateProfileForPacket(p);
timef rame = timestamp() −lastU pdate[link];
if abs(P p − CHP [link])/timef rame) ≤ RAT E then
CHP [link] = aggregate(CHP [link], P p);
end
endon

In order to address this issue, the initial profile stored at a node A for one of its
direct neighbors B is periodically updated based on overheard packets. Such updated
profile represents the current health profile (CHP) of that neighbor B considering its
normal lifetime variations. The investigation and profile comparison phases will then
use this updated profile, denoted as CHP [n ← n0 ] as a reference to detect the cause
of a packet dropping attack.
An important consideration in this case is how often the profiles must be updated,
and which new values to consider for inclusion. Our algorithm only takes into account,
for profile updates, those new values that can be considered as a natural variation
due to battery decay. This constraint is necessary to prevent spurious values due to
actual interference attacks or high fluctuations of the network from influencing the
profiles and effectively “poisoning” them to carry out undetected attacks. A value is
considered healthy if and only if the speed and smoothness of its change with respect
to the current profile is gradual enough, i.e. is below a preset threshold rate. The
WSN administrator needs to determine the threshold for the rate at which the change
is organically gradual at startup, possibly with the help of automated tools. In fact,
this is a parameter completely dependent on the used motes, the power source for
each of them, and the power consumption of the application running on the nodes.
The algorithm for updating the current health profile for a generic link n ← n0
(denoted with “link” in the pseudocode) is shown in Algorithm 4.
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At the beginning, the current health profile is set to the initial profile computed at
network startup. After that, while the WSN is operating, the current health profile is
periodically updated when a packet is snooped and its measurements are consistent
with the organic decay rate specified (denoted with “RATE” in the pseudocode in
Figure 4). The aggregation function simply incorporates the new value into the
averaged profile components, but could also be customized to specify a weight for the
new value into the CHP.

6.3.4 Adding, Removing, or Relocating Nodes
Our FGA tool is designed to perform the least possible changes in case of network
modifications. As sensor nodes have limited processing power and storage, we have
to ensure that our design can tolerate network changes, such as adding new nodes to
or removing nodes from the network, as well as relocating existing nodes.
When a new node is added, the occurring changes only partially affect the direct
neighbors of the introduced node. While the BS updates the network map, it requests
the new node to build its link profiles with its neighbor nodes. The new node will
also discover its direct neighbors and request them to profile their new common links.
At this point, each neighbor node will add one more link profile to its existing list of
profiles, and locally update its neighborhood profile as well.
In case a node has been removed, while the BS updates the network map, no
further immediate changes are needed at the nodes. In fact, for some time the direct
neighbors of the removed node will have one extra link profile recorded. Such extra
link progile does not have any negative impact on future analyses, unless storage
becomes an issue. As soon as a neighborhood re-profiling occurs during an investigation, each node will be able to determine which of the profiles it is storing are
about links to nodes that have been removed from the network – as such profiles will
not be updated during the re-profiling – and will therefore be able to remove from
the memory such non useful profiles. Whenever storage is a major concern, it is also
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possible for the BS to directly notify the neighbors of a removed node about this
network change during its network map update. The neighbors will then proceed to
immediately remove the profile of the removed node, and therefore reclaim storage
right away.
The process of relocating a node capitalizes on the considerations already made
for addition and removal of a node. Moving a node from a position in the network
to another is decomposed by our system in two separate conceptual steps. First,
the node is removed from the network, using the procedure described in the previous
paragraph. Then, the node is added back to the network in its new position, following
the procedure described in this section for adding a node. The need for these two
separate steps stems from the fact that, since our profiling parameters (RSSI, LQI,
PRR) are affected by location, re-positioning a node requires re-building its link and
neighborhood profiles. As the BS updates its network map, the relocated node is
introduced to new neighbors where neighborhood profiling is requested.

6.4 Diagnosis
In this section, we show the analysis steps to differentiate between different types
of attacks that may cause packet losses. As introduced in Section 6.1, we assume
each node to be equipped with an IDS to detect packet losses as well as data modifications [174–177]. In our work, the IDS will trigger the FGA only when the IDS
detects that there is a packet drop attack that needs to be investigated upon.
Since our FGA approach focuses on differentiating between node-related and linkrelated attacks, the detection of the attack itself – versus a non-malicious packet loss
– is delegated to the IDS. We believe that this approach provides our design with a
more clean separation of concerns, and let the FGA module focus on the diagnosis of
the attack, more than the detection of an attack versus a natural loss event. Either
way, we believe that a false positive, due to the IDS improperly detecting a packet
loss as an attack when it is not, will happen more rarely and with less persistence
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than an active attacker dropping packets in the network by means of compromised
nodes or interference. For these reasons, we think that a sporadic false positive due
to a component out of the scope of the FGA such as the IDS, is way less detrimental
than many false negatives to the overall security of the WSN.
Purpose of the analysis: The purpose of the FGA is to differentiate between
the attacks that target the nodes from those that target the links. Through the
detected attack, we can conclude whether the cause of packet drops is node- or linkrelated. For instance, Selective Forwarding attacks and Blackhole attacks are noderelated attacks that cause partial and total packet losses, respectively. However, Radio
Interference, or Jamming, attacks may also be responsible for packet losses as they
have a negative effect on the network links and regions depending on the interference
source location and strength2 . Basically, the existence of interference can affect the
RSSI and LQI values of received packets that passed through a noisy environment,
and can sometimes impair the signal quality of other packets to the point that they
become unreadable.
In the following subsections, we detail the various steps composing the analysis
process carried out by the FGA tool upon the detection of a packet loss.

6.4.1 Analysis Startup and Evidence Collection
Our analysis aims at understanding the components of each link profile together
with the neighborhood of each node, in order to better evaluate the cause of packet
losses. The basic idea is for the nodes whose IDS reported packet drops, to reprofile their links with the suspicious node and compare them to the CHPs for those
links (generated during initial setup and periodically updated during the lifetime of
the sensor application). The link re-profiling algorithm is carried simultaneously by
several investigating nodes and without the knowledge of the suspicious node, in order
to avoid any misdirection with the investigation results.
2

In this dissertation, we refer to the term interference for both intentional (jamming) and unintentional disruption of signal communication between sensor nodes.
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Figure 6.2. FGA event-driven algorithm.

Our FGA algorithm is event-driven, and thus ideal for asynchronous systems such
as WSNs. The triggering events and their respective actions are shown in Figure 6.2.
Basically, when the IDS of a node, say n, observes packet drop attacks at one of its
neighbor nodes, say nbad , it will activate the FGA tool of n in order to investigate the
cause of the packet drops observed at nbad .
In order to assess the current health status of the link with nbad , the investigating
nodes must collect new data evidence. The FGA tool of n therefore starts the Evidence
Collection phase, snooping packets sent by nbad and recording their corresponding
RSSI and LQI values in a re-profiling array Rnbad [] of size S. For every subsequent
notification by the IDS of n that another packet has been dropped by nbad , a value
of 0 is pushed into Rnbad []. This process is carried out in parallel at every node that
observes packet drops from nbad and is investigating accordingly.
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While the FGA tool of a node is investigating, it also simultaneously carries out
an environmental evidence collection in order to better account for the surrounding
environment. In fact, the FGA tool records the RSSI and LQI measurements for every
snooped packet coming from other direct neighbors. Similarly to what is performed
for nbad , values coming from a neighbor, say n0 , are pushed into the corresponding
re-profiling array Rn’ [], up to S elements.

6.4.2 Profile Comparison
At the time, say T C, when one of the investigating nodes fills up its re-profiling
array Rnbad [], this node, say n, computes a Current Investigation Profile (CIP ), representing the most current health state of the link between itself and nbad , as follows.
First, all re-profiling arrays (for nbad as well as the other direct neighbors of n) are
aggregated similarly to what is done during the initial profiling, thus generating a
single profile for each link with a neighbor n0 from which some data was snooped
during the Evidence Collection phase:
PS
CIAvgRSSIn0 =

i=1

RSSI (Rn’ [i])
|S|

PS

LQI (Rn’ [i])
|S|
nonzero (Rn’ [])
CIP RRn0 =
S

CIAvgLQIn0 =

i=1

CIPn0 = hCIAvgRSSIn0 , CIAvgLQIn0 , CIP RRn0 i
Note that, since every packet loss originated by nbad detected during the Evidence
Collection pushes a 0 in the re-profiling array Rnbad [], the Packet Reception Rate for
the link n ← n0 in this investigation on nbad is easily computed as the ratio between
the number of non-zero values in the array and the size S of the array.
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All the current profiles CIPn0 (including CIPnbad ) are compared to the respective
CHPn0 to compute a series of deltas 4n0 indicating the absolute change in profile for
each of these neighbor nodes, for the single components of RSSI and LQI:
4RSSIn0 = abs(RSSI(CIPn0 ) − RSSI(CHPn0 ))
4LQIn0 = abs(LQI(CIPn0 ) − LQI(CHPn0 ))
4n0 = 4RSSIn0 , 4LQIn0
Once all the deltas are calculated, all the 4n0 except 4nbad are averaged into a
Neighborhood Current Investigating Delta N CID. Finally, the Current Investigation
Delta CID is computed as follows:
CID = α · 4nbad + β · N CID
where α + β = 1 and α ≥ β.
The parameters α and β are customizable depending on how much weight the
environment should have in the final overall profile for that link. Including the environment in the Profile Comparison makes it harder for a malicious node to fake an
interference by intentionally manipulating the transmission power, as discussed later
in the security analysis (see Section 6.8). However, it is easy to see that the effect of
the rest of the environment on the Investigation Profile can be removed by choosing
α = 1.0 and β = 0.0. Experiment 7 in Section 6.7 provides insights on appropriate
values for the two weights.
At this point, the node executes the Profile Comparison algorithm, a fundamental
building block in our analysis technique. Figure 6.3 shows a representation of the
decision flow for this algorithm. The algorithm compares CIP RRnbad against the
threshold (P RRthres ) that differentiates between the cases of partial and total packet
losses. We denote the single RSSI and LQI components of the CID as 4RSSI and
4LQI , respectively. Interfthres denotes the interference threshold representing the
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Figure 6.3. Profile comparison algorithm at Node n being an neighbor
node investigating for packet drops observed at node nbad .

minimal difference in link profiles (RSSI, LQI) that can determine the existence of
interference. The value of Interfthres is determined by measuring the maximum
fluctuation occurred during the initial profiling of the network links.
When P RRcurr ≥ P RRthres , the profile comparison algorithm of each neighbor
node would only need to compare the link profiles that connect it with the node under
investigation. However, when P RRcurr < P RRthres , the profile comparison algorithm
of each neighbor node would need to re-profile all its links and compare the new
profiles with the originally captured link profiles.

6.4.3 Threshold Values Determination
The FGA Profile Comparison algorithm leverages two separate steps of thresholding. How to determine the best thresholds is very different for the two levels.
The P RRthres value differentiates between what should be considered a total
packet loss from what is only a partial packet loss. As such, it is very applicationdependent. In fact, consider two different WSN applications, as one that collects
temperature samples from a crop and another that monitors the health status of a
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hospital patient, both of which send out packets every 1 minute. In the first application, only having, for example, 30% of the packets delivered correctly to the
base station could be slightly inaccurate but sufficient to plot the temperature trend
in that crop; the temperature will not change too quickly, and the application is not
overall mission-critical. On the other hand, in the second application, even losing just
10 − 20% of the packets (thus obtaining 80 − 90% of the packets delivered correctly
at the base station) can be extremely dangerous: the health status of the patient can
change very drastically in a short span of time, and the criticality of the WSN application leads to defining even a small packet loss as total loss. For these reasons, the
two application might want to set their P RRthres values to 0.3 and 0.85, respectively,
and both choices would be perfectly legitimate and reasonable in light of their requirements. Anyway, as part of our future work, we plan on investigating techniques
to support users in choosing a PRR threshold. A possibility involves verifying the
potential presence of redundancy mechanisms. For example, for mission-critical applications, data packets could be duplicated and simultaneously sent along multiple
disjoint routes to the BS; in this case, the PRR local to a link is a much less pressing
constraint given the redundancy. Moreover, measuring the overall WSN packet delivery success rate under normal conditions could provide a better understanding of
a tolerable packet loss rate that can still maintain network functionality.
Unlike the P RRthres threshold, the values of the Interfthres threshold are not
application-dependent, and are calculated from the measures collected during the
initial profiling. In fact, the rationale behind an optimal value for the Interfthres
is to minimize the misdetections (link-related attack diagnosed as node-related, and
viceversa) during the investigation. The RSSI and LQI values are subject to natural fluctuations, the strength of which is determined by the motes used and various
environmental factors. During the initial profiling, many sample RSSI and LQI values are collected. The optimal threshold to minimize misdetections is determined
by measuring the maximum fluctuation occurred during the initial profiling of the
network links, separately for the two dimensions of RSSI and LQI, excluding strong
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outliers (i.e. values outside the 95th percentile). That maximum fluctuation effectively establishes how much the RSSI and LQI can deviate from the initial profile
value without the presence of any attacker-induced interference, and correctly delivering the packet (i.e. not causing a packet loss). To consider a concrete example,
consider a node that collects some initial profiling packets for a specific link, and
calculates the initial profile for that link as the average of the values collected, say
RSSI = 78 and LQI = 105. However, assume that the RSSI and LQI values of the
collected packets range in [76, 82] and [104, 106], respectively. Then, it is easy to see
that legitimate values for those two dimensions can fluctuate up to 6 points for the
RSSI and 2 points for the LQI, without being the result of a malicious interference.
A value outside of these bounds, during a FGA, will indicate a divergence greater
than the natural one experienced during the initial profiling, and thus indicate an
interference attack. Therefore, the values for Interfthres can be calculated directly
based on the maximum fluctuation experienced by a node during the initial profiling.

6.4.4 Majority Voting and Investigation Results
When the first node to finish the evidence collection completes the Profile Comparison, it is ready to vote on what the most likely cause of packet drops at nbad is.
The resulting vote is broadcasted with a message with the following format:
hnbad , N odeIDs[], V ote, T Ci
where N odeIDs[] is an array that initially contains the ID of the first voting node
but eventually will contain the IDs of all voting nodes.
Every other node that is still investigating on nbad , say n0 , will stop recording
packets for this investigation on nbad at the time of receiving the first broadcasted
vote. Moreover, it will only consider those collected packets with timestamp less
than or equal to T C. This is necessary because up until the first vote is broadcasted,
the investigation was hidden to nbad , and only after T C the suspect node will become
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aware of the undergoing FGA investigation. The suspect node may therefore attempt
to alter its sent packets to misdirect the investigation.
The majority voting algorithm is designed as a lightweight, simple Distributed
Agreement protocol. Every node initially computes its own vote according to the
evidence collected and the Profile Comparison algorithm already discussed (see Figure 6.3). Only nodes with enough packets recorded in Rnbad [] according to a preset
threshold will take part in the voting. Every node that computes its vote (its own
or aggregated) will broadcast the vote and start a timeout Tnbad . Any node that
receives a vote with the N odeIDs[] array including new node ID(s) will consider the
received vote as more updated and therefore will aggregate this with its own vote (if
not already included) and then broadcast such new aggregated vote. Tnbad is reset
every time a vote is broadcasted. All votes received from nbad are ignored and do not
reset Tnbad . When Tnbad expires at a node, the node considers the vote aggregation
complete, meaning that no more votes are circulating. In addition, every neighbor
node will have the most updated final vote result, with N odeIDs[] listing the IDs
of all the nodes that broadcasted this vote. Therefore, the appropriate action might
be taken depending on the policy put in place by the administrator. For example,
an automated Intrusion Response System [43] might take action, or the BS might be
notified of the determined attack.

Vote Aggregation. We first present the intuitions behind the vote aggregation
mechanism, and then we introduce a formal definition. At a high level, the vote
aggregation is based on the following rules:
• High Radio Interference: If at least one node votes for High Radio Interference, the aggregated vote is high radio interference and therefore packet drops
at nbad are link related. A node would vote for High Radio Interference when
the RSSI and LQI values of its neighborhood profile are significantly affected
due to such strong interference.
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• Low Radio Interference: If at least one node votes for Low Radio Interference
and none of the other nodes votes for High Radio Interference, the aggregated
vote is low radio interference and therefore packet drops at nbad are link related.
A node would vote for Low Radio Interference when the RSSI and LQI values of
the link profile with nbad are significantly affected, without significant changes
in the overall neighborhood profile.
• Selective Forwarding Attack: If at least one node votes for Selective Forwarding and none of the other nodes votes for any type of interference in the network medium, the aggregated vote is selective forwarding and therefore packet
drops at nbad are node related. A node would vote for Selective Forwarding
when none of its received packets from nbad has any significant changes in their
RSSI and LQI values when compared with its original link profile connecting
both nodes.
• Blackhole Attack: If at least one node votes for Blackhole when none of other
investigating nodes votes for selective forwarding or any type of interference in
the network medium, the aggregated vote is blackhole and therefore packet
drops at nbad are node related. A node would vote for a blackhole attack when
none of its neighborhood link profiles are affected by interference nor any packets
have being forwarded from nbad .
Interference might affect different, close-by links with different strengths. For this
reason, initial votes by different nodes might be diverse. However, the node aggregation effectively places a total ordering on the votes, always considering a vote for a
link-related attack more reliable than a vote for a node-related attack. In fact, if some
nodes detect interference while some others do not, it is most likely that interference
is present, but not affecting the communications of some of the investigating nodes.
Either way, interference will still be the cause for the packet droppings and should
therefore be chosen as the correct final decision.
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We now formalize such intuition for the vote aggregation mechanism. Let the
domain of votes be:
D = {HI IN , LO IN , SEL F W D, B HOLE}
such that each element represents High Radio Interference, Low Radio Interference,
Selective Forwarding and Blackhole, respectively. We define a total order relation
over D as follows:
HI IN ≺ LO IN ≺ SEL F W D ≺ B HOLE
Given a set V of votes to be aggregated, the result is computed through the aggregation function defined as follows:
aggr(V ) = min(V )
Since the RSSI and LQI values may be subject to sampling bias that could alter the voting result of a single node, we achieve better voting accuracy in network
topologies that allow each node to have at least two direct neighbors and more than
one disjoint path to reach the BS. This redundancy is typical in engineering a realworld sensor network and therefore makes our voting results less diverse.

Communication Complexity and Optimizations. In the majority voting
algorithm just described, every time a node receives a new vote, it aggregates it to
its current local vote and immediately rebroadcasts it. The final, exact number of
messages sent by the investigating nodes depends on the specific topology of the
neighborhood where the majority voting algorithm is taking place, but it is easy to
see that, in the worst case, the algorithm has a communication complexity of O(n2 )
in terms of messages exchanged among n investigating nodes. An optimization that
we developed as a performance enhancement of the FGA tool is able of reducing the
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communication requirements of the majority voting algorithm. For this optimization,
the execution of the majority voting is locally divided into rounds (a notion common in
many distributed agreement protocols). The round will be determined exclusively by
the local timeout Tnbad , that will have a different use in this version of the algorithm.
When a new vote is received, it is aggregated with the current local vote, but it will
not be re-broadcasted right away. Instead, the investigating node will keep collecting
and aggregating all the votes it receives during the current round. Every time the
timeout fires, the execution will advance to the next round. If any new votes were
received in the previous round, the node will broadcast the latest aggregated vote in
its possession. If, instead, no new votes were received during the previous round, the
majority voting phase is considered completed and the node uses the final vote that
was computed, as in the old version of the majority voting. Even for this optimized
algorithm, the exact number of messages sent by the investigating nodes depends
on the specific topology of the neighborhood where the majority voting algorithm
is taking place. However, this time we can imagine that a new vote travels at least
one additional link per round, and at most one message is sent per node per round.
Therefore the algorithm has a communication complexity of O(l), where l is the
longest hop distance between two nodes participating to the investigation. Since the
worst case topology for this communication is a linear structure with all the nodes
linked in a chain, the longest hop distance for n nodes is n − 1 hops; therefore the
communication complexity worst case would be O(n).

6.5 Colluding Investigating Nodes
The majority voting algorithms presented so far are based on the adversarial model
presented in Section 6.1, that assumes the investigating nodes to be trustworthy and
not to report false votes. Under such assumptions, a single vote can change the final
outcome of the collective investigation. In fact, as already discussed and motivated,
the vote aggregation algorithm places a total ordering on the values in the domain
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of possible attacks, and chooses the minimum value as the new aggregated vote.
Therefore, for example, a single vote for a link-related attack counts more than any
number of votes for a node-related attack, according to our adopted ordering.
We now relax our adversarial model to allow for colluding nodes among the investigating nodes. Under this model, the vote aggregation algorithm needs to be
revised, since allowing a single vote to potentially change the result might let a malicious investigating node to easily subvert the final decision. We therefore present
an algorithm effective in scenarios where some investigating nodes might be colluding
with a malicious node and thus enacting Byzantine behaviors. For every investigation, the algorithm is able to tolerate up to f colluding investigating nodes, with the
total number of investigating nodes is at least f + 1.
For this algorithm, we use the notion of multiset as a data structure for a collection
of votes. Intuitively, a multiset is a set in which each element is associated with its
multiplicity. More formally, a finite multiset Θ over our vote domain D is a function
Θ:D→N
that is nonzero for finitely many v ∈ D. The cardinality of a multiset Θ is calculated
P
as v∈D Θ(v). The minimum of a non empty multiset Θ is computed as
min(Θ) = min {d ∈ D s.t.Θ(d) > 0}
Through this definition of minimum, we can introduce the function l(Θ) that defines
the multiset obtained by removing one occurrence of the smallest value in Θ as follows:

 Θ(v) − 1 if v = min(Θ)
l(Θ)(v) =
 Θ(v)
otherwise
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With these definitions in place, we can proceed to describe the algorithm steps.
In this enhanced algorithm, every vote message is broadcasted with the following
format:
hnbad , V otes[]i
where V otes[] is an array of individual votes, each specified as:
hN odeID, V ote, T Ci
This means that every vote message can contain multiple votes proposed by different
investigating nodes, whose ID is specified in the N odeID field. When a node first
finishes the evidence collection phase and the subsequent Profile Comparison, its vote
will be the only one included in the vote message it broadcasts. Then, the algorithm
operates in rounds, like the optimized algorithm described in the previous section.
Every time a node receives a vote message, it merges the contained votes with the
ones it has already collected. Every node collects all the votes it receives during a
particular round r, and then broadcasts a vote message containing all the votes it has
collected so far in the following round r + 1.
The vote collection terminates when, in a particular round, no new votes are
received. At this point, all the votes collected so far are placed in the multiset. In
order to tolerate f colluding nodes that might try to skew the investigation result,
we intuitively need to remove some of the votes that could alter the final outcome.
For this, we reduce the multiset by applying the function l(Θ) iteratively f times,
thus removing the f lowest instances of votes in the multiset. At this point, the final
decision for a node given the votes that it has collected during the majority voting
phase and adjusted to tolerate colluding nodes is computed as:
decision = min(Θ)
This decision can be then, for example, communicated to the BS or reported to
the IRS, according to the policy put in place by the network administrators.
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6.6 Locating Interference Sources
In critical (real-time) sensor applications, it is necessary to be able to anticipate
possible future attacks on the network. This is achieved by enriching the system
with learning techniques that can warn of possible attacks, based on previous faulty
scenarios. In cases when radio interference is causing packet losses, it is necessary to
locate the source of the interference in order to identify the network region (set of
nodes/links) that may be also affected by the noise source.
Locating the source of interference is necessary as it may assist in evaluating the
trust level of sensor readings. When interference is the cause of packet losses at a
certain node or link, its effect may also reach other regions where the IDS might
require further diagnosis. This could leave the whole network in an inconsistent state
for a longer period of time, spent between detection and analysis of the same cause.
Therefore it is necessary for the FGA tool to locate the source of interference and
inform the BS about the affected region as part of its analysis. Even though the FGA
tool is decentralized and does not rely on the BS for detecting the cause of packet
drops, it will however require the BS’s knowledge of the network map in locating the
source of interference.

6.6.1 Design Choices for Localization
Localization algorithms can be classified as centralized and distributed [178]. In
centralized approaches, all the localization data for all nodes are collected and processed centrally – usually at the BS – with a global overview of the entire network. On
the other hand, distributed approaches use information from the node itself and the
direct neighbors. Therefore, centralized approaches lead to a more accurate localization, but require more communications. Thus, whereas for this reason the distributed
approach is usually preferred for WSNs, our FGA approach benefits from a hybrid
approach that carries out part of the computation at the investigating nodes (such as
the collection of re-profiling samples and the computation of the deltas for localiza-
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tions), while delegating to the BS the main computation. This strategy is particularly
appropriate for our work since the localization will need to be communicated to the
network administrator anyway in order for her to intervene.
In our work, as well as in the state-of-the-art approaches, the accuracy requirements for WSN localization approaches depend on many factors, including: the requirements of the application itself, the dynamics of the monitored environment, cost
and energy consumption, the availability of additional supporting hardware, the required speed of the computational processing. The requirements that drive the design
decisions in our approach include: no need for any additional hardware, maximization of the reuse of already-collected data, minimal processing for faster completion
of the localization, low energy consumption impact, enough accuracy to pinpoint the
area affected by interference and guarantee administrator intervention. To better
understand the rationale behind our design choices, it is important to formalize that
the goal of our interference localization is to give direction to in-network countermeasures, either automated – by Intrusion Response Systems that can for example
re-route packets around the affected area – or manual – by a network administrator
that wants to physically find and remove the malicious source of interference. These
two goals, driven by the needs of real-world scenarios, drive the tradeoff between the
speed and simplicity of the algorithm, and an exact position localization. In realistic
scenarios, this justifies a potentially small inaccuracy – inherent in the signal strength
measurement in WSNs – in order to quickly respond to the attack and to preserve
energy.
In addition, our approach has three main advantages compared with traditional
signal strength-based localization approaches:
• In traditional RSSI-based localization techniques, a node A collects on-demand
some samples of signal strength received from a node B, which as we discuss in
this chapter may fluctuate quite a bit. In our approach, the link profiles that
each node records are the result of an accurate samples collection, are smoothed
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Figure 6.4. Vi and 4i representing node i ’s location and neighborhood profile delta.

out to account for the natural signal fluctuations, and are constantly kept up
to date during the network’s lifetime when energy is discharging.
• In such traditional techniques, node A then uses its own collected samples to
estimate the distance of B. In our approach, the information used for the localization process comes from multiple investigating nodes, providing our approach
with redundancy and thus more robust and accurate. Moreover, the aggregation
of such data for the localization process is carried out at the BS, that having
more resources can afford to store additional information such as the complete,
detailed map of the WSN.
• The most crucial part of our technique is that, instead of trying to estimate the
distance from a node, the investigating nodes only report to the BS the relative
deltas in all their link profiles, that is, how affected by the interference these
links are. So, instead of measuring how strong the signal is, this is a measure
of how attenuated it is with respect to a normality profile built over time. The
BS, then, based on the map of the WSN, can use those deltas as weights to
each link in its search, and accurately localize source of interference.
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6.6.2 Localization Approach
When the FGA tool determines that the cause of packet losses is an interference,
it attempts to locate the interference source in order to estimate the nodes and links
that may be possibly affected. The approach used for detecting the interference
source works as follows. Let nbad be the first node reported to the BS as affected
by interference. The BS then requires all the direct neighbors Nnbad of this node to
re-compute their current neighborhood profiles, as discussed in Section 6.3. Once the
new profiles are computed and compared to the original neighborhood profiles, each
node sends the BS the profile difference, denoted as 4, for evaluation.
The technique used to locate the source of interference leverages the formula for
the calculation of the weighted centroid of finite points [179], defined as:
Pn
~
i=1 Wi · Vi
P
n
i=1 Wi
where Wi is the weight at Node i computed as a function of 4i , and V~i is the vector
with the spatial coordinates (~x, ~y , ~z) of Node i according to the actual topology of
the network known by the BS. Figure 6.4 also shows the vectors that represent each
node’s location according to a given origin O and their corresponding 4. The BS
will use these 4i s and V~i s, together with knowledge of the topology, to locate the
interference source.

6.6.3 Weight Function
As we already mentioned, the weight Wi used in the weighted centroid of finite
points formula for the localization of interference sources is computed as a function
of 4i . Depending on the particular function chosen, the localization accuracy could
vary greatly. In order to determine the weight function that would guarantee the
best localization accuracy, we carried out an extensive analysis, applying different
weight functions to all the experimental data collected from our real-world testbed.
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Figure 6.5 shows a comparison of the percentage error of some of the different weight
functions we used. As the results show, we determined that the function that guarantees the best accuracy in all our tests is the exponentiation function. Therefore,
this is the function of choice for our FGA localization algorithm, and is the function
used in the localization experiments described in Section 6.7.

Figure 6.5. Comparison of accuracy with different functions for the
weight in the weighted centroid of finite points formula for the localization of interference sources (smaller is better).

6.7 Experimental Analysis
In this section, we report experimental results to assess the efficiency and accuracy
of our FGA tool. We first introduce our experimental setup, then we perform realworld experiments to test our FGA tool on different attack scenarios.

6.7.1 Experimental Setup
Our setup consisted of 25 TelosB [180] wireless sensor motes using TinyOS 2.1,
which were placed at different locations. These motes operate at 2.4 GHz ISM band,
with an effective data rate of 256 kbps, a much higher rate than that of older radios.
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For experimental purposes, we set up one sensor to act as a BS and created a server
Java program to interact with the BS through the USB port. All the other nodes
were programmed with the same code and waited for commands from the BS. Each
node was programmed to perform its analysis locally and independently.
We also built a simple routing system on top of the standard messaging layer
that offers point-to-point multi-hop direct communication. We applied concepts from
common Internet routing protocols so that every node is capable of automatically
building its own routing table and self-discovering/learning the best routes towards
any other node in the network. Thus, after a few initial packet exchanges, most of
the routes are automatically discovered and so is the whole network. Our improved
routing system reduces the nodes communication overhead by avoiding useless packet
transmissions. Through the BS, we used the multi-hop protocol to allow the administrator to send commands to all the nodes, as well as to single specific nodes, through
our Java program that was connected to the BS.
We also set up a special mote, the jammer, to act as the source of interference in
order to test the FGA accuracy in detecting and locating the noise [181]. This mote
was programmed to emit dummy packets every 5 msec. with an increasing counter
value. We avoided keeping the other mote radios busy with useless interrupts, while
maximizing the interference on the radio medium itself. This helped us to get a more
realistic representation of a real-world interference attack.
The accuracy of the FGA is related to the considered topology of the sensor
network. The minimum topology requirements would be for each node to have at
least two possible paths to reach the BS. This requires that every link has at least
one additional node watching it, forming a triangular structure for every hop towards
the BS. This requirement is basic for most real-world sensor networks, considering
that redundancy is always required by the engineering of every topology.
The testbed network topology for our experimental evaluation follows this structure, in which the links form many triangular shapes.
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Figure 6.6 shows a snapshot of the topology of a portion of our network that is
the closest to the BS. Focusing on a portion of the network is effective in showing the
performance of the FGA tool, since investigations are always local to the neighborhood
of a detected packet loss. We performed experiments using this topology to compute
the corresponding profiles of each link. Then we used these profiles to detect the
causes of packet drops as detailed in Section 6.4.

Figure 6.6. Snapshot of the network portion closest to the BS.

6.7.2 FGA Testing on Different Attack Scenarios
We carried out our testing at different parts of the network to better evaluate its
efficiency, and we experimented all possible cases by placing the interference source
at different locations.
The results we present in this section come from 5 independent repetition of each
experiment in identical conditions.
Since only the direct neighbor nodes participate in the FGA of a suspect node, we
will refer to Figure 6.6 in our experiments for clarity of discussion, as attacks causing
packet losses will occur among these nodes.
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Figure 6.7. Comparison of link profiles for nodes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
with and without interference near node 3. ”I” denotes initial profiles values, and ”C” denotes current profile values in the presence of
interference.

Our experiments were divided into several scenarios:

Experiment 1: Building Profiles at Initial Network Setup: At initial network setup, the BS requests every node to start building its initial profiles with its
direct neighbors, and save these profiles locally at every node. The time needed to
profile our 25 sensor nodes, which each sends 100 dummy messages to each other node
every 10 milliseconds, was a total of 25 sec., thus 1 sec. to profile each node links.
Figure 6.7 shows sample profile values we collected from Nodes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
(see Figure 6.6).

Experiment 2: Interference Effect on Link Profiles: In order to test the
impact of interference on link profiles, we activated our interference mote and placed
it close to Node 3. We manually requested re-profiling to see the changes in the RSSI
and LQI values of the affected links, mainly around Node 3. Figure 6.7 shows the
corresponding profiles of these links. Notice the changes in the RSSI values with
no significant changes in the LQI values due to low radio interference we purposely
used. Also, since the LQI values that CC2420 radios report are independent from
the RSSI parameter, the link quality is stable once the signal strength is good enough.
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Experiment 3: Selective Forwarding Attack: To test the FGA tool against
this attack, we configured our network so that Node 5 would send messages to the BS,
whereas Node 2 would be the intermediate node as chosen by the routing protocol.
Nodes 3, 4, 6 and 7 would be the direct neighbors of Node 2 and thus monitor its
behavior.
The intermediate Node 2 was programmed to simulate a selective forwarding attack
by dropping packets with 10% probability, and we made sure that there was no
interference within range. Our results show that when 20 packets were dropped by
Node 2, the IDSes of Nodes 3, 4, 6 and 7 successfully detected a packet drop attack
and triggered the FGA. In our experiment, Node 4 was the first to completely fill its
re-profiling array of 10 slots at time T C, compute, and broadcast its vote. Each of the
Nodes 3, 6 and 7 had already recorded the RSSI and LQI values of 9 received packets
from Node 2 at the time stamped in Node 4 ’s vote. The FGA tool of each node in
turn aggregates and broadcast its vote accordingly until all votes of the investigating
nodes are aggregated. The final vote aggregation reported a selective forwarding
attack.
Vote for node 3: h2, [3], SEL F W D, T Ci
Vote for node 4: h2, [4], SEL F W D, T Ci
Vote for node 6: h2, [6], SEL F W D, T Ci
Vote for node 7: h2, [7], SEL F W D, T Ci
Aggregated vote: h2, [3, 4, 6, 7], SEL F W D, T Ci

Experiment 4: Low Interference Attack: We placed the interference mote
to carry out low interference near Node 2. The interference however was not strong
enough to isolate Node 2 completely. However, when 20 packets were dropped by
Node 2, the IDSes of Nodes 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 detected a packet drop attack and
activated their FGA tool. Node 3 was the first to fill its re-profiling array slots and
send out its vote. Nodes 4 and 6 received the vote and stopped recording with 9/10
slots filled, while Node 5 and 7 stopped recording with 8/10 slots filled. Since our
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threshold for accepting a node’s vote is to have at least 70% of its re-profiling array
slots filled, we considered the votes of all 5 investigating nodes. Even though Nodes
4 and 7 voted for “Selective Forwarding” as their recorded packets did not show any
significant influence of the existing interference, Nodes 3, 5, and 6 voted for “Low
Interference” which is the aggregated vote result according to the methodology we
presented in Section 6.4.
Vote for node 3: h2, [3], LO IN , T Ci
Vote for node 4: h2, [4], SEL F W D, T Ci
Vote for node 5: h2, [5], LO IN , T Ci
Vote for node 6: h2, [6], LO IN , T Ci
Vote for node 7: h2, [7], SEL F W D, T Ci
Aggregated vote: h2, [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], LO IN , T Ci

Experiment 5: Strong Interference Attack: This attack scenario was the
same as the previous attack scenario but we strengthened the interference to such
a point that Node 2 was completely isolated from the network. Nodes 3, 4, 6 and
7 carried out the analysis with Node 4 filling out its re-profiling array first and
broadcasting its vote. Nodes 6 and 7 received the vote and stopped recording with
7/10 slots filled, while Node 3 with only 5/10 slots filled. Since our threshold for
accepting a node’s vote is to have at least 70% of its re-profiling array slots filled, we
did not consider the vote of Node 3. Because of the applied strong interference, the
re-profiling arrays of Nodes 4, 6 and 7 contained 0’s and therefore had to re-profile
their links with their direct neighbors to perform the profile comparison algorithm.
Even though Node 6 was the only node to report ”High Radio Interference”, its vote
was dominant according to the methodology in Section 6.4.
Vote for node 4: h2, [4], B HOLE, T Ci
Vote for node 6: h2, [6], HI IN , T Ci
Vote for node 7: h2, [7], B HOLE, T Ci
Aggregated vote: h2, [4, 6, 7], HI IN , T Ci
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Experiment 6: Locating the Source of Interference: In this experiment,
we applied the technique described in Section 6.6 to locate the source of interference
that was causing packet losses. We placed the interference source at different locations, mainly near Nodes 2, 3 and 4, to compute the accuracy of our location method.
Figure 6.8 shows the actual and estimated location of the interference source when
placed near Node 3. Once the BS receives the neighborhood profile difference, it can
locate the interference source using its precise/approximate coordinates of each node.
Figure 6.9 shows the accuracy of our method by comparing the actual location of the
interference source to the computed ones resulted from various interference locations.
We present three of the most relevant test cases for this experiment. In each of the
tests, the source of interference was placed in a different position (indicated as “Actual Position”), and we computed the error with respect to the “Estimated Position”
as the Euclidean distance of the two points. In Test 1 and Test 2, we placed the
source of interference quite close to two different nodes, respectively, while in Test
3 we placed it in the middle of a link. The particular weight function we use for
interference location, as discussed, is the exponentiation of the neighborhood profile
delta. Such function, while guaranteeing the lowest error among all the functions we
used, tends to “pull” the estimated position next to the nodes; this is the reason why
Test 3, while still proving very accurate, showed a higher error than the other two
tests.

Experiment 7: Power Manipulation: A smart malicious node might try to
misdirect the outcome of an investigation by manipulating its transmission power
after dropping a packet. By using the investigation profile for the malicious node
alone, the investigating nodes might detect a variation in the profiles greater than
the threshold for interference, and thus determine a link related attack instead of a
node related attack. We carried out an experiment to verify that the introduction of
the Environmental Evidence Collection, as well as its use in calculating the Current
Investigation Delta, can prevent such misdirection. We used the same topology as
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Figure 6.8. Actual vs. computed location of an interference source
with respect to sensor nodes, in feet.

Figure 6.9. Accuracy of computed vs. actual location (in feet) of
different interference source positions.

the other experiments, instructing Node 2 to carry out a selective forwarding attack
and, immediately after, lowering its transmission power by 10dBm during the inves-
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tigation by the neighboring nodes. We detected that this power manipulation caused,
on average, a variation of 9.25 in the RSSI component of the profile of nbad (∆nbad ) at
the investigating nodes. Figure 6.10 shows how the computed Current Investigation
Delta varies at different investigating nodes depending on the values chosen for α and,
consequently, β. For ease of analysis, we present the results for the RSSI components
of every delta, as well as of the Interfthres , which for this experiment was set to
8.0 based on the fluctuation measured at network setup. The highlighted cells show
the occurrences of detection of interference instead of selective forwarding, indicating
that the misdirection by the attacker succeeded. The results show that a value of 0.8
for α already changes the outcome for 2 out of 3 nodes that would have decided for
an interference attack using the profile for nbad alone. With a value of α set to 0.7 or
lower, all the nodes correctly identify the attack despite the power manipulation.

Figure 6.10. Accuracy of the detection in presence of power manipulations using different values for α.
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Experiment 8: Tolerance to Colluding Investigating Nodes: In this experiment, we tested the tolerance of our collusion-resistant majority voting algorithm
in presence of malicious investigating nodes, presented in Section 6.5.
We repeated the scenario described in Experiment 3, programming one of the
intermediate nodes to perform a selective forwarding attack. We also programmed
one of its neighbor to act as a colluding node during all the investigations, and thus
to broadcast fake votes.
At first, we did not use the collusion-resistance algorithm. Once the investigation
started, the nodes started broadcasting correctly their votes for “Selective Forwarding”. The colluding node, then, broadcasted its fake vote for “Low Interference”.
Since that vote, according to our total ordering, is less than the other votes circulating, the other nodes chose it as a voting result and incorrectly reported a low
interference attack to the BS as the cause of the packet dropping. Therefore, the
collusion attack was successful.
We then repeated the same scenario but using our collusion-resistant majority
algorithm. This time, after all the votes were collected, they were placed into the
multiset and the “Low Interference” vote, being the lowest, was discarded. The investigation result was therefore correctly computed as a selective forwarding attack.
Thus, the collusion attack in this case was prevented, tolerating for the malicious
investigating node.

Experiment 9: Initial Profiling Stability for Sample count: In this experiment, we evaluate how the duration of the initial profiling in terms of exchanged
dummy packets affects the obtained profile stability. We have carried out the initial profiling procedure, as already discussed in this work, by exchanging up to 1000
dummy packets (in each direction) between each pair of node in our testbed.
We characterize a profile by its mean, maximum and minimum values, which will
describe the value for the profile and the fluctuation. Moreover, we define a profile
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as stable when any number of future samples does not change the mean, maximum
and minimum by more than 1.0.
Figure 6.11 shows the statistics for one of those links, focusing on the RSSI. On
the x axis there is the number of samples collected, while the y axis shows the signal
strength value for each packet. It is easy to see that after a sample size of 60, all the
three statistics do not change by more than 1.0, therefore we consider the profile as
stable.

Figure 6.11. Relationship between initial profiling duration and profile accuracy.

We carried out this same evaluation on all the links of our testbed, to determine
the necessary number of sample until the respective profile may be considered stable.
Overall, our results show that the minimum number of dummy packets necessary,
during the initial profiling, to obtain a stable link profile ranges between a minimum
of 26 and a maximum of 74, averaging at 43, and longer profiling times do not add
significant advantages.

Summary of Results: Figure 6.12 shows the accuracy of our FGA technique
with respect to the actual number of packet loss test cases we performed. Our FGA
technique was able to perform correct diagnoses in ∼ 90% of the cases when selective
forwarding was the cause of packet losses (Experiment 3 ), in ∼ 95% of the cases when
low interference was the cause (Experiment 4 ), and in ∼ 100% of the time when strong
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interference was the cause of packet losses (Experiment 5 ). These results show the
accuracy of our FGA technique for sensor network applications.

Figure 6.12. Comparison of FGA accuracy in experiments 3, 4, and 5.

6.8 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the FGA technique with respect to the
possible strategies that an adversary might use to hide the cause of packet drops.
The aim of our security analysis is to devise mitigations against such strategies and
discuss how likely they are to compromise the results of the FGA.

Transmission Power Manipulation. When a node is suspected to be maliciously dropping packets, the FGA tool executes the re-profiling algorithm as described in Section 6.4. However, an attacker may try to misdirect the FGA by using
a different power than the usual power to transmit the messages included in the reprofiling process, which will make the neighbor nodes think the packet loss is caused
by link interference. However, our re-profiling procedure is hidden from the attacker
and thus the node under attack will not be able to differentiate between normal and
re-profiling traffic. Only after the FGA results (votes) are broadcasted, the attacker
might become aware that the re-profiling process has already been executed.

175
A smart attacking node might still, however, manipulate its sending power for the
packets following a node-related packet dropping attack. For this reason, the investigating nodes also collect evidence about the environment (i.e. the rest of the traffic
coming from their neighbors) during the investigation, and this data is used in the
profile comparison to reduce the possibility of success of an attack with intentional
transmission power manipulation.

Organic Battery Decay vs. Interference. We now consider the scenario in
which an attacker tries to trick the FGA tool by very gradually and slowly introducing interference until the network becomes disrupted. The Profile Update algorithm
would detect this change as an organic battery decaying and not interference, thus
leaving the attack undetected. However, if the network administrator sets the threshold rate for the change smoothness of accepted decaying (i.e. the threshold for the
rate at which the change is organically gradual) to a low, appropriate value, then the
attacker would only be able to produce as much interference as what the natural decaying of the overall network battery life is. Therefore, the attack would be effectively
harmless. The same considerations arise in the scenario in which a single node would
alter its power levels slowly enough to be considered physiological battery discharge.
Again, the attacker would only be able to decrease the level as slowly as the natural
decaying of the node’s battery, thus producing a very slow and effectively harmless
attack.

Strong Interference and Disruption of the FGA. When the WSN is under
a strong interference attack, if the attack covers an area larger than a single/few
nodes, it might disrupt communication for a whole node neighborhood. Therefore,
even assuming that some of the nodes in the neighborhood could start investigating,
the interference might prevent some of the FGA tool’s fundamentals steps, such as
the exchange of votes. If no interference-free node exists, and the entire network is
blocked out, then in this worst case the FGA tool would not be able to complete the
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analysis but no recovery would be possible anyway. In any well-designed WSN, the BS
profiles the traffic over time and, in a case like this, it would notice a huge difference
in the traffic profile and immediately detect the attack. However, there will often be
a frontier around which the effect of the jammer is not strong enough. If, thus, such
a frontier exists (as it will in most of the cases, not having interference strong enough
to disrupt an entire WSN), the fully distributed FGA algorithm guarantees that the
nodes around that frontier will be able to investigate successfully.

Correctness of Initial Link Profiles. One possible interference source could
be a result of closely placed sensors that could disturb the network communication
signals. After a successful network initial setup, the existence of strong interference
among the sensors is easily detectable. However, very low interference could exist
that may affect the RSSI values but without causing any packet drops. The initial
link profiles are collected right after a successful network initial setup. Thus the RSSI
values collected may be affected by the existing interference. However, we claim that
those link profiles are still valid and correct as long as no packets drops have been
detected by the IDS during the initial collection process. Moreover, the existence of
a malicious node among the newly installed nodes is unlikely as we believe that each
node would be tested at initial setup, thus also validating the correctness of the FGA
initial profiles.

Reactive Jamming Attacks. In a reactive jamming attack, the jammer may
modify the Start-of-Frame Delimiter (SFD bytes) of some packets before sending
them, resulting in dropping packets at the destination node. As such packet modification does not increase 4RSSI or 4LQI , the FGA algorithm might think that the
destination node is malicious, but actually it is not. As packet modification is out
of the scope of this dissertation, we rely on the IDS to check if there is any packet
modification before the FGA tool starts carrying its re-profiling algorithm.
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Simultaneous Different Attacks at Same Location. Our FGA approach
is able to carry out multiple simultaneous investigations about attacks in different
parts of the network. However, there could be extreme instances in which a fully
correct diagnosis would not be possible right away. In fact, in the case of multiple
attacks of different nature happening at the same time at the same node – i.e. when
a node-related and a link-related attacks occur jointly in the same location – the
interference attack would always affect the surrounding links in a way that can mask
attacks from compromised nodes. Out of the two attacks occurring simultaneously
at the same node, therefore, the FGA would be able to initially diagnose only the
interference attack, as the changes in the link profiles would hide the further attacks
by the compromised node. However, this would still lead the network administrator
to be able to diagnose and resolve the interference attack in that portion of the WSN.
Then, if the attacks from the compromised node are still happening, these would be
detected correctly by the FGA upon the immediately following packet loss event, and
would lead the administrator to completely eradicate the problem.

6.9 Related Work
Our work is related to previous research on two different topics: (1) the use of
forensic analysis techniques for investigating packet losses in WSNs, (2) the use of
RSSI/LQI for WSN performance and sensor localization.
Very few forensic analysis techniques have been proposed to investigate packet
losses occurring in networks. Yang et al. developed a detection scheme employing
neighboring nodes as witnesses that monitor their peers for possible misbehaving
nodes incorrectly forwarding packets [40]. The forensic analyzer by Ning et al. aims
at determining the cause of discarded packets and forwarding misbehaviors by means
of various network parameters (packet size, bit rate in use, node density, interference
level) and logs [41]. Our approach, in contrast, uses less network parameters and
fewer computations to determine the likely causes of packet losses. Moreover, our
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approach differentiates between node and link related causes of packet drops, while
their approach focuses on differentiating between natural induced packet losses from
malicious discarding.
Several approaches have been proposed for detecting packet dropping attacks, but
few approaches identify the cause of packet drops through their impact on network
parameters, as we investigate with our FGA technique. Ramach et al. proposed
a generic architecture able to monitor many parameters in protocols, devices and
networks parameters [37]. On the same line, the diagnostic system introduced by Qiu
et al. leverages trace-driven simulations in order to diagnose performance problems
caused by various network adverse events, such as link congestion, packet dropping,
MAC misbehavior and external noise [36]. However, the evidence collected by both
these approaches aims at diagnosing performance issues, rather than determining the
most likely cause of packet losses. De Couto et al. designed an expected transmission
count metric to estimate the packet delivery ratio on links [38], similar to the ETT
metric that assigns weights to individual links based on the expected transmission
time of a packet over the link [39]. Although both the metrics assess the packet loss
rate, neither of them gives information about the cause of packet losses.
The RSSI and LQI metrics of the CC2420 have also been used for goals different
from ours. Zaruba et al. used RSSI readings for locating wireless nodes in an indoor
environment, requiring a single access point [182]. However, Parameswaran et al. [183]
determined that the sole RSSI metric is sufficient for localization algorithms, but they
were not always successful in getting very accurate measurements of node distances
due to the presence of factors such as interference. Zanca et al. [184] compared many
RSSI-based localization algorithms and showed that by just using RSSI, localization
may not be accurate with errors of few centimeters due to the presence of moving
people or obstacles. However, Srinivasan and Levis [185] argued that the combination
of RSSI and LQI measurements represents an effective indicator for localization, even
with the existence of obstacles or interference. Other uses of RSSI parameters were
proposed by Khan et al. for troubleshooting unresponsive sensor nodes. However,
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their approach requires the use of external power-metering subsystems located next
to the nodes to collect their power consumption traces in case of future possible
failures [172].
In [186], Bocca et al. use RF sensor networks for real-time device-free localization,
by leveraging the change in RSSI of the various links to infer the targets locations.
Their technique is similar to the one in our proposed approach, even though more
geared towards real-time tracking of moving targets, and their 0.5 m average error
demonstrates how signal strength-based localization approaches can achieve a high
accuracy.
Chen et al. in [187] propose a signal strength-based localization algorithm for
WSNs by using dependable RSSI values, chosen with empirically defined thresholds.
While our approach is similar, and leads to comparable accuracy, we add the flexibility
of achieving the same level of dependability in RSSI values by smoothing down the
samples collected during link profiling. Therefore, in our approach there is no need
to pre-determine a dependability threshold for the samples.
In [188], Bekcibasi et al. discuss the classification of factors that reduce RSSI
accuracy for localization purposes as environmental and device factors. The former
are related to the wireless communication channel itself, and include multipath, shadowing and interference. The latter are related to the devices radio chip and include,
for example, calibration errors. In our work, the discussed way of our approach for
building and updating the link profiles is able to account for both these categories
of inaccuracy factors: the initial profiling strengthens against environmental factors,
while the use of relative deltas for localization instead of absolute values protects
against device factors.
Some traditional localization approaches make use of anchors, nodes that will
measure the received signal strength from the target (often moving) and use it to
triangulate the position by intersecting the radiuses of multiple anchors. Bekcibasi et
al. propose in [188] to use groups of four anchors instead of three in order to improve
the localization accuracy. In our approach, all the investigating nodes effectively act
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as anchors – adding even more redundancy to the measurements – but without the
burden of knowing their own exact location – which is delegated to the BS.
We originally proposed the FGA technique in [189]. In the current status of the
work, we enhance our technique by addressing some limitations of the original approach. A first limitation was that, over the execution life of a WSN, the use of a static
reference profile for the links is not able to account for the organic battery decay. In
our current work we address such limitation by the introduction of the Current Health
Profile to reduces the possibility of false positives. Sophisticated adversaries might intentionally manipulate the transmission power in order to mask node-related attacks
as interference issues. By performing the Environmental Evidence Collection, the improved FGA technique includes reference data that accounts for the surrounding links
in order to prevent those power manipulations from misdirecting the investigation. In
this work, the enhanced security provided by the improved FGA tool is investigated
in more depth, to analyze different adversarial scenarios such as colluding nodes or
strong interference preventing local investigations.

6.10 Summary
This chapter introduced our FGA technique for wireless sensor networks that uses
existing link parameters to investigate the cause of packet losses, whether it is related
to node attacks or to link interference attacks. Our technique has been implemented
in a tool that has been deployed on actual sensors. Experiments on these sensor nodes
have shown that our FGA technique is able to successfully differentiate the various
attacks and determine the most likely cause of packet losses. Also, in the case when
interference is the cause of packet losses, our FGA technique is able to locate the
interference source and to estimate its effect on other nodes and links.
Since determining the correct parameters to the diagnostic system can be a hard
task, in the next chapter we present a statistical model to enhance the FGA system
and assist in determining the necessary thresholds.
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7 STATISTICALLY-ENHANCED FINE-GRAINED DIAGNOSIS OF PACKET
LOSSES
All the parameters for the FGA tool, such as its detection thresholds, can be customized by the network administrator based on the requirements of their specific
WSN of interest. Incorrectly setting the parameters can impact the accuracy of the
analysis and, consequently, the correctness of the packet loss cause determination
in face of subtle attacks. While the parameter values identified in Chapter 6 were
evaluated to be effective, an automated guidance to the choice of optimal values
for such system parameters is of great importance. In fact, empirically-determined
values might not always be optimal. As a consequence, a higher number of false
alarms would be produced, reducing the accuracy of the tool. Moreover, such previous approach uses a single threshold for the whole WSN. While this is aimed at
reducing the workload for the network administrator, it can lead to an additional
increase in false alarms. In fact, in a large-scale WSN deployment, different parts of
the network might experience different normality conditions, and a single predefined
threshold might be suitable for a network portion but inadequate for another. Lastly,
the previous approach does not allow one to control the false alarm rate for each link.
This means that it is not possible to require a priori a desired maximum rate of false
detections. We therefore design an approach that builds and uses a statistical model
for the determination of the optimal system thresholds. By collecting and analyzing
samples from the initial deployment of the WSN system, our approach builds an accurate statistical model of each link exploiting the variances of RSSI and LQI. Based
on such model, our approach is able to select the optimal threshold for each link in
the WSN. One of the advantages of our model is that it also allows the setting of
a different threshold for each link. Such task is manually unfeasible for a network
administrator, but can be effectively carried out in an automated way by our model.
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Moreover, since each threshold is tuned according to an optimum criterion, we can
always choose a desired false alarm rate on a per-link basis and, if needed, exclude
from the network all the links that will not be able to reach satisfactory detections.
By means of extensive MATLAB simulation based on real sensor data, our experimental evaluation shows that our model is accurate and leads to well-tailored system
parameters for an optimally-accurate fine-grained analysis of the underlying causes
of packet losses.

7.1 System Model
7.1.1 WSN Metrics Formalization
In this section, we provide a formal definition of well-known resident packet metrics
and aggregated value that we leverage for building our model. We refer to the TelosB
motes [57] as our hardware platform of choice. Such platform, specifically, uses a
CC2420 radio chip, but our approach can be applied to any of the newer radios
based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. In fact, these radio chips natively offer two
measurements for link quality estimation, namely RSSI and LQI. The RSSI represents
an estimate of the received signal power for a packet, and it is measured in dBm. Its
value is calculated over an 8-symbol period, long on average 128 s. The dynamic
range for the RSSI is between −50 and −100, with higher values (less negative)
representing a stronger signal. It is worth noting that, on the CC2420 chip, the
manufacturer specifies that the read RSSI value is stored in the RSSI VAL register of
the chip, with a fixed offset of −45 dBm. According to the specifications of the IEEE
802.11.4 standard, the RSSI value can be effectively used for both detecting noise
on a channel, and estimating the quality of an incoming packet upon its reception.
This property is leveraged by many protocols for optimal routing decisions [124],
and validated by several research efforts on the accuracy of the RSSI measurements
themselves [185, 190]. The LQI can be seen as the chip error rate of the received
signal and measures the signal reception quality. It is calculated over the 8 bits after
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the start frame delimiter (SFD). The specifications of the CC2420 radio chip state
that the measured LQI is actually the average correlation of each symbol obtained
by comparing the symbol that is supposed to be received and the symbol actually
received (signal plus noise). LQI values range between 110 and 50, corresponding
respectively to maximum and minimum quality frames. Another important metric
for link quality estimation is the PRR. It is not a value natively computed by the
radio chip, but instead an aggregated metric for each individual link, computed as the
ratio between the number of packets successfully received and the number of packets
sent. Higher values of PRR indicate a better link quality and therefore a healthier
communication medium.
P RR =

#successf ullyreceivedpackets
#sentpackets

7.2 A New Profiling Technique
In this section, we first discuss the motivations behind the new profiling approach,
and then show the rationale of our procedure.

7.2.1 Motivations
The profiling proposed by in Chapter 6 has proven to be very effective in discriminating between a wireless network affected by a packet drop attack (either selective
forwarding or blackhole attack) or by low/high interference (i.e. noise). One of the
major drawbacks of this method is that the threshold is only one for the entire network and, above all, the threshold is empirically evaluated (i.e. not tuned according
to an optimum criterion). Here, we move further by proposing a new profiling technique that, by exploiting the variances of the RSSI and LQI parameters, can define a
threshold for each link in the network. The problem is formulated as a conventional
binary hypothesis test, where the two hypotheses H0 and H1 correspond, respectively,
to the absence or presence of the attack of interest. We define as probability of false
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alarm (PF A ) the probability of our technique to declare the presence of the attack
when it is actually not present. Conversely, we define as probability of detection (PD )
the probability of our system to correctly identify the presence of the attack, when it is
actually performed. To limit the computational cost of the decision device, we choose
some one-dimensional testing variables that are compared to a pre-selected threshold
to efficiently perform the test. The optimal threshold for each link is tuned according
to an optimality criterion [191]. In particular, the constant false alarm rate (CFAR)
procedure, typically used to perform effective tests [192], is here exploited as such
an optimality criterion. The CFAR procedure refers to a common form of adaptive
algorithm used in telecommunications systems to discriminate between the presence
and absence of something (e.g. an unknown user in hidden communications), against
a background of noise and interference [193]. The CFAR criterion is executed, for
each link, according to the following two steps: first, the threshold is determined that
limits the false alarm probability at a given reduced value (i.e. the size of the test)
under the null hypothesis H0 ; then, the probability of detection, PD , (i.e. the power of
the test) is evaluated under the alternate hypothesis H1 for the threshold previously
determined. The main idea behind our procedure is that the variance of the received
signal (and hence the variance of the RSSI and LQI of the received packets) is lower
when the link is affected by a packet drop attack (H0 hypothesis), while it is higher in
the alternate H1 hypothesis (i.e. when the link is affected by low/high interference).
In fact, and as noted previously, packet drop attacks do not change the statistics of
the received signal in terms of RSSI and LQI. Conversely, the same consideration is
not any longer valid in the presence of channel noise. Therefore, we can select the
variances of the received RSSI and LQI as the one-dimensional testing variables to
compare with the optimal thresholds. Hence, our variance-based test can be effective
in discriminating between cases of a packet drop attacks by nodes and the presence
of low/high interference. In addition, since these considerations apply to each link
in the network, we can identify the most appropriate threshold and consequently the
detection performances for each network link.
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7.2.2 Rationale
The rationale behind our method is the following. The Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) has declared the presence of an anomaly (i.e. some kind of attack) in the
network. This declaration is based on the observation of the PRR values. This allows
us to discriminate between the following two hypotheses:
• H0 : the WSN is affected by a packet drop attack;
• H1 : the WSN is affected by an interference attack.
The decision about the presence or absence of an interference attack in a certain link
of the WSN can be obtained by comparing the decision metric to the pre-selected
threshold. In the case of our interest, the decision metric (or decision variable) is
the variance of the RSSI and LQI of the received packets on that link. Let u(n),
i(n) and x(n) be the sequences (of N samples) representing, respectively, the (useful)
transmitted signal, the interference affecting the communication in the network, and
the received signal. Since node-related packet dropping attacks do not change the
signal statistics, the problem can be formulated as follows:
H0 : x(n) = u(n); H1 : x(n) = u(n) + i(n)

(7.1)

Then, assuming that the signal and the interference are zero-mean, mutually independent random processes, the two hypotheses result in:
H0 : 2x = 2u ; H1 : 2x = 2u + 2i
where

2
u

and

2
i

(7.2)

are the variances of the useful signal and the interference respec-

tively, while 2x is the variance of the received signal. The variance 2x can be the variance
of either the received RSSI values or of the LQI values. For the sake of the compactness, in what follows we refer only to the test in terms of RSSI variance. The same
considerations apply to the LQI case. Now, the estimation of the variance of the
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received RSSI values is used as the testing variable for discriminating about the presence of a packet drop or interference attacks. The new testing variable is estimated
according to the following expression:
N
1 X
Ẑ =
x(n) − E[x]2
N n=1

(7.3)

Then, considering a threshold η, the test is finally formulated as follows:
Packet drop attack: Z < hatη; Interference attack: Z >= hatη
This means that, if the testing variable is greater than the threshold value (η̂),
then the algorithm decides for the hypothesis H1 (i.e. interference attack), otherwise
the choice is for the hypothesis H0 (i.e. packet drop attack). Finally, the testing
variable in 7.2.2 is asymptotically (N → inf) Gaussian as a direct consequence of the
central limit theorem. Hence, the test threshold can be asymptotically tuned from
a straightforward evaluation of the Gaussian integral for a fixed probability of false
alarm, under the null-hypothesis [193]:
q

η = E[Ẑ] +
2 · var[Ẑ] · erf −1 (1 − 2PF A )

(7.4)

where E[Ẑ] and var[Ẑ] denote the expectation and variance of the testing variable,
respectively, while erf −1 (·) is the well-known (inverse of the) complementary error
function. It has to be noted that the time-consuming threshold setting stage is usually
performed off-line (i.e. during the deployment of the network, when no attacks are
occurring). Then, the thresholds are pre-computed and stored on look-up tables for
several SNR values. Finally, the probability of detection PD is determined in the H1
hypothesis as:




E[Ẑ]

PD = 1/2 + 1/2 · erf −η + q
2 · var[Ẑ]

(7.5)
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7.3 Evaluation Results
In this section, we report experimental results validating our theoretical approach
and assessing the efficiency of the proposed profiling technique. The WSN setup
consists of 16 TelosB sensors placed in a 4x4 grid. These nodes use the CC2420 radio
chip, natively providing the RSSI and LQI measurements for each received packet.
In our experiments, we have collected a large amount of real sensors data under
two operating scenarios of interest. In the first scenario, the WSN works properly
without any interference (H0 hypothesis); in the second scenario, a sensor acting as a
jammer introduces different levels of interference in the WSN communications. The
interference varied from low, to medium and high values in order to collect data at
several signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) of practical interest. We have first estimated the
variance of the received RSSI and LQI parameters according to 7.2.2, and then tuned
the optimal theoretical threshold using 7.2.2.
It is important to mention that the number of testing variables, used to estimate
the mean and variance in 7.2.2, directly impacts on the threshold tuning. More testing

(a) RSSI variance

(b) LQI variance

Figure 7.1. Theoretical (Theor.) and experimental (Sim.) probability
of detection of the proposed method for several values of SNR and
different false alarm probabilities exploiting: a) the RSSI variance; b)
the LQI variance. Simulation (dotted lines); theory (solid lines).
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variables allow one to set a finer threshold corresponding to the PF A targets (according
to the CFAR procedure), while fewer testing variables result in a rougher threshold
setting with an actual PF A not according to the CFAR procedure. We thus decided
to work with 1000 testing variables, estimating the variance of the received RSSI/LQI
values over N = 1000 samples, since this value represents a reasonable trade-off between test performance and accuracy. Then, we have evaluated the performance of
our test for three different false alarm probabilities (i.e. PF A = 10−2 , PF A = 10−3 ,
and PF A = 10−4 ). We have evaluated PD both analytically, i.e. using 7.2.2, and experimentally. Figure 7.1 shows the performance of our profiling technique in terms of
the detection probability of an interference attack. In particular, Figure 7.1(a) refers
to the observations of the RSSI variance, while Figure 7.1(b) illustrates the case of
the LQI variance. The simulation results (dotted lines) well match the theoretical
ones (solid lines), thus validating the correctness of the mathematical analysis and
assumptions. As the SNR increases (from −5 dB to 15 dB, i.e. the attacker changes
the interference level from high to medium-low interference), the performance of the
proposed FGA technique decreases, as expected. In fact, if the level of the interference by the attacker (or jammer) is too low, it becomes impossible for the sensor to
discriminate between interference and a packet drop attack. However, notice that
we are able to obtain a true detection (higher than 90%) in the presence of a low
interference (at about SNR = 3 − 4 dB), even at very low false alarm probability (i.e.
PF A = 10−4 ).
Finally, in order to fully assess the performance of our profiling method, we have
investigated how the detection and false alarm probabilities relate to each other.
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve illustrates the performance of our
binary profiling method as its discrimination threshold is varied. The ROC curve
is created by plotting the detection probability against the false alarm probability
at various threshold settings. Ideally, all the ROC curves must be above the line
PD = PF A (bisector) and concave downward. Paradoxically, if they were not, a
randomized test would be better. The best performing detector presents the minimum
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(a) RSSI variance

(b) LQI variance

Figure 7.2. Theoretical ROC curves for several values of SNR exploiting: a) the RSSI variance; b) the LQI variance.

distance from the ideal point (PD = 100% and PF A = 0%) in its ROC curve. An
effective operating point is just the point of the curve near such an optimum case.
Figure 7.2 shows the theoretical ROC curves, i.e. PD vs. PF A , of our profiling
technique for several values of the SNR. In particular, Figure 7.2(a) refers to using
the RSSI variance for the test, while Figure 7.2(b) refers to the use of the LQI variancebased test. For the sake of the simplicity, only the theoretical curves are reported
in Figure 7.2, since the experimental data again perfectly overlap the theoretical
ones. It is interesting to note that our method is able to identify a true detection
(with a PD > 90%) even in the presence of an interference attack with a SNR of
7 dB, allowing the target PF A to increase from 10−4 to 10−2 . In other words, our
test needs to work with lower SNR values, to maintain the same level of detection,
thus decreasing the false alarm rate. As we can see from the previous graphs, larger
detection probabilities are achieved also in the presence of (low-power) interference
attacks, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of our test for fine-grained diagnosis of
packet losses in wireless sensor networks.
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7.4 Summary
This chapter presented an approach that builds a statistical model for optimallyaccurate fine-grained analysis of the underlying causes of packet losses in WSNs,
whether node- or link-related. Our model exploits the variances of RSSI and LQI
to determine an individual, optimal detection threshold for each link. Unlike other
techniques such as Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and Nave Bayes, our approach
is extremely fast and requires less computational resources, allowing implementing it
on the sensors. In addition, the proposed approach allows us to have control on the
PF A through the CFAR criterion. Extensive MATLAB simulations, based on real
sensor data, validated the accuracy of our model and the optimality of its system
parameters under the constant false alarm rate criterion.
With all the accurate diagnostic information on the detected security incidents,
it is possible to enact an effective recovery. However, automating such response is a
challenging task, and we address this issue in the work presented in the next chapter.
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8 A SYSTEM FOR RESPONSE AND PREVENTION OF SECURITY
INCIDENTS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
It is vital that WSNs services be continuously provided even in face of anomalies or
attacks, and to effectively recover from attacks without significant interruption. Detection alone is not enough, but the monitoring and diagnostic techniques presented
in the previous chapters provide crucial information useful to quickly react to the
attacks, by taking actions that make the system able to continue its operations and
at the same time to block the attacks. We thus need response tools that would enable
automatic responses and recovery actions. The intrusion response systems developed
for other domains, such as database systems or distributed systems, cannot be directly used in WSNs due to significant differences in their operations, resources, and
communication. An effective intrusion response system tailored to the characteristics
of WSNs would need to fulfill the following requirements:
• Lightweight: The constrained resources of WSN nodes call for a system that
is lightweight in terms of both computational cost and resource usage. In particular, the response policies should be specified in a flexible but simple fashion,
so not to incur much overhead when selecting the appropriate response actions.
• Real-time: While the response system must be effective in ensuring that the
WSN operations are not interrupted by adverse events, it should at the same
time execute the most effective action for each anomaly or attack in a secure
fashion.
• Cooperative: To fulfill the two previous requirements, as well as make sure
that the response system itself is resilient to attacks, the intrusion response
system should have a fully distributed design. It should rely on local opera-
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tions and cooperative strategies, instead of heavy interactions with a central
authority.
In this Chapter, we present Kinesis – the first systematic approach to a security Incident Response and Prevention System (IRPS) for WSNs. The system is
lightweight, cooperative, and distributed. According to our design, each sensor in
the WSN is a watchdog monitor [29] and hosts both an IDS, and the Kinesis system.
Kinesis best works in static WSNs, which are a very common scenario for WSN applications (e.g., open-air deployments for agriculture domains, indoor deployments for
healthcare scenarios, ...). The Kinesis operations are based on a three-phase workflow:
• Detect. Through the IDS, the monitor observes neighbor behaviors, detects
suspicious incidents (anomaly/attack) in the neighborhood, and notifies Kinesis.
• Diagnose. While IDSes are generally capable of detecting anomalies and attacks, they might not be aware of the root causes for such adverse events.
Therefore, in some instances further diagnosis is needed. This task is executed
by Kinesis in order to have a better understanding of the events in the network.
• Respond. Upon being notified of an incident, and after acquiring sufficient
knowledge about the occurred incident and the current security state of the
neighbors, Kinesis matches the appropriate response policy from the set of response policies specified by the base station (BS). The system thus performs
the most appropriate response actions to pursue its security goal.
To support a flexible specification of response policies in Kinesis, we propose
a WSN-specific lightweight policy language based on the Event-Condition-Action
(ECA) paradigm [194]. In a response policy, a set of rules maps incidents and anomalies to different response actions to be performed, based on security assessments of
the suspect node. A monitor estimates the security level of the suspect node based
on the (i) incident detection confidence, (ii) suspect’s behavior history, and (iii) incident impact on the WSN. This strategy helps in selecting the most effective response
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action. We have surveyed the various attacks in WSNs and created a taxonomy of attacks (Figure 8.1) and a comprehensive set of response actions (Table 8.3). However,
Kinesis can generate responses against an unknown attack based on the anomalous
behavior the attack manifests.
To trigger the response execution corresponding to an incident, Kinesis selects a
daemon node in a neighborhood via a self-organized competition among the neighbors.
The competition is controlled in a distributed fashion by a per-node action timer.
The node whose timer fires first wins the competition and executes the action. Most
of the actions involve a transmission which is overheard by the neighbors and then
allows the neighbors to stop their action timers and to refrain from taking redundant
actions. Thus, Kinesis does not require any message exchanges for the response action
synchronization and has no communication overhead. A node’s action timer value
is locally estimated based on: (i) neighborhood size, (ii) neighbor link qualities, (iii)
time since its last action. It reflects the effectiveness of a node in executing the action
and ensures load distribution among the neighbors.
The distributed nature of Kinesis also enhances security. When a node is compromised, other legitimate nodes in the neighborhood can continue with the Kinesis
functionalities. Kinesis is secure in terms of policy dissemination and storage since
the BS specifies the policies, converts them to a binary code and disseminates the
binary throughout the network with a secure dissemination protocol [195].
Following, we summarize our contributions:
(1) We build Kinesis, the first (to the best of our knowledge) IRPS for WSNs able
to continue the WSN services despite an attack or anomaly and to recover from the
attack eventually. We present the design and architecture of Kinesis, as well as a
prototype implementation in TinyOS.
(2) Considering the context and constraints of WSN, we propose a lightweight
policy language to express the response policies. It enables low-overhead mechanisms
for response policy specification and dynamic response based on the suspect and
incident context.
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(3) We propose a distributed strategy to synchronize action executions in a neighborhood without significant communication overhead. Using a single timer to manage
the action executions in a neighborhood supports minimization of redundant actions
and load distribution. This design enhances the simplicity and scalability of the
system.
(4) We propose an alternative daemon selection technique that allows network
administrators to trade memory and communication overhead reducing potentially
redundant and conflicting actions.
(5) We evaluate the performance of Kinesis through extensive TOSSIM simulations. We run simulations for various application and network layer incidents involving single and concurrent/multiple attackers. The results demonstrate that Kinesis
always keeps data loss rate and transmission delays close to those of a typical attack
free WSN. Kinesis also achieves redundant action optimization, load balancing among
the neighbors, and energy efficiency.
(6) We port Kinesis to a real-world testbed of 37 TelosB motes and run experiments for (i) data loss, (ii) selective forwarding, and (iii) sinkhole attacks. Kinesis
performance in the testbed are consistent to the simulation results.

8.1 Background and System Model
8.1.1 Case Studies
An important application of WSNs is intelligent surveillance for smart cities.
Many traditional surveillance systems employ continuous video recording via CCTV
cameras, with severe shortcomings in terms of excessive bandwidth, storage space,
and constant human monitoring. Instead, the increasing need for safety in public and
private areas is pushing the merge of physical and cyber worlds into smart surveillance
systems [196–199]. Real-world deployments of such systems employ wireless sensors
– able to detect movements, changes in temperature or light, vibrations, and more
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– to activate the video recording, and independently and automatically alert a base
station about intrusions.
As a concrete case study, Libelium [200] – a company focused on IoT, Machine2Machine, and Smart Cities solutions – has deployed several WSNs for intelligent
surveillance and perimeter access control. Their sensors notify of intrusions over a
low-bandwidth medium in self-organizing topologies, and trigger video recording to
be streamed over a 3G network. As additional case study, SmartSantander [201] is
one of the first holistic attempts at smart cities in Europe, deployed in the city of
Santander, Spain. Among the various goals and solutions of this project, the add-on
European project EAR-IT [202] aims at using a WSN with sound detection to use
“intelligent acoustics” for detecting intrusions and danger situations, and notifying
the authorities.
In these intelligent surveillance deployments, an attacker might compromise sensor nodes and/or tamper with the communications in order to drop the alert packets
about his intrusion and cover his tracks. This can be easily identified as a concrete
threat for several different kinds of facilities that employ intelligent surveillance systems, from corporate facilities, to government buildings, to homes. The employment
of Kinesis in all these scenarios would ensure a quick response to data losses in the
WSN. Moreover, as we show in our evaluation, the use of Kinesis in a WSN incurs
a very small performance overhead, which would ensure to maintain the original application deployed on the nodes functional and responsive for this critical real-time
task.

8.1.2 Network Model
We consider a multi-hop WSN, consisting of a number of sensor nodes and a base
station (BS) that collects data from the network. A node is assumed to have more
than one neighbor node which can monitor its behaviors. The BS is secure and has a
secure mechanism to broadcast authentic messages and to disseminate code updates
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Figure 8.1. Attack graph

in the network. Sensor nodes are stationary after deployment, but routing paths may
change over time, e.g., due to node failure. Once after the deployment, the BS assigns
each node u a unique nodeID and a cryptographic key Ku . Each node also shares a
pairwise key Ku,k with each neighbor k and a group key Kg with all the neighbors.

8.1.3 Threat Model
We consider the BS as trusted, but any other node may be malicious. We assume
a majority of honest nodes in a neighborhood. The WSN maintains the standard
layered architecture of protocol stack which enables typical as well as WSN specific
attacks to these layers. The attacks are directed to impair the following resources:
(i) network, (ii) control and data message, (iii) sensor device resources, e.g. memory,
power, etc. Below, we discuss these attacks with respect to the target resources.
Communication Network: Jamming disrupts a sub-network or even the entire
network. Attacks at the link layer include purposely introduced collisions, resource
exhaustion, and unfairness in medium access.
Messages: In a WSN, all the nodes act as routers. Hence, an attacker may spoof,
alter, or replay routing messages to disrupt network traffic through creating routing
loops, changing routes, attracting or repelling traffic from selected nodes, increasing
latency, etc. Examples include sinkhole, selective forwarding, blackhole, wormhole
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attack. Additional attacks, like false data injection and delayed forwarding, may be
conducted to degrade data quality and utility.
Sensor Devices: To keep sensor networks economically viable, sensor devices
come without tamper-resistant packaging, which adds the risk of physical attacks,
e.g., physical capture, tampering, etc. An adversary can extract the secrets stored
on captured sensors’ chip and exploit software vulnerabilities. The adversary can
also clone the captured sensors and place them into network at chosen locations
(replication attack). Once these replicas gain the trust of others, they can launch a
variety of insider attacks. ID spoofing, e.g. Sybil attack, poses threat by enabling a
malicious node to present multiple false identities to the network.

8.1.4 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
A number of IDSes [27–29] have been proposed for WSNs that cooperatively detect
intrusions. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, overhearing is a natural
phenomenon in WSNs. Neighboring nodes overhear transmissions from each other,
even if they are not the intended recipients [203]. Utilizing this fact, Marti et al. [29]
introduce the watchdog mechanism by which a node identifies a misbehaving neighbor
node by observing the neighbor behaviors. Such a node is termed watchdog monitor
(a.k.a monitor). Each monitor observes its neighbors, collects audit data, and then
performs behavioral analysis for each of them to detect any suspicious activities. The
intrusions are cooperatively detected by the monitors based on their analyses, and a
set of pre-defined inference rules. The relationships between the symptoms used by
the IDSes and the various attacks are shown in Figure 8.1.

8.1.5 State Information and Notation
We now introduce the information used by Kinesis throughout its execution, together with some of the notation that we will use in the remainder of this Chapter.
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Each node maintains a set of state information representing its current knowledge of
the network and its security level. Each node u maintains a list of its direct neighbors
neigh(u) and link quality information L(u, w) with each neighbor w ∈ neigh(u). Also,
u retains a per-neighbor sliding window wk of size W to record a history of neighbor
behavior observations, used by u to update the security estimation and state of the
neighbors.

8.2 Architecture Overview
In Kinesis, each monitor hosts a distributed IDS and the Kinesis system. Through
the IDS, a monitor observes neighbor behaviors, detects suspicious incidents in the
neighborhood, and notifies Kinesis for automated response action. However, as we see
in Section 8.4.2, Kinesis depends on the IDS only for the notifications on good/bad
behaviors which is the basic functionality of an IDS. Hence, the specific design of the
IDS is out of the scope of our work.

Figure 8.2. Overview of the Kinesis architecture

Figure 8.2 shows the architecture of Kinesis. The background process Neighbor
Observer, with the help of IDS observations, records recent behaviors for each monitored neighbor and periodically updates the neighbor’s security status based on this
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history. Upon detecting an incident, the IDS reports to Kinesis the possible anomaly/attack, suspect node(s), and alert confidence for each reported anomaly/attack. A
Diagnosis and Filtering Agent serves as the first entry point for such reports. This
component, designed as an extensible pipeline, is responsible for ensuring an appropriate confidence in the IDS’s reports, as well as for further disambiguation of reports
concerning anomalies/attacks that may have similar symptoms but very different root
causes, as discussed more in details in Section 8.3. The Action Selector then performs
the security assessment of the suspect node based on the alert confidence, the suspect
behavior history, and the incident impact. Based on the security assessment, the action(s) to be executed are selected dynamically from the response policy matched on
the incident. Because of our incident-based approach, Kinesis can handle unknown
attacks based on the anomalous behaviors they manifest.
Given a set of response action(s), the Executor triggers and executes the actions. A
monitor competes to be the next daemon (i.e. the one to take the response action) by
setting an action timer inversely proportional to its action effectiveness and takes the
action when the timer fires. Note that actions such as log and analyze are executed by
each node independently, whereas for actions like retransmit data, redundant actions
by the neighbors should be minimized. In the latter case, upon hearing an action taken
by a monitor, other monitors in the neighborhood stop their action timers to refrain
themselves from taking any further action for that incident. Any communication
related to response actions or with the BS is handled by the Communicator module.

8.3 Diagnosis and Filtering of Adverse Events
IDSes typically associate a confidence value with each incident reported, in order
to indicate the likelihood of its occurrence. Sometimes, however, the IDS might
not provide a built-in confidence value, or such value might be very low due to the
indecisiveness of the IDS about an incident. Moreover, traditionally IDS systems
are able to detect incidents such as packet drops or data modifications, but not
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the underlying causes of such incidents. Reporting incidents to Kinesis with good
accuracy and a clear understanding of their root causes is critical to the selection of
an effective response action.
The Diagnosis and Filtering Agent component of Kinesis implements an extensible
filter pipeline (see Figure 8.3) that supports Kinesis in better diagnosing reported
incidents, raising the confidence level of the notified adverse event, and reducing the
number of possible root causes of such events. This way, when the notification reaches
the IRS, the system is able to carry out a significantly more informed, data-driven
decision, leading to a more effective action.

Figure 8.3. Overview of diagnosis and filtering pipeline prototype design

The first pipeline filter aims at back-filling the potentially missing confidence data
in the incident reports. The confidence value is useful in selecting a response action,
as it provides an estimate of the detection effectiveness of the IDS, as well as a
suggestion about the expected severity of the response action. However, if the IDS
does not provide a built-in confidence value, this first filter in the pipeline computes
the confidence value RC for the incident report as follows:
(i) For Anomalies, we consider RC = 1. This is reasonable since watchdog monitors
can correctly identify a failure or misbehaving event [29].
(ii) For Attacks, RC is computed as a false alarm rate based on the past performance
of the IDS about successfully detecting attacks. Thus, RC is computed as:
RC =

# of true attacks
# of attacks reported

Details of how Kinesis gets feedback about false alerts are discussed in Section 8.4.5.
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The second pipeline filter is the Fine-Grained Analysis (FGA) tool developed as
part of our previous work [189]. This filter is vital in understanding the root causes
that lead to an incident reported by the IDS. As an example, the IDS of a node
might detect a packet dropping event, but it might not know whether the packet
drop was caused by a compromised node performing a selecting forwarding attack,
or by the introduction of interference – natural or malicious – disrupting the wireless
transmissions. It is easy to see that, while both scenarios lead to packet loss, an
effective action against the former would be the revocation of the compromised node,
while an effective action against the latter would be the re-routing of traffic outside
of the interference-affected area. Therefore, reporting incidents to Kinesis with good
accuracy is critical to the selection of an effective response action. This strategy is
particularly useful when several attacks share the same symptoms as shown in Figure 8.1. The FGA tool is able to distinguish between node- and link-related incidents,
and can in the future be extended to discriminate among more kinds of incidents. The
tool profiles the normal conditions for each link with the neighbors by measuring the
link’s received signal strength indicator (RSSI), link quality indicator (LQI), and
the packet reception rate (PRR). The RSSI represents the signal strength between
two nodes, measured in negative dBm (typically ranging in [−100dBm, −45dBm]),
with higher values representing stronger signals; the LQI measures the quality of the
signal; the PRR is the packet reception rate. In ideal situations, high RSSI values
indicate a strong signal link and reveal better quality with high LQI and PRR values. However, the presence of interference induces noticeable changes in these values.
Our fine-grained analysis is driven to understand the components of each link profile
along with the neighborhood of each node. Initially after the network deployment,
the stable profile parameters (RSSInorm , LQInorm , P RRnorm ) for each link are saved
at both the end-nodes. Upon the occurrence of an incident whose symptoms could be
attributed to both node- and link-related issues, the FGA tool compares the current
link profile with the stable parameters, and is able to determine the exact root cause
for the reported incident.
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Table 8.1.
Response policy language
<rules> ::= ’Begin’ <rule-list> ’End’
<rule-list> ::= <rule> <rule-list> | <rule>
<rule> ::= ’on’ <incident> (<condition> <action-list>)+
<incident> ::= <anomaly> | <attack>
<anomaly> ::= data loss | data alteration | data replay | ...
<attack> ::= unknown | selective forwarding | jamming | ...
<condition> ::= <condition>*|’if’ <incident> ’then’
|’if’ severity(<suspect>,<incident>) <op> (<value>|<range>) ’then’
<op> ::= ’<’ | ’>’ | ’⇐’ | ’>=’ | ’==’ | ’ !=’ | ’IN’
<action-list> ::= <action>, <action-list> | <action>
<action> ::= <conservative-action> (<suspect>)*
|<moderate-action> (<suspect>)*
|<aggressive-action> (<suspect>)*
<aggressive-action> :: = revoke | reauthenticate | rekey | ...
<moderate-action> ::= retransmit data | trigger data authentication | ...
<conservative-action> ::= nop | analyze | alert | ...
<suspect> ::= <digit>+ | <literal> (<literal>*<digit>*)*
<range> ::= (’[’|’(’) <value>–<value> (’)’|’]’)
<value> ::= <digit> | <digit>+. <digit>+
<digit> ::= [’0’-’9’]
<literal> ::= [’A’-’Z”a’-’z’]

8.4 The Response Policy Language and Engine
In this section, we present the Kinesis policy language, and how Kinesis selects
and executes appropriate response actions to incidents and anomalies.

8.4.1 Policy Language
A response policy is defined on an incident and specifies actions for different
security estimations, based on various conditions on the incident and the suspect.
The response policies are specified as a set of rules, expressed with the grammar
in Table 8.1. The terms within quotes ’ ’ are static tokens and the italics represent
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functions. The main construct of the language is <rule> which defines the response
policy corresponding to an attack or anomaly.
Through a detailed analysis of the various attacks in WSNs and corresponding
recovery actions, we have identified a comprehensive set of response actions, listed in
Table 8.3. The actions are categorized into three classes:
• Conservative: Low severity actions that may help a monitor in more precise
attack detection or in not executing erroneous responses, but cannot prevent or
recover from attacks.
• Moderate: Actions intended to preserve the WSN services under failures or
attacks.
• Aggressive: High severity responses executed to recover from an attack and to
prevent further malicious attempts. These actions may be executed by local
sensors or may require help from the BS to execute them.
Note that the policy language of Kinesis allows for the use of generic symptoms as
triggers, e.g. “data loss”, as well as anomalous behaviors detected by the IDS but
not identified as a specific attack, i.e. “unknown”. This lets Kinesis take action even
in face of attacks that were not entirely diagnosed or detected, but that still require
action to maintain the network functionality. The chain-like structure of our policies,
moreover, ensures that the rules will be checked sequentially, reacting to more specific
attacks when possible, and falling back onto general action rules as “safety nets” for
the WSN. While this might result in a less accurate response action to an unknown
attack, it ensures that some corrective measure is taken in all cases.
An example policy for data alteration incident is shown in Table 8.2. Here,
nodeID refers to the suspect node identifier.
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Table 8.2.
Response policy example
on ’data alteration’
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) ⇐ 0.3
then retransmit data
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) IN (0.3,0.6]
then retransmit data, trigger route change
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) > 0.6
then revoke nodeID

Table 8.3.
Taxonomy of response actions
Actions
nop
log, analyze
alert

Descriptions
CONSERVATIVE: Low Severity
No actions to take
Record auxiliary information and analyze
Notify the suspect node(s) or other neighbors/the BS about the misbehavior

MODERATE: Medium Severity
discard data
Prevent forwarding false data
retransmit data
Retransmits cached data
trigger reauthentication
Re-authenticate the suspicious node
trigger route change
Change route and notify others
trigger multipath routing Route data through multiple paths
suspend
Temporarily block the suspect node
revoke
re-program
re-key
flood alerts

AGGRESSIVE: High Severity
Black list/block the convicted node
Re-program the malicious node
Re-key the (sub) network
Flood alert messages in the network

8.4.2 Policy Matching and Response Selection
Since response policies are defined specific to incidents, it is straightforward to
match the policy for an incident in Kinesis. However, the action to execute is selected
dynamically from the action set specified by the matched policy, based on the security
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assessment of the suspect. This strategy ensures that Kinesis takes the most effective
action at any incident.
The security assessment of a node is quantified by a Security Index (SI). In Kinesis, a monitor continuously updates per-neighbor security state records based on its
observations of the neighbor behaviors. The SI of a neighbor is also updated on each
observation. If a neighbor shows legitimate behavior, its SI is updated based on the
behavior observations only. Otherwise, if an incident is reported (i.e. a misbehavior
is observed), SI is updated based on three factors:
(i) Incident Confidence: The confidence with which the incident is detected, denoted by a Confidence Index (CI).
(ii) Incident Impact: A numeric value of the impact of the incident on the WSN,
denoted by an Impact Index (II).
(iii) Neighbor behavior history: The continuous behavior observations and security
state of the neighbor, reflecting how much the monitor believes the suspect
node.
In what follows, we discuss how Kinesis computes these indices and then selects
the response action based on the SI.

Confidence Index (CI)
At the end of the Diagnosis and Filtering pipeline execution, the report of an
incident will always have a confidence value associated to it. We utilize it to select a
response action since it measures how effective the IDS is in detecting an incident and
how severe the response should be. The confidence value for the reported incident is
therefore used as value for the CI.
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Impact Index (II)
The II estimates the overall impact of an anomaly/attack and implies the urgency
and severity of the response action. Despite extensive work on vulnerability scoring in
enterprise networks [204], little attention has been paid to WSNs. A few mathematical
risk models for WSNs have been proposed [205], but they do not provide a complete
framework considering the WSN specific practical concerns. In this work, we propose
a simple mechanism to estimate the impact of an incident.
Table 8.4 lists the consequences of incidents to the WSN services. Based on the
priority of the WSN, the BS assigns static scores to the impacts and configures the
nodes with the incident-impact mapping and impact scores. On receiving a report of
incident x, Kinesis computes the incident impact as:
Pn
k

I (x) =

j=0

impactkx [j] × rk [j]
Pn k
j=0 r [j]

(8.1)

where k is the type of impact, n is the total number of k-type impacts, impactkx is
an n-length array of k-type impacts for incident x where impactkx [j] = 1 means that
the incident has j-th impact, and rk is an array of impact scores associated with
the k-type impacts. Using Eq. 8.1, Kinesis computes the Data Impact (I d ), Network
Impact (I n ), Node Impact (I s ) of the incident and then the II as follows:
II(x) = βd × I d (x) + βn × I n (x) + βs × I s (x)

(8.2)

where, the coefficients βd , βn , βs ≥ 0 are real numbers such that βd + βn + βs = 1.
Note that if the network administrator does not change the WSN priorities, the Impact
Index es are static and need to be calculated only once after deployment.
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Table 8.4.
Possible impacts of WSN anomalies and attacks
Data Impact

Network Impact

Node Impact

Data delay
Data unavailability
Data alteration
Data falsification
Network unavailability
Network disruption
Path unavailability
Node unavailability
Node misbehavior
Node malfunction

Neighbor Behavior Observations
The neighbor behaviors help a monitor assess how vulnerable the neighbor is and
how likely it is that the neighbor is going to attack. Hence, we consider the behavior
observations of the suspect node while determining the severity of the response action. Usually IDSes maintain the behavior history and trust scores [206]. However, to
conform with IDSes without such facilities, Kinesis includes a mechanism for recording information about the neighbor behaviors and utilizing ing this information in
computing security score and state.
To justify the accuracy of the response action, we utilize the history of neighbor
behaviors rather than the latest single behavior. Kinesis maintains a per-neighbor
sliding window wk of size W to keep track of the neighbor’s most recent W behaviors.
When the IDS notifies about a behavior of neighbor k, Kinesis pushes out the oldest
behavior from wk and stores the recent one. We consider two types of behaviors:
• Service Behavior : How trustworthy a neighbor node is in providing WSN services, e.g., in-time packet forwarding.
• IPRS Behavior : How efficient and honest the neighbor is in taking required and
desired actions.
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Security Index and State Update
A monitor u computes the SI for each neighbor k ∈ neigh(u) on each behavior
observation for k and updates the security state accordingly. A node is estimated to
be in five possible states: (i) Fresh, (ii) Suspicious, (iii) Secure, (iv) Malicious, and (v)
Revoked. Figure 8.4 shows the security state transition diagram. After the network
deployment, a monitor assigns to all its neighbors the Fresh state with SI = 0.
For a pre-specified amount of time tf , a neighbor is considered to be in Fresh state
while its SI is updated based on behavior observations according to Eq. 8.3. The
significance of Fresh state is that a neighbor is given the benefit-of-doubt while being
in this state. Although the SI of a suspect node in Fresh state affects the response
selection, no aggressive action is taken against the node, i.e., the node is not revoked,
reprogrammed, etc. After a time tf , the neighbor moves to Suspicious or Secure state
based on its SI. A node in the Suspicious state moves to the Secure state if its SI
decreases due to legitimate behaviors. On the contrary, if a node in the Suspicious
state continues its anomalous behavior, its SI goes above a pre-defined threshold σ2
and the node moves to the Malicious state. When a neighbor moves to the Malicious
state, the monitor initiates an aggressive action against the node. A neighbor node
can also be revoked anytime due to the monitor’s own decision or action initiated by
neighboring monitors. In this case, the monitor enlists the suspect node as Revoked
and discards further request/data from the node.
We compute the SI of a neighbor k with two auxiliary functions f (x) and g(SI),
where f (x) computes the severity of an incident x and g(SI) returns a coefficient
based on the current SI and security state of k.




1



g(SI) = 1.5





2

; SI ≤ σ1 i.e k is Fresh/Secure
; σ1 ≤ SI ≤ σ2 i.e k is Suspicious
; SI > σ2 i.e. k is Malicious
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time > tf ʌ SI > σ1

time < tf

σ1 < SI < σ2

Fresh
time > tf ʌ SI < σ1

Suspicious

Secure

Malicious

Revoked

Figure 8.4. Security state diagram of a monitored node

f (x) =



0

; x is good behavior


min(CI × II(x) × g(SI), 1)

; otherwise

On each i-th behavior observation for neighbor k, its SI is computed by a monitor as

SI =





Pi
PW




f (wk [j])
i

, if i ≤ W

f (wk [j])−f (wk [0]))
W

, if i > W

j=1

j=1

(8.3)

8.4.3 Response Computation and Optimization
If the IDS reports a single incident corresponding to an incident, Kinesis computes
the SI, matches the response policy, and selects the SI based action(s) from the
matched policy. When multiple incidents are reported, we follow the same procedure
to select the action(s) for each reported incident and compute the final action set
as a union of these actions. However, each individual action set may be inclusive,
overlapping, inconsistent with respect to the other sets. Moreover, before considering
new action(s) for execution, we should also check inconsistencies with the on-line
actions. To resolve this issue for a limited resource system, we introduce the action
precedence graph.
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discard data

reauthenticate
data

reprogram

revoke

trigger
authentication

log
retransmit data

analyze

Figure 8.5. Example of an action precedence graph

The Action precedence graph (APG) is a directed graph which describes the
precedence relationship between actions in terms of their effectiveness. In such graph,
(i) each node ai represents an action, (ii) an edge ai → aj denotes that the parent
action ai invalidates the child action aj , and (iii) a black edge ai ⇒ aj denotes that ai
and aj are contradictory actions and on conflict, ai is executed. Thus the execution
of action ai invalidates all of its successors, and aj not reachable by ai means that
they are independent actions. Two actions ai , aj conflict if one can reach the other
only through a path of black edges. An example APG is shown in Figure 8.5 where:
the reprogram action overrules all of its successors; {log, analyze} are independent of
each other; and {retransmit data, reauthenticate data, discard data} conflict. We
assume that the BS pre-configures the nodes with all possible response actions and
the precedence relationships between them.
By utilizing the APG, Algo. 5 computes the equivalence, independence, intersection, and coverage relationships between two action sets. To compute the optimized
action set from n different action sets {A1 , A2 , . . . , An } (each specific to an individual incident), Kinesis runs a recursive algorithm initialized with O1 = A1 and then
computing Oi = cors(Oi−1 , Ai ) for i = 2, 3, . . . , n.
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ALGORITHM 5: : cors() - computation of optimized response set
Input: Response sets A = {ai }, B = {bi }
Output: Optimized response set O
if A = B then
O←A;
// A is equivalent to
else if ∀ai , ∃bj , bj → ai then
O←B;
// B covers
else if ∀ai , ∀bi , ai ⇒ bj or Vice-versa then
O ← A (or B) ;
// A contradicts
else if ∃ai , ∃bj , ai → bj then
O ← A ∪ (A\B) ;
// A intersects
else
O←A∪B;
// A is independent to
end

B
A
B
B
B

8.4.4 Execution of a Response Action
The response action executions are fully distributed. The low/medium severity
actions are executed by the monitors solely based on their own decisions. The high
severity actions against convicted nodes require consensus among the neighborhood
monitors. In the latter case, a selected monitor node (daemon) broadcasts a message
asking the decisions of other monitors, performs a majority voting on the collected
replies, and then executes the agreed upon action. Some aggressive actions, such
as reprogram or rekey, cannot be completed at the sensors. In such a scenario, the
daemon node notifies the BS with an authenticated report and the BS then performs
the action. In addition, even though some actions, like retransmit data, alert others,
can be executed upon a monitor’s own decision, they require interactions with other
nodes. In all these cases, a monitor has to initiate the action and take over all
the related responsibilities. Kinesis dynamically selects the most competent node as
the daemon to ensure the action effectiveness and to avoid the same node doing all
the work all the time.
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Selection of the Daemon
A node is selected as the daemon via a self-organized competition among neighboring monitors. The novelty of our scheme is that we do not need any message
exchange or special time synchronization among neighbors to manage the action executions. Each node in a neighborhood competes independently through a locally
managed back-off timer, called action timer. The timer value of a node u depends
on the action effectiveness, AE(u), of the node, which is estimated locally based on:
(i) neighborhood size, (ii) one-hop link qualities, and (iii) time since last action. Intuitively, if a node has more neighbors with good link qualities, it can interact with
more monitors and help minimize redundant actions. Again, if the node is idle for a
long time, it should take the action to ensure load distribution in the neighborhood.
Thus, the AE(u) is computed as follows:
AE(u) ∝ c1 · tl + c2 ·

X

L(u, k)

(8.4)

k∈neigh(u)
k∈neigh(s)

Here, c1 , c2 are real numbers, neigh(u), neigh(s) denote the neighbors of u and
the suspect node, respectively, L(u, k) is the link quality between u and the monitor
k, and tl is the time since last action by u. The higher the AE(u), the more effective
u’s action is. u joins the competition to be next daemon by setting the timer value
inversely proportional to AE(u). We add to this value a small random time r, in order
to ensure that, even when the action effectiveness values at two monitors are close –
that is, when the load balancing factor (i.e. time since last action) is the same in both
of them and the link qualities with the neighbors do not make a big difference – their
action timers still have different values. This additional small random factor helps in
making sure that the action timers of two monitors do not fire simultaneously, and
therefore only one monitor is selected as daemon.
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ActionT imer(u) ∝

1
+r
AE(u)

(8.5)

Thus, a node with better AE has lower back-off period and wins the daemon
selection competition. When the action involves a transmission and a neighbor k
overhears it, the node stops its running timer to avoid any redundant action for
the same incident and updates its tl and AE value. Kinesis could allow redundant
actions with a goal to enhance the system reliability. For example, suppose that
node u drops data packets and one of its monitors retransmits the dropped packets.
If another attacker v in the data flow path drops the retransmitted packets, then
redundant transmissions by multiple neighbors of u may help mitigate data loss.
However when v drops data, its neighboring monitors retransmit the data, which
invalidates the necessity of redundant actions by u’s neighbors. Our experimental
results also support the design of minimizing redundant actions as we see very low
data loss rate in the presence of multiple attackers. We investigate redundant actions
further in Section 8.5.

Consensus Among the Monitors
To execute high severity actions, the monitors consult with each other and decide
an action based on majority voting. After selecting a response action, the daemon
node broadcasts an authenticated status req msg in the neighborhood. The message
contains the (i) detected attack, (ii) the suspect node, (iii) the response decision, and
(iv) a Message Authentication Code (MAC) computed on the data using the group
key Kg .
Upon receiving the message, each neighboring monitor replies with an authenticated status reply msg, containing the local response decision. The daemon node
computes and broadcasts again the majority voting result. Based on the voting decision, the daemon may execute the agreed upon action or notify the BS with an
authenticated report to trigger the action. The neighboring monitors also observe
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each other to check whether they abide by the voting decision and otherwise records
a bad behavior for the misbehaving node.

8.4.5 Response Feedback
The majority voting decision gives a feedback to the monitors about their accuracy
in terms of detecting an incident and selecting the actions. If the severity of the agreed
upon action is lower than the locally determined action at a node, it implies a false
alarm and decreases the confidence of the monitor. Every monitor node keeps the
records of its false alarms and updates its CI. Note that we do not consider false
negatives here. Response feedback may also help assess the effectiveness of the taken
action for an incident. However, we do not investigate this direction in this work.

8.5 Redundant and Conflicting Actions
The ability of Kinesis of taking a single action per incident, as it would be ideal,
mainly depends on the topology of the network, among other factors. As our experimental evaluation in Section 8.7.3 shows, occasionally, multiple monitors simultaneously undertake an action for the same incident. The concurrent execution of
more than one action for the same adverse event can impact the battery life of the
monitor nodes as well as, in extreme cases, lead to inconsistencies in the network if
the redundant actions performed are both of high severity and conflicting.
In scenarios in which the network administrator has control over the topology
of the WSN, he or she can adjust the placement of the nodes to address the issue
of redundant and conflicting actions. Under such scenarios, the techniques used by
Kinesis to select the daemons discussed so far are optimal with respect to the security
goal as well as the resource constraints of the nodes. However, to deal with cases in
which the network administrator does not have much control over the topology of the
network, we introduce a daemon selection technique that allows one to trade some
additional memory and communication overhead for energy saving and consistency
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assurance in face of redundant and conflicting actions. It is worth noting that the
security goal of Kinesis remains anyway unchanged. The desired trade-off between the
efficiency of the various resources (memory, energy, communication channel), together
with the specific requirements of the individual WSN application, will let the network
administrator establish which daemon selection technique is more appropriate on a
per-case basis.

8.5.1 Conflicting Actions Analysis
First of all, we analyze all the actions supported by Kinesis in pairs, to determine
which pairs of actions conflict with each other. Formally, we define two actions as
conflicting if they obstruct each other in reaching the security goal of Kinesis, which
is to minimize data losses.
Table 8.5 summarizes the results of our analysis, with the ‘X’s marking conflicts.
For example, the actions discard data and retransmit data aim at opposite end
results. If the packet contains false data, then retransmitting it will propagate false
information throughout the network; conversely, if the data is true, discarding the
packet will not let valuable information reach the base station. So if the two actions
are performed concurrently by different monitor nodes, the conflict might make it
harder for Kinesis to reach its security goal. As shown in the table, however, there are
only 5 instances of conflicting actions. In the remainder of this section, we discuss how
the alternative daemon selection technique helps Kinesis in mitigating the potential
issues of redundant and conflicting actions.

8.5.2 Redundancy Motivating Scenario
To understand the reasons behind the phenomenon of redundant actions, consider
the network portion in Figure 8.6, with the edges denoting direct communication
between two nodes. Node 18 is an attacker node, while Nodes 7, 8, 9, 13, 14 and 29
are the monitors. When Node 18 drops a packet, all the monitors start their action
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re-program

revoke
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route multipath

×
-

change route

×

reauthenticate

retransmit data
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discard data

nop
log
alert
discard data
retransmit data
reauthenticate
change route
route multipath
suspend
revoke
re-program
re-key
flood alerts

log

nop

Table 8.5.
Analysis of potentially conflicting response actions

×
×
×

×

×
×

×
-

×
-

Figure 8.6. A segment of the attacker’s neighborhood

timers. In this topology, two different kinds of situations can lead to redundant
actions:
1. “Hidden Node”: When, for example, Node 7 wins the action timer competition, it retransmits the dropped data and Nodes 8 and 9 stop their timers upon
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overhearing the action. However, Node 29 does not have a link to Node 7, thus
it is a “hidden node” with respect to the action taken by Node 7, and will also
take action when its timer fires.

1

2. Disconnected Neighborhood Portions: Nodes 13 and 14 have no direct
connections with any of the nodes 7, 8, 9, 29. Therefore, their portion of the
neighborhood of Node 18 is disconnected from the other portion. In this case, no
matter which node in one portion of the neighborhood of Node 18 takes action,
the other portion will never overhear the action. The only solution is therefore
introducing an action-reporting mechanism among the portions. Node 3, even
though not directly interested in the action since not directly connected to the
malicious Node 18, could relay the notification that an action has been taken
from one portion of the neighborhood to the other. In case of high-severity
actions, it would be very important to propagate the information about an
undertaken action to the rest of the interested neighbors.
The alternate daemon selection technique presented in this section provides a
solution to both scenarios, at the cost of additional memory and communication
overhead. At a high level, such solution is composed by two parts, the first addressing
the “hidden node” problem with an analysis of the connectivity between monitors for
any specific incident, and the second addressing the disconnected portions problem
with an automatic reporting mechanisms that still minimizes the communication
overhead.

8.5.3 2-hop Knowledge
At the base of any solution against redundant actions, there is the need for each
node to be more aware of the topology of its neighborhood, as well as the connectivity
of its other neighbors, in order to make better informed decisions. Each node, when
meeting its direct neighbors at network startup, also acquires the list of its neighbors.
1

This kind of redundancy is not a sole problem of Kinesis, but of any overhearing-based solution.
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That is, node u will store the list neigh(w) for each 1-hop neighbor w ∈ neigh(u).
This is defined as 2-hop knowledge. Every node therefore is aware of the topology of
its network up to 2 hops away. Given an incidence matrix M representation of the
graph of the entire wireless sensor network, a node u knows all and only columns v
for which M [u, v] = 1.

8.5.4 Connectivity Advantage
Let us assume a node u wants to start the action timer after its direct neighbor b
caused an adverse event – e.g. dropped a packet. Let us define the direct neighbors of
node u that are also direct neighbors of b as the local action set of u with respect to b,
denoted as LAS(u, b). Nodes in such set are the only nodes in the direct neighborhood
of u that will be setting an action timer for the adverse event caused by b.
LAS(u, b) = neigh(u) ∩ neigh(b) \ b
Each node, knowing its 2-hop neighbors, can determine how well each of its direct
neighbors is connected to the neighbors of the malicious node b. We define the ratio
of neighbors of b that a node v is directly connected to as connectivity ratio CR(v, b),
computed as:
CR(v, b) = |neigh(b) ∩ neigh(v)|/(|neigh(b) ` 1)
In order to maximize the number of nodes that overhear an action undertaken and
thus minimize the number of redundant actions, our solution ensures that the node
that wins the action timer competition is the one connected to as many interested
nodes as possible. For this reason, we introduce the Connectivity Advantage Adv(u, b)
of node u over the nodes in the local action set of nodes u and b. Before providing a
formal definition, we informally introduce this concept. Intuitively, the Connectivity
Advantage parameter determines how well a node u is connected to the other neighbors of a malicious node b, that are the monitors for every incident caused by the
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latter. Since node u is taking part to the monitoring of node b, this implies that u
is a direct neighbor of b, and therefore knows the set of direct neighbors of node b –
whether they are directly connected to u or not – thanks to the 2-hop knowledge that
node b provided to node u at network startup. We formally define the Connectivity
Advantage of node u over the nodes in the local action set LAS(u, b) as a parameterized factor ranging between α and 1/α that will increase (or decrease) the action
effectiveness of u2 .
When a node u has to set its action timer for an adverse event caused by a node
b, it needs to calculate its own Connectivity Advantage. Therefore, it calculates
the connectivity ratio CR for each one of the nodes in the local action set LAS(u, b),
including itself. Once all the connectivity ratios are calculated, the node can normalize
them in the [0, 1] range as normalized connectivity ratios N CR(u, b):
CR(u, b) −
N CR(u, b) =

min

CR(w, b)

w∈LAS(u,b)

max CR(w, b) −
wLAS(u,b)

min

CR(w, b)

wLAS(u,b)

Node u will finally use its own N CR(u, b) value to determine its Connectivity Advantage as a value in the aforementioned range [α, 1/α] as:
Adv(u, b) = (1/α − α)(N CR(u, b)) + α
It is easy to see that a normalized connectivity ratio equal to 1 will result in a
Connectivity Advantage of 1/α, while vice versa a normalized connectivity ratio equal
to 0 will result in a Connectivity Advantage of α. Thus, this function fulfills the
requirements of increasing or decreasing the delay in the action timer depending on
the better or worse connectivity of a node to the direct neighbors of a malicious node,
in order to reach as many neighbors as possible with an action upon winning the
competition and therefore to limit redundant actions.
2

Remember that a smaller value for the action timer means more chances to win the competition,
and therefore the best advantage will result in a factor of 1/α, while the worst will be a factor of α.
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Based on Adv(u, b), the equations in this alternative technique for action effectiveness and action timer at node u for an adverse event cause by its neighbor b are,
respectively, as:
AE(u) ∝ c1 · tl + c2 ·

1
Adv(u, b)

ActionT imer(u, b) ∝

(8.6)

1
AE(u)

Here, c1 , c2 are real numbers, and tl is the time since last action by u.
It is evident that a node might not be directly connected to all the other nodes
in the local action set. This means that each node has only partial information
about such nodes, and this will affect the values that are calculated locally at each
node. This is a purposeful design choice that limits the information exchanged among
the nodes to a 2-hop knowledge in order to enable advanced calculations such as
the Connectivity Advantage, while limiting the memory and storage overhead of the
nodes. The algorithm is guaranteed to provide a local optimum that can be efficiently
computed without the need for interaction with the other nodes (apart from the initial
neighbor list exchange at network bootstrap).

8.5.5 Proofs of Action
Depending on the particular topology of the malicious node’s neighborhood, there
are cases in which favoring the node best connected to all the other neighbors of the
malicious node – by considering its Connectivity Advantage – cannot completely solve
the issue of redundant actions. This happens when no single node in the neighborhood
of interest is directly connected to all the others, or also in the more general case when
such neighborhood is divided in multiple, disconnected sub-portions. Here, some
nodes are said to be “hidden” with respect to the particular undertaken action(s). To
deal with such scenarios, the solution provided by Kinesis includes a mechanism for
automatic notification to the interested parties, via Proofs of Action.
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While it is important to make sure that high-severity actions are reported to all
the interested nodes immediately – before more redundant and potentially conflicting high-severity actions are undertaken by unaware nodes in a different part of the
neighborhood – for non-conflicting redundant actions, the main concern is the unnecessary consumption of energy. Since adding extra rounds of communication would
effectively defeat the purpose, Kinesis intelligently differentiates between these two
security goals and only activates the notification mechanism in case of high-severity
actions. In case of non-conflicting (i.e. low-severity) redundant actions, it is more
energy effective to simply let multiple actions coexist.
We now describe how this mechanism helps in reducing the number of redundant
actions. Let us analyze again the scenario of a node b causing an adverse event.
Several monitors will witness the event and will start their action timers (considering
also their Connectivity Advantage). Suppose that the timer of node v fires first, then
node v undertakes action A. All and only the direct neighbors of v will overhear that
action, and will stop their action timers. In order to solve the hidden node problem,
each one of these direct neighbors will then leverage the 2-hop knowledge in order
to check if any of its direct neighbor is hidden with respect to action A by node v,
proceeding as follows. Without loss of generality, let u be one such node. From the
point of view of u, the nodes that are hidden with respect to action A originated by
node v against the malicious node b are all those nodes w such that b is one of their
direct neighbors, but v is not. More formally, such hidden nodes compose the set
defined as follows:
hidden(v, b) = {w : b ∈ neigh(w) ∧ v ∈
/ neigh(w)}
If the set hidden(v) is not empty, and action A has potential conflicts with any other
action (as per Table 8.5), then node u will generate and broadcast an authenticated
proof of action to let the hidden nodes know about the action and prevent them from
undertaking redundant and potentially conflicting actions.
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Since this algorithm is fully distributed, the information will keep propagating
hop by hop to all the interested nodes, i.e. those that witnessed the adverse event
but could not overhear the action taken and might attempt to start one on their
own. It is important to mention that the number of these nodes is always bounded
by the number of direct neighbors of the malicious node minus 1, and depending on
the topologies might be much lower than this upper bound.
Algorithm 6 shows the pseudocode for the solution provided by Kinesis for managing redundant actions, composed of both the computation of the Connectivity Advantage, its use in setting the action timer upon the detection of an attack, and the
use of proofs of action to propagate information to the hidden nodes. The algorithm
has been optimized in order to only keep the bare minimum variables necessary for
the computation, thus lowering the memory requirements. For example, instead of
keeping in memory all the connectivity ratio values, it only computes in place the
minimum and maximum of their range in order to later on normalize only the value
for the node that is performing the calculation itself.

8.6 Implementation and Configuration
We implement Kinesis in TinyOS 2.x. We adapt the Skipjack encryption based
CBC-MAC implementation in TinySec [207] for TinyOS 2.x to compute a 4-byte
MAC while majority voting. The implementation is lightweight since it takes 0.38 ms
for Mica2 motes [207] and would take less time in the TelosB platform since TelosB
has higher processing capability than Mica2 mote.
According to the policy language defined in Section 8.4.1, policy rules are implemented as switch-case based on incident. This strategy optimizes the implementation. Security state thresholds (σ1 , σ2 ) are used to specify the severities in policies.
To compute σ1 , σ2 , we average over all the incident impacts, measure the SI with this
average impact for various attack rates, and select the values based on the tolerance
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ALGORITHM 6: : Pseudocode for the solution against redundant actions (at node u)
on adverse event(b) do
my ae ← computeAE(); // omitted as trivial
my adv ← computeAdv(b);
setActionTimer(my ae, my adv);
endon
function computeCR(v, b) {
common ← (neigh(b) ∩ neigh(v)).size();
common / (neigh(b).size() - 1);
}
function computeCR(v, b) {
common ← (neigh(b) ∩ neigh(v)).size();
return common / (neigh(b).size() - 1);
}
function computeAdv(b) {
for v ∈ neigh(b) do
if v ∈ my neighbors then
conn ← computeCR(v, b);
if conn < min cr then min cr ← conn ;
if conn > max cr then max cr ← conn ;
end
end
my ncr ← (computeCR(self, b) - min cr) / (max cr - min cr);
my adv ← (1/alpha - alpha) * my ncr + alpha;
return my adv
}
on overhear proof of action(p) do
overhear action(p.timestamp, p.A, p.originator, p.malicious);
endon
on overhear action(timestamp, A, originator, malicious) do
cancelActionTimer();
if alreadySeen(timestamp, A, originator, malicious) ∨ ! isHighSeverity(A) then
return;
end
hidden ← ∅;
for w ∈ my neighbors do
if malicious ∈ neigh(w) ∧ originator ∈
/ neigh(w) then
hidden ← hidden ∪ w;
end
end
if hidden 6= ∅ then
p ← generate proof of action(A, originator, malicious);
broadcast(p);
end
endon
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to attack rates. The particular set of response actions used to specify the policies are
determined based on the security goals of the WSN application.
As Kinesis configuration, the WSN administrator configures the sensors with the
incident-impact mappings, impact scores, and the real coefficients. The data, network,
or node impacts of an incident do not vary across different WSNs, hence the incidentimpact mappings are static. On the contrary, how severely an incident affects the
WSN services may well depend on the network application. Thus, the impact scores
and β coefficients, used to compute the II, should be set by the administrator according to the application requirements. However, we assume that these configuration
parameters are changed infrequently over the network lifetime.

8.7 Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results to show the performance of Kinesis
under various network settings.

8.7.1 Simulation Setup
For simulation, we use the TinyOS simulator TOSSIM. The network topologies are
generated with symmetric links. As a routing protocol, we use the standard Collection
Tree Protocol (CTP). In the experiments, we consider the following application and
network layer anomalies and attacks: (i) data loss, (ii) data alteration, (iii) selective
forwarding, and (iv) sinkhole attack. The policies considered for these incidents are
shown in Table 8.6. To detect incidents, we implement a simple watchdog monitor
based IDS in TinyOS 2.x.
To configure Kinesis, we assign equal weight to the real coefficients in Eq. 8.2, i.e.,
βd = 0.34, βn = 0.33, βs = 0.33. The size of the per-neighbor sliding window, W, is
set to 100. In Section 8.4.4, we have stated how we determine the values of σ1 , σ2 . A
data source periodically sends out data every 2 seconds. In each simulation run, the
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results are averaged over 3, 000 data transmissions. Unless otherwise stated, we use
the above default values in all simulation runs.
Table 8.6.
Considered response policies
on ’data alteration’
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) IN (0,0.2]
then retransmit data
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) IN (0.2,0.4]
then change route, retransmit data
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) > 0.4
then retransmit data, revoke nodeID
on ’data loss’
if severity(data loss, nodeID) IN (0,0.2]
then retransmit data
if severity(data loss, nodeID) IN (0.2,0.4]
then change route, retransmit data
if severity(data loss, nodeID) > 0.4
then retransmit data, revoke nodeID
on ’selective forwarding’
retransmit data, revoke nodeID
on ’inconsistent etx’
if severity(inconsistent etx, nodeID) IN (0,0.4]
then NOP
if severity(inconsistent etx, nodeID) > 0.4
then revoke nodeID
on ’sinkhole’
revoke nodeID

8.7.2 Performance Metrics
The metrics considered to evaluate Kinesis are:
1. Effectiveness: Since our goal is to minimize the impact of data, network, etc.
failure, we show the effectiveness of Kinesis from two aspects:
(a) Data Loss Rate at the BS : The frequency with which the BS experiences
the effect of an incident i.e. the rate of reception failures at the BS. In this
context, we compare the performance of our system with (i) an attack
free typical sensor environment, and (ii) an under-attack network
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to show that Kinesis can get back the WSN into a normally operating
environment, even under anomalies or attacks.
(b) Average Data Transmission Delay: On average, the amount of time a
packet takes to reach the BS since its transmission by the source. Here,
we compare the performance of Kinesis with an attack free scenario.
2. Optimization of Redundant Actions: The average number of actions taken
per incident by the monitors in a neighborhood. We also measure the rate of
redundant actions per incident as a ratio of the number of monitors taking
response actions to the number of monitors that detected the incident. They
justify our action timer design based distributed scheme to trigger the response
actions.
3. Load Balance: How evenly the response action executions are distributed
in the neighborhood. This is indicated by the standard deviation among the
number of actions taken by the monitors in a neighborhood.
4. Energy Consumption: The sum of energy usage by all the nodes when Kinesis along with an IDS is in operation.

8.7.3 Grid Network Experiments
We place 16 to 100 nodes in grid topologies of dimensions from 4 × 4 to 10 × 10,
respectively. The nodes are spaced 1.5 meter apart. For each network, a data source
and an attacker are randomly selected and the results are averaged over 10 runs. The
attack rate is set to 0.1. For concurrent attacks, we place a second attacker both in
the same and different neighborhood than the first one. Both attackers are equally
likely to make an attack.
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Figure 8.7. Kinesis performance for data loss of rate 0.1 in grid
networks of various sizes and for various attack rates in a 10 × 10
grid network.

Single Attack
First, we show the performance of Kinesis in case of a single incident (anomaly/attack) in the network.
data loss Incident: In this case, a node may be faulty or malicious and drops data
packets intermittently instead of forwarding them to the BS. Figure 8.7(a), 8.7(b),
8.7(e)-8.7(g) show the performance of Kinesis under data loss incidents in WSNs of
sizes from 16 to 100. As shown in Figure 8.7(a), Kinesis reduces the data loss rate of
a network under attack from [0.073, 0.103] to ∼ 0.002, which is similar to the natural
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data loss rate (∼ 0.0018) in a network without attack. It proves the effectiveness of
Kinesis both in small and large networks.
Figure 8.7(b) shows the linearly increasing trend in average transmission latencies
with network sizes. However, the average latency Kinesis adds due to action execution
is almost invariant ([39.03, 41.607] ms) in different networks. The delay incurred by
Kinesis is mostly due to the action timer. According to Eq. (8.4.4) and (8.5), the
action timer value depends on the number of neighbors and the link qualities with
them. In the experiments, neighborhood sizes vary from 3 to 5 in different networks
and the link quality values lie in [0.8, 0.976]. The combined effect of neighborhood
size and link qualities makes the action timer values almost invariant in different
networks. Thus, the increasing trend in transmission delays is mainly due to the
increase in routing path length with network sizes.
Figure 8.7(e) shows that Kinesis is not always able to take a single action per
incident as in ideal case. Occasionally, it triggered as much as 1.4 actions per incident
on average. However the rate of redundant actions, as shown in Figure 8.7(f), is
bounded by 0.11. The small standard deviation ([1.93, 8.41]) in the number of actions
by neighboring monitors, as shown in Figure 8.7(g), indicates the high success of
Kinesis in load balancing.
To further analyze the scalability of Kinesis, we measure its performance under
various attack rates in a 100-node network and show in Figure 8.7(c), 8.7(d), 8.7(h),
8.7(i) how well Kinesis survives, even for very high attack rates. As expected and
consistent to earlier results, Kinesis counteracts the data loss attacks and gets the
network back to normal operating condition. Figure 8.7(c) shows that Kinesis reduces
the data loss rate of a network under attack from [0.02, 0.52] to ∼0.0001, which proves
its effectiveness and scalability, even under higher attack rates. Figure 8.7(d) reveals
the linearly increasing trend in average transmission latencies with higher rate attacks.
Even average latencies introduced by Kinesis with varying attack rates are negligible
([12,223] ms).
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Figure 8.9. Kinesis performance for sinkhole attack

Figure 8.7(h) shows that the average number of actions per incident is ∼1.5. The
action redundancy per incident is bounded by 0.16. However, both numbers are
almost invariant with respect to attack rates. This is because the number of actions
depends on the link quality among the neighbors and the differences in their action
timer values. Figure 8.7(i) shows a small standard deviation in the number of actions
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taken by the neighbors, which indicates the effectiveness of the distributed scheme of
Kinesis in triggering action executions.
data alteration Attack: In this attack, a malicious node selectively modifies
the data value in a data packet before forwarding it to the BS. We run simulations for
data alteration attacks and find similar trends in the results as in data loss incidents.
Later on, we show the performance of Kinesis for concurrent incidents of data loss
+ data alteration, hence we do not report the graphs here.
selective forwarding Attack: In a selective forwarding attack, the monitor
nodes initially observe data loss by the attacker and hence retransmit the dropped
data. Once they detect a selective forwarding attack is occurring, the daemon issues
a state req msg to the neighborhood. The neighboring monitors reply with their
own action decision about the suspect in a status reply msg. Based on the majority
voting decision from the replies, the daemon possibly issues a revocation request to
the BS. The BS then disseminates a revoke command to the network, upon receiving
which all the nodes exclude the attacker from the routing path.
Figure 8.8 reports the performance of Kinesis under selective forwarding attacks
in networks of various sizes. In a selective forwarding attack, no matter whether the
attacker is revoked from the network or not, Kinesis retransmits the packet dropped
by the attacker. Hence, Kinesis reduces the data loss rate of a network under attack
to that of a network without attack. Figure 8.8(a) supports the claim by showing that
the natural data loss rate and the loss rate of a network under attack with Kinesis
enabled are almost equal.
Figure 8.8(b) shows an interesting and significantly different trend in transmission delays with Kinesis under selective forwarding attack. In this case, the average
transmission delays are much lower compared to that of data loss incidents and quite
close to the natural data transmission delays. To analyze the performance better, we
show the average transmission delays over time in Figure 8.8(c). Initially when the
monitors do not detect the selective forwarding attack yet but only observe data
losses, they retransmit dropped packets and thus add latencies to data transmissions.
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After the revocation of the attacker at packet 1755, there is no attack and hence no
delay is incurred due to response execution.
Figure 8.8(d) shows the average number of control messages (state req msg + status reply msg) exchanged in a neighborhood for majority voting. The state req msg
is of 27 bytes and state reply msg is of 35 bytes. The number of control messages
per majority voting is ≤6.2 packets. However, it is proportional to the neighborhood
size and thus does not vary with network sizes unless the number of neighbors varies.
Figure 8.8(e) - 8.8(g) show that the average number of actions, action redundancy
and load distribution measurements are consistent with the earlier experiments and
can be explained in a similar way.
For the selective forwarding attacks, the monitors always agreed on the decision
to revoke the suspect node. The average time to perform the majority voting and
execute the decided action is ∼ 96.4 ms, most of which is contributed by the action
timer value.
sinkhole Attack: To simulate this attack, we modify the CTP protocol to enable
the attacker advertising low cost routing path through it. Once the attacker attracts
all the data in the neighborhood, it drops data at a rate of 0.2.
In Kinesis, a monitor suspects a potential sinkhole attack upon hearing an inconsistent path cost advertisement, which results in an update of the SI for the suspect
but N OP as a response. During the subsequent packet drop observations, the monitors retransmit the dropped data and eventually revoke the malicious node when
the attack is confirmed. Figure 8.9(a) shows that Kinesis reduces the data loss rate
to ∼ 0.0015. At the same time, it keeps the transmission delays closer to natural
latency, as shown in Figure 8.9(b), due to the quick revocation of the attacker node.
Note that the sinkhole attack often created routing loop causing as high as 3.5% data
loss. By revoking the attacker, Kinesis made the WSN stable again.
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Concurrent Attacks
In the concurrent attack experiments, we consider two cases, two simultaneous
but independent attackers, and two colluding attackers.
• In case of two concurrent but independent attackers, we consider an attacker
causing data loss and the other conducting data alteration at various rates in
a 10 × 10 grid WSN.
As we see in Figure 8.10, Kinesis shows behaviors consistent with the single
attack scenario, in all the aspects. Thus, Kinesis is effective under concurrent
and high rate attackers.
• Next, we consider two colluding attackers performing sinkhole and selective
forwarding (SF) attack. When the sinkhole attacker is revoked, routing path
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changes enable data routing through the SF attacker which then drops data at
a rate of 0.5, and vice versa. Figure 8.11 shows how Kinesis performs in such
scenario. The irregularity occurring when the number of nodes is equal to 16 is
due to the temporary routing instability after revocations.

Varying the Number of Attackers
To further show the scalability of Kinesis, we present its performance in a multiattacker environment. Here, we consider data loss incidents and vary the number
of attackers from 2% to as high as 20% of the total nodes in a 100-node network.
Figure 8.12(a) shows that Kinesis still keeps the data loss rate lower than 0.009.
Due to Kinesis, the average transmission latencies vary within [122.33,189.46] ms, as
shown in Figure 8.12(b). The results are consistent to earlier results.
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Figure 8.12. Kinesis performance for data loss for various % of attackers at rate 0.1 in a 10 × 10 grid network.

Energy Consumption
We measure and compare the aggregated energy consumption of the WSN under
various incidents while Kinesis (as well as the IDS) is in operation and in an attackfree scenario where Kinesis is not deployed (baseline). For energy measurement,
we consider MICAz platform and use PowerTOSSIM z [208] plugin. Due to the

234
scalability limit of PowerTOSSIMz, we consider a 6 × 6 grid WSN with one source
and one attacker.
In a Kinesis enabled system, overhearing does not incur overhead since it is inherent in WSNs. In TinyOS, the radio stack requires a node to receive and process
all the packets transmitted in a neighborhood to understand whether the packet is
destined to it or not. TinyOS also exposes the Receiver [209] interface that allows
one to perform actions upon overhearing a message in transit. Thus, the only energy
overhead imposed to the nodes is due to the IDS and Kinesis operations. The results
reported in Table 8.7 show that Kinesis system incurs only a maximum of 0.06%
energy overhead.
Table 8.7.
Aggregated energy cost of the WSN without and with Kinesis + IDS
—
Energy
(×107 mJ)

Kinesis
data loss SF
1.320488 1.320482 1.321356
Baseline

usage

sinkhole
1.320480

The vast majority of the energy consumption of a WSN node is due to radio communications. Since in case of increasing attack rate – which for data loss events means
higher number of dropped packets – the communication rate does not consequently
increase, the energy consumption analysis results in Table 8.7 are representative of
any attack rate from the point of view of a single Kinesis-equipped node.

Action Timer Configuration
Action timer design is crucial in Kinesis and its configuration impacts the performance with respect to redundant actions and load balance. Hence, we vary the
coefficient factors (c1 , c2 ) in Eq. 8.4.4 and analyze the impact of timer values on
Kinesis performance. Since c1 , c2 are weight coefficients, c1 + c2 should be bounded
to optimize the timer value. If c1 + c2 is too small, the action timer fires frequently
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which increases the number of actions. If c1 + c2 is too big, the latency increases. In
our experiment, we fixed c1 + c2 to 8. Figure 8.13(a) shows that the optimum values
of (c1 , c2 ) in terms of load balance are near (3,5). In Figure 8.13(b) the optimum
values are after (4.5, 3.5). To optimize both the action redundancy and load balance,
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Figure 8.13. Coefficient configuration for action timer

Benefits of Diagnosis
We analyze how the Diagnosis and Filtering pipeline enhances the capabilities of
Kinesis to take the most appropriate action for an adverse event by knowing the root
cause of the incident. To do so, we compare the performance of the network with
Kinesis under the two situations in which the diagnosis features of the architecture
are turned on and off. In particular, we analyze the scenario in which the IDS detects
the loss of data packets and notifies Kinesis; however, such packet loss is caused, in
turn, by selective forwarding attacks and by the introduction of interference/jamming
by an external node not part of the network. In our evaluation scenario, only one
attack at a time is active in the network; one malicious node is programmed to carry
out a Selective Forwarding attack discarding packets with 20% probability, and the
jamming attack is able to drop up to 30% of the traffic. The FGA tool part of the
diagnosis pipeline is able to differentiate between selective forwarding and interference
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Figure 8.14. Node placement in an indoor 6 × 6 grid WSN

with an average accuracy of 92.5% [189]. We consider a simplified response policy, as
shown in Table 8.8. Data loss is the general anomaly that the IDS reports to Kinesis;
the diagnosis pipeline is then responsible to further differentiate between selective
forwarding and interference attacks.
Figure 8.15 shows the results of our evaluation, plotting various measures of packet
losses and retransmission over the number of packets generated and sent. In Figure 8.15(a) we can see the result with respect to the selective forwarding attack.
With and without the presence of the FGA tool, there is no data loss at the BS,
thanks to the retransmissions of Kinesis. However, without the FGA tool, the attack
is not correctly identified and the malicious node is not revoked: this lets it continue
to drop packets and requires Kinesis to keep on retransmitting the dropped packets,
wasting resources. On the other hand, the accurate diagnosis by the FGA tool leads
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Table 8.8.
Response policy for diagnosis scenarios
on ’data loss’
retransmit data
on ’interference’
if severity(interference) IN (0,0.2]
then retransmit data
if severity(interference) > 0.2
then retransmit data, trigger route change
on ’selective forwarding’
retransmit data, suspend nodeID

(a) Selective Forwarding attack

(b) Interference attack

Figure 8.15. Benefits of the fine-grained analysis on response effectiveness

to an early revocation of the malicious node, and therefore the packet loss is halted
much earlier (around packet number 15).
Figure 8.15(b) shows the results for the interference attack. This time, the data
loss at the BS, even though very small, is non null. The reason is that some of the
retransmitted packets are still dropped because of the interference in the most affected
areas. Tthe plotted lines for “Retransmissions” in the figure denote an attempted
retransmission, but not necessarily a successful one; for this reason, the graph shows
a retransmission for each dropped packet, but a non-null data loss at the BS. When the
FGA tool provides Kinesis with an accurate root cause for the packet loss incidents,
Kinesis is able to trigger the most appropriate action, that is, re-routing the traffic
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away from the affected area, and greatly limits the packet loss and the subsequent
retransmissions by the daemons.
We find therefore that, both under the selective forwarding attack and the interference attack, the accuracy of the diagnosis pipeline in detecting the root cause of an
incident greatly improves the effectiveness of the selected response actions, minimize
the retransmission and save resources, and reduce potential data losses.

Alternate Daemon Selection and Redundant Actions
We compare the original daemon selection technique with the the alternate daemon selection technique presented in Section 8.5, to quantify how much the latter is
able to limit the number of redundant actions. In our evaluation scenario, we vary
the number of nodes in the network, and carry out a selective forwarding attack. We
measure the number of actions per incident that the monitors undertake.

Figure 8.16. Comparison of the original and alternative daemons selection technique with respect to average number of actions per incident with varying number of nodes

Figure 8.16 shows the results of our evaluation. The alternate daemon selection
technique leveraging the connectivity advantage is consistently able to reduce the
number of actions per incident on all network sizes. In particular, the results average
to 1.18 actions/incident, which indicates that with this strategy Kinesis is almost
always able to carry out a single action per incident. These results confirm our
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expectations that more information about the connectivity of the monitors in each
individual neighborhood leads to a better informed decision in the selection of the
daemon.

Proof of Action Overhead
In order to determine the communication overhead of Proofs of Action in terms of
number of additional packets sent, we set up an evaluation scenario that stress-tests
this feature by simulating exclusively actions that require proofs of actions (i.e. high
severity or potentially conflicting actions, as described in Section 8.5.5) for different
network sizes. For each number of nodes, we vary the nodes acting as data source
and suspect node, and present averaged results. Specifically, we measure the number
of proof of action packets sent per incident, as well as the coverage of the hidden
nodes that are reached by the proofs of action and therefore became aware of the
actions undertaken (thus avoiding starting conflicting actions). Figure 8.17 shows the
results of our evaluation. For every network size, always 100% of the hidden nodes
are reached. This result confirms the theoretical expectation that each hidden node
should eventually be reached, possibly after more than one hop. We also observe
that, on average, no more than about 3 packets need to be sent to reach all the
hidden nodes. Note that for attackers with a small neighborhood, this quantity might
include some redundant proof of actions sent by nodes at the opposite edges of the
neighborhood, while for attackers with bigger neighborhoods, this number is more
influenced by the number of propagation hops that a proof of action needs before
reaching all the hidden nodes. For an increasing network size, the average size of the
neighborhoods as well as the number of hidden nodes does not grow linearly, and
therefore the number of proof of action packets does not increase linearly either. As
an additional note, while this evaluation is a stress-test that triggers proofs of action
for every incident, in normal scenarios many of the actions undertaken by Kinesis
will not require this mechanism to be activated; the average number of additional
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Figure 8.17. Evaluation of the proof of action overhead

packets over the lifetime of the WSN is therefore bound to be significantly low. We
can see, then, that the mechanism of proofs of action has a quite low overhead, while
still providing benefits in case of potentially conflicting actions.

Scalability
In the design of Kinesis, each node only maintains state about its direct neighbors. Therefore, the absolute scale of the network does not affect the practicality
of the system; instead, the relevant scalability factor is the average neighborhood
size, which however is physically bound to reasonably small sizes and entirely independent from the total scale of the WSN. Nevertheless, we evaluate the performance
of Kinesis in a large-scale WSN of 529 nodes (a grid of 23x23 nodes) carrying out
a selective forwarding attack with increasing attack rates (from 5% to 40%). Figure 8.18 shows the results. The baseline – with no attacks – is slightly lower than
in smaller-scale networks, as routing becomes more complicated due to loop-induced
queue overflows, mutual interference on multi-path duplications, no-ack drops, and
more [210]. Nevertheless, across all attack rates, Kinesis maintains the network functional by guaranteeing a Packet Delivery Ratio comparable to that in absence of
attacks (averaging at 90.5%) even in case of a very large network.
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Figure 8.18. Evaluation of the scalability of Kinesis in a large-scale
WSN with increasing attack rate.

8.8 Testbed Evaluation
We ported the Kinesis implementation to the TelosB platform and placed batterypowered TelosB motes in an indoor environment. Our motes have a 8 MHz TI MSP430
microcontroller, 2.4 GHz radio, 10 KB RAM, and 48 KB ROM. We ran experiments
for data loss, selective forwarding, and sinkhole attacks and use the same metrics as
in simulation for performance evaluation. The results of the experiments are averaged
over 1500 packets.

8.8.1 Experimental Setup
We build a 6 × 6 grid WSN, consisting of 36 TelosB motes, in a 160 × 200 cm2
indoor environment. Figure 8.14 shows the coordinates of the network nodes, labeled
from 2 to 37. Node 10 is the source, which sends data every 1 second.
We controlled the transmission power of motes to ensure multi-hop communication. A special mote, labeled as node 1, is set to the root node. For performance
analysis, the root collects statistics on the number of data and action packets transmitted, number of actions per incident, transmission delays and passes these data to
a laptop through serial forwarder.
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8.8.2 Kinesis Performance
Below, we present the testbed performance of Kinesis for data loss, selectiveforwarding, and sinkhole incidents. For the first two incidents, we set node 16 as
the attacker.
data loss Incident: We evaluate the performance of Kinesis under various rates
of data loss incidents. Figure 8.19(a) shows that Kinesis reduces the data loss rate
of the WSN under attack from [0.1, 0.51] to ≤ 0.0015, similar to the natural data
loss rate. The average transmission delays when Kinesis is in operation vary within
[97.5, 260.4] ms, as shown in Figure 8.19(b). Kinesis triggers on average [1.28, 1.97]
actions per incident. Thus the testbed performance of Kinesis is consistent to that in
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Figure 8.19. Testbed performance of Kinesis for data loss incidents
of various rates in a 6 × 6 grid WSN.

selective forwarding (SF) Attack: Table 8.9 summarizes the performance
of Kinesis under SF attack, where the attacker drops packets at a rate of 0.4 and
is revoked at packet 604. Hence there is no attack and Kinesis actions afterwards,
which keeps the average transmission delays much lower compared to that of data loss
incidents.
sinkhole Attack: We conduct two sets of sinkhole attack experiments, setting
two different nodes 21 and 22 as attackers. Once an attacker is able to attract
surrounding data packets, it drops data at a rate of 0.2. The performance results of
Kinesis are presented in Table 8.10.
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Table 8.9.
Testbed performance of Kinesis on SF attack
Data loss rate
Avg. transmission delay (ms)
Avg. actions per incident

Ideal
0.0008
32.89
N/A

SF
0.064
N/A
N/A

Kinesis + SF
0.0008
61.11
1.6875

Table 8.10.
Testbed performance of Kinesis on sinkhole

Data loss rate
Avg. transmission delay (ms)
Avg. actions per
incident

Ideal
sinkhole
Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 1 Exp 2
0.011 0.086 0.015 0.20
71.17 113.03 N/A
N/A

Kinesis
Exp 1
0.011
75.27

+ sinkhole
Exp 2
0.086
177.36

N/A

1

1.604

N/A

N/A

N/A

The results of experiment 1 are quite similar to simulation results. The attacker is
revoked at packet 158. It is to be noted that the sinkhole attack in this case created
routing loops due to low cost path advertisements by the attacker and thus resulted
in data loss. However, Kinesis took a quick response action to revoke the attacker,
which brought back the routing stability and helped keep the data loss rate minimal.
In experiment 2, we see comparatively higher data reception failure and transmission delay at the BS. This is due to the routing instability created when Kinesis
revoked the attacker at packet 376. Consequently, some packets were lost while a few
others needed unusually longer time to reach the BS until a stable routing path was
re-established.
Energy Consumption: Due to the difficulty of measuring energy directly on the
sensor hardware [73], we adopt the energy model proposed by Polastre et al. [74] to
estimate the energy cost in testbed. The energy cost of a node is estimated as a sum
of energy usage due to sensing, transmission, and reception. The energy for a type of
operation is computed by multiplying the battery voltage with the current draw and
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time spent (according to the TelosB datasheet) for the operation. The aggregated
energy cost of the WSN in case of baseline, Kinesis+data loss, Kinesis+SF are
4232.86, 4447.44, 4467.46 mJ, respectively. Thus, Kinesis (along with the IDS) incurs
a maximum of 5.5% energy overhead.

8.9 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss various ways in which an attacker might try to circumvent the security mechanisms of Kinesis, and how our system deal with such
situations.
Majority Voting. A set of colluding attackers may mislead the majority voting
to decide on a wrong response action. If the attacker(s), replying with a low severity
action, can affect the voting decision to be an action of lower severity than those
reported by honest monitors, it also makes them detecting a false positive and lowering
the monitor confidence. These attacks, however, will not succeed as we assume a
majority of honest nodes in a neighborhood.
A solution to deal with such attacks on majority voting is to set higher weights on
the local decisions of more trustworthy nodes. An alternative approach is to use
complementary methods with Kinesis to detect such attacks. For example, we may
use our previous work on lightweight provenance techniques that enables the BS to
detect a data dropping attack and identify the misbehaving node, based on the data
provenance, i.e., the identities of the source and routing nodes that processed or
forwarded the data towards the BS [211]. In case a number of colluding attackers
falsely report an honest node as a data dropping attacker and ask the BS to take
aggressive action (e.g., revoke) against it, the BS will find an inconsistency between
the reports of the colluding attackers and the data provenance. The reason is that,
based on the provenance information, the BS will not be able to detect any data
dropping attacks by the honest node. The BS may then conclude about a highly
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probable collusion attack and respond accordingly. As part of future work, we will
extend our current implementation by integrating such an approach.
Connectivity Advantage. The only drawback in the use of the Connectivity
Advantage for the setting of the action timer is the impact that it will have on load
balancing. In fact, it is easy to see that better connected nodes will typically win
more action timer competitions and thus perform more actions, resulting in a quicker
consumption of their energy. However, at the granularity level of neighborhoods,
limiting redundant actions as much as possible will concurrently save energy for other
nodes, thus balancing the global neighborhood energy consumption.
One may wonder whether a compromised node could collude with an attacker node
and pretend to be a badly connected neighbor (when exchanging the neighbor lists
at startup), therefore forcing the other nodes to always take action. This would push
more often the burden of taking actions on other nodes, thus affecting their battery
life. However, this attack is not a relevant threat. The reason is that, if a monitoring
node is compromised and it is colluding with the malicious node object of the action,
an identical energy-consumption threat would still happen in normal conditions if the
colluding node simply never took action (i.e. never let its action timer fire).
Colluding nodes. Kinesis is designed in such a way that it is not possible for
compromised nodes to collude with each other. For example, one such malicious node
might drop a data packet, and another node might pretend to take a response action
just to stop all the other monitors’ action timers, but not actually executing such
action. This scenario is not possible, since the action timer mechanism expects an
action to actually be undertaken in order to have the other timers stopped. In the
particular case of proofs of action, the collusion is still not possible, as we discuss
next.
Proofs of Action. We investigate the possibility that a compromised node, in
the attempt of colluding with an attacker node, might broadcast false proofs of action
to stop the other nodes’ action times. As we discuss here, the inherent mechanism
of proofs of action prevents this scenario from being fruitful for either the attacker or
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the colluding node. First, each proof of action must be authenticated, leveraging the
cryptographic primitives already in use for the other operations in Kinesis. This will
always connect a particular proof of action to the node that generated it. Secondly,
while proofs of action are propagated hop-by-hop to all the possibly hidden nodes,
they are bound to eventually reach at least one of the action’s originator node. Such
node would be able to tell that, while the proof of action claims that the originator
node performed an action, this never happened. It will thus be able to immediately
treat such false proof of action as misbehavior and take action accordingly, by marking
the colluding node as malicious and potentially revoking it.

8.10 Discussion
In this section, we analyze the characteristics of Kinesis from various aspects and
discuss possible improvements.
False Positives. A false positive occurs if an attack is detected when there is
none. In Kinesis, when a monitor observes an anomalous activity by a neighbor
node, it does not immediately conclude that this is an attack. It continues to observe
the node while taking appropriate response action(s) (conservative or moderate) to
mitigate disruption to WSN services. Thus, as long as Kinesis can keep the WSN
functional (e.g., send data successfully to the BS) and minimize the disruption, our
security goal is achieved.
When the security estimation for the monitored node exceeds a threshold specified
in the matched response policy, the monitor may go for an aggressive action, requiring,
however, consensus among a minimum number of neighboring monitors. It is highly
unlikely that all of these monitors will detect a false attack.
2-hop Knowledge Overhead. From an analytical point of view, handling and
storing the additional information about 2-hop knowledge (see Section 8.5.3) results
in some memory overhead, strictly dependent on the topology. In the worst-case
scenario, where the topology is a fully connected graph of N nodes – and therefore each
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node is connected to every other node – then a node will have to store N −1 IDs for the
neighbors of each one of its N −1 direct neighbors, resulting in (N −1)(N −1) = N 2 +1
values. This theoretical upper bound, however, is relative to the very extreme fullyconnected topology described, which is very much unlikely to happen in any real WSN.
The lower bound, on the other hand, is that in which a node is either completely
isolated (therefore storing 0 IDs of 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors), or only has 1-hop
neighbors (e.g. a star topology with a node in the middle and all the others around,
therefore storing only N −1 IDs for direct neighbors). An average case, more plausible
for a common WSN scenario, could be a grid layout for the nodes. In such topology,
each node has at most 4 direct neighbors, therefore 4 · (4 − 1) = 12 IDs need to be
stored per node, which is a very acceptable overhead.
Jamming. An attacker may interrupt Kinesis operation by jamming a part of
the network and disabling data communication. We implemented a jamming attack
following the method described in [212]. This jamming attack, however, results in no
more than 20-30% data loss, which is the same as the data loss in data loss incidents.
As part of future work, we will implement stronger jammers able to block the channel
completely and will investigate whether Kinesis, in response, can send a top priority
message to the BS through the border nodes.

8.11 Related Work
We discuss the work related to Kinesis in following categories: intrusion detection
and/or response system for wireless networks, policy specification, daemon selection.

Intrusion Detection and Response System: A number of IDSes have been
proposed for wireless and mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) and WSNs. The majority of these IDSes just raise an alarm or take simple response actions without following
any systematic approach. In a pioneering work, Zhang et al. propose a distributed
and cooperative IDS for MANET [213]. Each mobile node runs a local IDS agent
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that monitors local activities, detects intrusions, and may trigger responses. Neighboring IDS agents cooperate in global intrusion detection when there is inconclusive
evidence. The architecture is similar to Kinesis but is more focused on intrusion
detection and does not provide a well-designed response framework. Marti et al.
propose a mechanism to improve throughput in MANETs in the presence of compromised nodes [29]. They use a watchdog to identify misbehaving nodes and a trust
based routing path rating scheme to help routing protocols avoid these nodes. The
CONFIDANT protocol aims at detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes, thus making it unattractive to deny cooperation [44]. Trust relationships and routing decision
are based on experienced, observed, or reported routing and forwarding behavior of
other nodes. The responses in these systems, however, are limited to rerouting data
or isolating the misbehaving node.
Ma et al. [45] propose a self adaptive IDS (SAID) for WSN, where three agents,
namely monitor, decision, and defense agents, cooperate to defend from intruders in
networks. However, the response system in SAID does not follow a systematic approach and the responses are only limited to revoking or suspending a node. Also,
the agents need to update a central knowledge base continuously to update the node
reputations and to choose response agents accordingly. Hsieh et al. [214] propose an
adaptive security design to secure cluster communication via neighbor node authentication, secure link establishment, and send alarms to the BS upon an intrusion. The
mechanism proposed by Younis et al. [46] adapts the security provision to the need
of the application and the trust of the nodes in the routing path. These mechanisms
heavily depend on cryptographic operations and the counterattack is limited to routing path rotation or raising alarms. Taddeo et al. [215] propose a self-adaptation
method of security mechanisms. They always start with the highest security level,
which may be unnecessary and costly for sensor nodes.
Asim et al. [216] propose an architecture that organizes the WSN nodes in a virtual grid of cells. Each cell has a manager responsible for anomaly detection and
recovery. Their approach is not fully distributed and focuses on network failures and
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energy related issues, rather than on malicious behaviors or attacks. MALADY is a
machine learning-based system that enables nodes to use gathered data to make realtime decisions [217]. However, MALADY aims at the detection and learning process
rather than response to attacks. Mamun et al. [218] propose a policy based intrusion
detection and response system with a four level hierarchy architecture. Their intrusion response system has a general scope based on customizable policies. However,
their only responses are suspend or revocation of the suspect node, and are only applicable to the hierarchical architecture they consider. To the best of our knowledge,
Kinesis is the first complete system able to manage automated responses not only to
attacks, but also to anomalies with an aim to minimize disruption to WSN services
while natural error or an attack progresses.
Policy Specification: A number of policy languages have been proposed for
the specification of policies for quality-of-service management within a network [219],
privacy management for web users [220], access control in database systems [221],
etc. However, these languages serve specific purposes and do not consider the context
of WSNs or IRPSes, required to optimally express the response policies. Hence, the
resource constrained nature of sensor devices makes it challenging to utilize the typical policy languages used in general purpose networks, database systems, and other
domains. We propose a simple and lightweight policy language considering the IRPS
specific requirements for WSNs.
Daemon Selection: Leader election is a fundamental and well studied problem in
fault-tolerant distributed computing. Garcia-Molina [222] first proposed leader election protocols for distributed systems to elect a coordinator node which reorganizes
the active nodes after a crash failure and helps them continue the desired tasks. In the
context of wired and wireless networks, leader election has a variety of applications,
such as key distribution, routing coordination, general control, etc. and a considerable number of leader election protocols [223] has been proposed over the years. In
a similar context, many clustering algorithms [224] have been proposed for WSNs
to group sensor nodes into clusters and to elect a leader for each cluster for cluster
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management and data aggregation. However, these leader election protocols require
multiple rounds of group communication and often time synchronization among the
participants. In contrast, we propose a daemon selection mechanism that selects a
node for executing response action in a neighborhood via a self-organized competition
among the neighbors. Each node in a neighborhood competes independently using
a locally managed action timer. We do not need any time synchronization or
message exchanges among the neighbors.

8.12 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the first incident response and prevention system
for WSNs. The system reacts not only to the occurrence of attacks, but also upon
anomalous events, so that the WSN remains functional even if the attack progresses.
The system is dynamic – as it selects the response actions based on the suspect’s
security status – and distributed – since it does not require any central authority to
trigger the response actions. The simple yet flexible design of the response policies
makes the system extensible and thus able to handle new attacks. Kinesis is secure
with respect to policy dissemination, storage and execution. The experimental results
show that Kinesis achieves high effectiveness in terms of data rate and latency, low
redundancy in action executions, and, most importantly, scalability.
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9 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
As continuation of the results achieved so far we plan to investigate further directions
with the goal of developing security techniques for sensor systems and IoT. Hereafter
we present some of these planned research projects.

Prevention through Memory Safety Enforcement on Embedded Devices. As future work, we will extend our implementation of nesCheck to explicitly
address temporal safety, and design mechanisms tailored for embedded platforms to
enforce it. Moreover, currently, the node is rebooted whenever a dynamic check fails.
In the future, we will work on more advanced, programmer-guided recovery mechanisms, with the goal of maintaining the network as functional as possible even in face
of memory errors. Lastly, the scalability of the system and further optimization on
the overhead are a main goal. We plan to integrate Bounded Model Checking techniques into nesCheck to use advanced formal verification techniques for proving the
safety of some seemingly dangerous memory accesses, and therefore further reducing
the overhead.

Fine-Grained Diagnosis Techniques for Sensor Systems and IoT. As part
of future work, an interesting research issue is to learn and characterize the duration
of the interference to discriminate between a naturally occurring interference – such
as people walking – and attack-originated interference. Note that our goal for the
FGA tool is to provide information useful for response actions to prevent/minimize
data losses. Therefore, even when data losses are caused by natural causes, our FGA
can provide information useful to potentially reconfigure the network to reduce data
losses. For example, if interference due to people walking by is detected, the sensor
network could perhaps benefit from additional sensors deployed at different positions.
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As further future directions, we plan to extend the FGA tool to cover additional
events and anomalies, such as different kinds of jamming. We also plan to investigate
the use of learning techniques so that our tool can learn from previous attacks and
anticipate future ones. Finally, automated intelligent tools might help the network
administrator in tweaking the various parameters offered by the FGA tool to tailor
it to the specific features of the WSN of interest.
Concerning the statistical model for FGA, we plan on further evaluating the effectiveness of our approach on real testbeds, as well as comparing the system performance
with the performance of tools based using machine learning methods (e.g. neural networks or Naive Bayes classifiers). Moreover, we will investigate the potential of using
different PF A values for different links based on various criteria, such as distance or
expected QoS.

Mobility-aware Fine-Grained Analysis. The diagnosis techniques presented
in this dissertation with the FGA tools are effective in differentiating node- and linkrelated incidents and, in case of interference, accurately locate the source of noise.
However, our technique assumes a static network of sensor nodes. While this is
true for many WSNs, several applications of sensor systems leverage mobile nodes
whose position changes over time. This includes, for example, critical scenarios for
military operation, drones, MANETs, and VANETs. For this reason, one of our
research work directions includes enhancing the design of our FGA approach to make
it applicable to mobile sensor systems. Our initial design for a mobility-aware FGA
approach leverages a 2-hop knowledge of a nodes neighbors in order to construct a set
of geometric constraints that can help in localizing the direct neighbors with respect
to a fixed system of coordinates. However, the non-linearity of some of the parameters
used in the design of the FGA such as the signal strength indicator makes this a
hard problem. We will continue working in this direction, as well as investigating
other potential alternative design to tackle this important problem.
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10 CONCLUSIONS
Our research work aims at securing sensor systems and IoT through the development
of new security techniques, as well as the adaptation and enhancement of existing
ones.
We argue that the intrinsic characteristics of the sensor and IoT domain expand
the attack surface of computer and communication systems. Existing security techniques need to be analyzed, extended and modified in order to efficiently and effectively achieve security across heterogeneous and constrained scenarios, throughout all
the four phases of hardening, monitoring, diagnosing, and recovering. A thoughtful
leveraging of such domain characteristics enables an effective use of techniques that
are less suitable for traditional networks and systems, such as overhearing-based monitoring, whitelist-based anomaly detection, or whole program analysis. The solutions
and results we presented in this dissertation substantiate our claim, and compose an
overall security framework able to ensure security for sensor systems and IoT.
Overall, we identified and addressed four security phases – namely “Prepare and
Prevent”, “Monitor and Detect”, “Diagnose and Understand”, “React, Recover and
Fix” – with various security solutions.
The initial hardening steps before the deployment of constrained devices must
address the security of the firmware in face of memory vulnerabilities. We designed
nesCheck, a novel whole program analysis-based approach that combines static analysis and dynamic checking to efficiently enforce memory safety on existing embedded
software, without requiring any source modification.
Since protections such as that offered by nesCheck come at a cost, determining
the optimal allocation plan for security measures becomes very important for realtime, constrained systems. Therefore, we presented OptAll, a game-theory-based
method to compute the optimal security resource allocation plan through a Pareto
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optimization problem, taking into account the available security resources and their
capabilities, their fixed cost, and runtime energy consumption, how critical different
areas of the network are, as well as the risk associated with successful attacks on
them.
The operation of IoT devices and sensors must be continuously monitored to detect anomalies and attacks, but the heterogeneity of systems and protocols make it
a challenging task. On the other hand, knowledge about the features of the network
and entities, as well as about the security measures in place (provided by our solutions in the Prepare and Prevent phase), can be leveraged to achieve a more accurate
detection. We thus first developed a taxonomy to better represent the relationships
between IoT network features and related attacks, and then designed and developed
Kalis, an overhearing-based, self-adapting, knowledge-driven IDS for IoT able to detect attacks in real time across heterogeneous IoT systems.
While Kalis detects attacks to the IoT network, the exposure to the untrusted
Internet makes the devices desirable for botnets; accounting for the typical communication patterns of IoT, we designed a centralized router-based defense, Heimdall, that
prevents botnet DDoS attacks through a whitelist-based anomaly detection technique
tailored to IoT devices.
For the monitoring solutions we developed, it is critical to perform an accurate
diagnosis of the detected security incidents in order to provide effective response actions. For the important class of attacks of packet losses in sensor networks, we
developed a Fine-Grained Analysis (FGA) tool that leverages resident packet parameters to determine the incident’s root cause and, in case of interference, locates the
source of jamming.
As the accuracy of the FGA tool relies on the correct choice of some system
parameters, we extended this work with a statistical-based approach for determining
optimal system thresholds by exploiting the variances of RSSI and LQI.
The accurate diagnosis information provided by our previously introduced solutions make it possible to take automatic, effective response actions to security inci-
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dents in order to maintain the network functional. We therefore designed Kinesis, a
security incident response system for WSNs aimed at keeping the network functional
despite anomalies or attacks and to recover from attacks without significant interruption. Its overhearing-based distributed strategy makes the system efficient and
scalable, achieving load-balancing and redundant action optimization, while maintaining a fully-distributed design.
As part of our research effort, all the developed solutions fit in an overall security
framework to employ them in concert and provide a holistic approach at securing
sensor systems and the IoT.
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[70] Raimondas Sasnauskas, Jó Ágila Bitsch Link, Muhammad Hamad Alizai, and
Klaus Wehrle. Kleenet: automatic bug hunting in sensor network applications.
In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Embedded network sensor systems, pages 425–426. ACM, 2008.
[71] Philip Levis, Nelson Lee, Matt Welsh, and David Culler. TOSSIM: Accurate
and scalable simulation of entire TinyOS applications. In Proceedings of the 1st
International Conference on Embedded networked sensor systems, pages 126–
137. ACM, 2003.
[72] Victor Shnayder, Mark Hempstead, Bor-rong Chen, Geoff Werner Allen, and
Matt Welsh. Simulating the power consumption of large-scale sensor network
applications. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Embedded
Networked Sensor Systems, SenSys ’04, pages 188–200, New York, NY, USA,
2004. ACM.
[73] Vinaitheerthan Sundaram, Patrick Eugster, and Xiangyu Zhang. Prius: Generic
hybrid trace compression for wireless sensor networks. In International Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys), pages 183–196, 2012.
[74] Joseph Polastre, Jason Hill, and David Culler. Versatile low power media access for wireless sensor networks. In International Conference on Embedded
Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys), pages 95–107, 2004.
[75] Memsic. MicaZ datasheet. http://www.memsic.com/userfiles/files/
Datasheets/WSN/micaz_datasheet-t.pdf.
[76] Armin Biere, Alessandro Cimatti, Edmund Clarke, and Yunshan Zhu. Symbolic
model checking without BDDs. Springer, 1999.
[77] SoftBound website. http://www.cis.upenn.edu/acg/softbound/.

262
[78] Laszlo Szekeres, Mathias Payer, Tao Wei, and Dawn Song. SoK: Eternal war in
memory. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP ’13, pages 48–62, Washington, DC, USA, 2013. IEEE Computer Society.
[79] Jeremy Condit, Matthew Harren, Zachary Anderson, David Gay, and George C
Necula. Dependent types for low-level programming. In Programming Languages and Systems, pages 520–535. Springer, 2007.
[80] Edmund Clarke, Daniel Kroening, and Flavio Lerda. A tool for checking ANSIC programs. In Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of
Systems, pages 168–176. Springer, 2004.
[81] Heinrich von Stackelberg, Damien Bazin, Rowland Hill, and Lynn Urch. Market
Structure and Equilibrium. Springer, 2010.
[82] Rodrigo Roman, Cristina Alcaraz, Javier Lopez, and Nicolas Sklavos. Key
management systems for sensor networks in the context of the internet of things.
Computers & Electrical Engineering, 37(2):147–159, 2011.
[83] Lal C Godara. Application of antenna arrays to mobile communications:
Beam-forming and direction-of-arrival considerations. Proceedings of the IEEE,
85(8):1195–1245, 1997.
[84] Asis Nasipuri and Kai Li. A directionality based location discovery scheme for
wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings of 1st ACM International Workshop
on Wireless sensor networks and applications. ACM, 2002.
[85] Chanatip Tumrongwittayapak and Ruttikorn Varakulsiripunth. Detecting sinkhole attack and selective forwarding attack in wireless sensor networks. In Information, Communications and Signal Processing, 2009.
[86] Ferdinand Brasser, Brahim El Mahjoub, Ahmad Reza Sadeghi, Christian
Wachsmann, and Patrick Koeberl. TyTAN: Tiny trust anchor for tiny devices.
In DAC, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2015.
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